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ABSTRACT
Despite its recent advent, value at risk (VaR) became the most widely used
technique for measuring future expected risk for both financial and non-financial
institutions. VaR, the measure of the worst expected loss over a given horizon at a given
confidence level, depends crucially on the distributional aspects of trading revenues.
Existing VaR models do not capture adequately some empirical aspects of financial data
such as the tail thickness, which is vital in VaR calculations. Tail thickness in financial
variables results basically from stochastic volatility and event risk (jumps). Those two
sources are not totally separated; under event risk, volatility updates faster than under
normal market conditions. Generally, tail thickness is associated with hyper volatility
updating.
Existing VaR literature accounts partially for tail thickness either by including
stochastic volatility or by including jump diffusion, but not both. Additionally, this
literature does not account for fast updating of volatility associated with tail thickness.
This dissertation fills the gap by developing analytical VaR models account for
the total (maximum) tail thickness and the associated fast volatility updating. Those
aspects are achieved by assuming that trading revenues are evolving according to a
mixed non-affine stochastic volatility-jump diffusion process. The mixture of stochastic
volatility and jumps diffusion accounts for the maximum tail thickness, whereas the nonaffine structure of stochastic volatility captures the fast volatility updating. The non-affine
structure assumes that volatility dynamics are non-linearly related to the square root of
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current volatility rather than the traditional linear (affine) relationship. VaR estimates are
obtained by deriving the conditional characteristic function, and then inverting it
numerically via the Fourier Inversion technique to infer the cumulative distribution
function.
The application of the developed VaR models on a sample that contains six U.S
banks during the period 1995-2002 shows that VaR models based on the non-affine
stochastic volatility and jump diffusion process produce more reliable VaR estimates
compared with the banks’ own VaR models. The developed VaR models could
significantly predict the losses that those banks incurred during the Russian crisis and the
near collapse of the LTCM in 1998 when the banks’ VaR models fail.

v
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Value at Risk or VaR is a quantile measure1 to quantify the risk for financial
institutions. It measures the market risk of a financial firm’s “book”-- the list of positions
in various instruments that expose the firm to financial risk. Roughly speaking, VaR
measures the worst expected loss over a given horizon under normal market conditions at
a given level of confidence.
In a loose form, VaR calculation models make the following statement: “We are c
percent certain that we will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days”. The
variable V is the VaR of the portfolio. It is a function of two parameters: a time period
(horizon) N and a confidence level c. Thus, when we calculate VaR for a portfolio of a
financial institution, we calculate the expected loss in the portfolio’s market value over a
given horizon such as one day or two weeks (N) that is exceeded with a small probability,
say, 1 percent (1-c).
Accordingly, the quality of VaR for a portfolio depends on its distributional
assumption and its valuation model. Assumptions about distribution specify what the
VaR model assumes about the distribution of trading revenues --profits and losses (P&L)-

1

Other measures to quantify risk, in addition to quantile measures, include standard deviation, interquartile
range, and lower partial moments or shortfall measures.
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of the financial firm’s portfolio. It specifies as well what the model assumes about the
distribution of the underlying market risk sources upon which the portfolio’s value
depends. The valuation model specifies how VaR relates the portfolio’s value to different
shocks in the market risk sources, or the relationship between the return on the portfolio
and returns on the instruments included in the portfolio.
The so-called normal approach to VaR assumes that all risk factors in the market
are normally distributed and the portfolio is a linear function of those normally
distributed risks, which implies that the P&L distribution for the portfolio is also
normally distributed. Under such assumptions, VaR calculations become easy to handle.
VaR becomes a multiple of the portfolio standard deviation, where the standard deviation
is a linear function of individual volatilities and covariances of underlying market risk
factors. So all we need to calculate VaR is the variance covariance matrix and
information about sizes of individual positions to determine the portfolio standard
deviation. Then, by multiplying this standard deviation by a confidence level parameter
and scale variable reflecting the size of the portfolio, we obtain a VaR number.
The normality assumption gives “normal VaR” great advantages such as
tractability and informativity. Informativity includes translatability across confidence
levels and holding periods and informativity about expected tail losses, [Dowd (1998)
and Jorion (2001)].
Unfortunately, the normal approach to VaR does not always fit actual financial
institutions’ portfolios or actual finance data. On one hand, portfolio returns may be
nonlinear in risk factors, as in the case when the portfolio contains positions in options or
fixed-income instruments. On the other hand, normality is a very strong assumption for
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finance data, since many empirical studies in time series data, Bollerslev (1987) for
example, show that the rate of return of percentage change of many financial variables
are not normally distributed. It tends to be skewed and leptokurtic.
In response to non-linearity, authors use the Taylor series expansion or linear
approximation for returns to these instruments, and then use the linear approximation to
work out VaR. The simplest approximation produces the so-called delta-normal
approach. Delta-normal, by definition, is the first order Taylor series expansion of a
portfolio’s value with respect to stock returns. Delta-normal restores the linear normality
and makes VaR estimation easy. However, such a simple approximation produces an
inaccurate VaR estimate. Wilson (1996) argues that delta-normal approach would
produce reliable estimates for VaR for a small holding period or / and when the portfolio
has few option positions (close to normality).
To get a more accurate VaR for non-linear positions (options and fixed income),
some literature including Wilson (1994, 1996), Jamshidian and Zhu, (1996), and Zangari
(1996 a, b) use the quadratic model or the second Taylor series expansion known as
delta--gamma approach. Jamshidian and Zhu, (1996), Zangari (1996 a, b), and Fallon
(1996) report that their delta-gamma approaches improve VaR estimates tremendously
compared with delta-normal. Gamma, the first derivative of delta with respect to stock
returns, measures the curvature of the relationship between the portfolio value and the
underlying market variable. A non-zero gamma implies skewness in the distribution of
P&L of the portfolio. When gamma is positive (negative), changes in the portfolio are
positively (negatively) skewed.

4

The normality assumption of risk factors or P&L of the portfolio would certainly
affect VaR estimates since it depends crucially on the distribution of the tail. Thus if we
have a thicker (thinner) tail compared with the normal distribution, then VaR estimates
based on normality would be under-- (over--) estimated. Zangari (1996 c) discusses VaR
as a technique of risk management under departure from normality. He shows that VaR
calculated under normality assumption underestimates risk since the observed
distribution of many financial return series have tails that are flatter than those implied by
conditional normal distribution.
Generally speaking, with deviation from normality assumption, there are two
main methods to construct VaR: parametric approach (analytical approach) and the nonparametric approach (the simulation approach). In the parametric approach, an alternative
distribution is explicitly assumed instead of the normal distribution, and based on this
assumed distribution; a formula to describe the confidence interval is analytically
derived. The variance-covariance approaches that include the distribution of portfolio
return method, the delta normal valuation method and delta-gamma method fall under the
parametric approach.
In the non-parametric approach, no particular distribution assumption is needed.
VaR is calculated from the standard theory of order statistics, as in Kupic (1995), or from
Monte Carlo simulations. Under this approach, VaR is deduced from multiple runs that
might be representative of the possible market price outcomes. Chapter Two below
provides full description of VaR, VaR methods, recent developments on VaR methods,
and strengths and weaknesses of VaR analysis.

5

By definition, VaR estimates depend on the distribution of the left tail. VaR
parametric approaches that deviate from normality assumption aim basically at modifying
for kurtosis. A probability distribution with fat tails has a greater probability mass out in
the tails of the distribution, where large price movement occurs compared with the
normal distribution. Accordingly, VaR estimates tend to under-- or over-- estimate risk if
normal distribution is assumed, Zangari (1996c).
Fat tails in finance data come from stochastic volatility of the underlying market
risk factor (like stock returns). The size of kurtosis depends on the correlation between
volatility of returns and returns themselves (Duffie and Pan 1997), Das and Sundaram
(1999) and Lewis (2000). However, Bollerlev (1987) reports that actual market data are
typically found to have more leptokurtic compared with what would come from
stochastic volatility alone.
Another wave of literature including Bates (1996), Duffie and Pan (1997), Das
and Sundaram (1999), Lewis (2001), and Airoldi (2001) see that the other source of fat
tails in the distribution of financial data comes from jumps in the underlying risk factors.
New evidence from Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (1999), Chourdakis (2000),
Lewis (2002), and Chacko and Viceira (2003) find that stochastic volatility and jumps are
both significant in explaining the dynamics of stock returns for different frequencies.
Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (1999) find that non-affine jumps and stochastic
volatility are significant in finance time series data.
To account for kurtosis in the distribution of underlying risk factors in VaR
estimates, authors use different methods. One method used is to assume an alternative
distribution that accounts for tail thickness. Fong and Vasicek (1997) assume that
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changes in the portfolio value follow gamma distribution. Rachev and Mittnik (2000),
Khindanova, Rachev, and Schwartz (2001), Rachev, Schwartz and Khindanova, (2002)
use stable Paretian models for modeling the distribution of the P&L in the portfolio.
Another method used to achieve kurtosis is to use a mixture of two normal distributions
as in Zangari (1996 d, e),Venkataraman (1997), and Hull and White (1998a).
Duffie and Pan (1997 and 2001) and Gibson (2001), on the other hand, adopt
event risk (jumps) as a source of tail thickness. Duffie and Pan (1997) and El-Jahel,
Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) use stochastic volatility to achieve kurtosis in the underlying
risk factors for a portfolio with derivatives’ positions and they include the first four
moments in their estimation. Levin and Tchernitser (2001) account for tail fatness by
assuming time varying volatility and Levy Processes (stochastic volatility). Li (1999) also
includes skewness and kurtosis explicitly in VaR estimates. Many other VaR methods
utilize the extreme value theory (EVT) to account for tail dynamics and thickness2.
Chapter Two summarizes the literature of VaR techniques under non-normality
assumption.
One crucial issue in estimating VaR is estimating the current volatility of
underlying risk factors3 or the change in the portfolio returns. VaR normal models
assume volatility to be constant, since it is estimated under the assumption of normal
distribution. Hull and White (1998b) report that incorporating volatility updating into
VaR models improves substantially VaR estimates. Generally, VaR models use the
common estimation techniques for estimating volatility including historical volatility,

2

For a survey of such literature see Embrechts, Kluppelberg and Mikosch (1997) and Embrechts (2002).
When the portfolio depends on several positions, VaR estimates need estimation for the variancecovariance matrix and the correlation matrix. And with increase of the number of positions this process
becomes more cumbersome.
3
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ARCH/GARCH volatilities, implied volatility from option pricing, moving average
volatilities and extreme value theory (EVT).
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) find that VaR models depend on GARCH
estimation for volatility bound actual daily losses in banks’ portfolio closer than internal
VaR models used by banks. However, they find that even VaR models that depend on
GARCH models could not describe actual portfolio dynamics during the Russian crisis
and the near collapse of the LTCM in August and September 1998.
Eberlein, Kallsen and Kristen (2001) test for the impact of using different
methods of estimating current volatility in VaR models and find that the estimation
technique substantially affects VaR estimates. Chapter Two gives detailed explanations
for volatility estimation methods used in VaR context.
1.2 Motivation
This research is motivated by the suggestion by Bates (1996), Duffie and Pan
(1997), Das and Sundaram (1999), Lewis (2001), and Airoldi (2001) that full kurtosis can
not be captured by stochastic volatility alone or jumps alone. It is also motivated by new
evidence from Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (1999), Chourdakis (2000), Lewis
(2002), and Chacko and Viceira (2003) who find that stochastic volatility and jumps are
both significant in explaining the dynamics of stock returns. Gibson (2001) and Lewis
(2002) suggest that modeling of financial data should combine both, time varying
volatility and event risk. Both Gibson (2001) and Lewis (2002) consider this task very
important and very challenging, especially in modeling risk factor’s dynamics.
The other motivation comes from the suggestion of Airoldi (2001) that fat tails
are associated with faster updating of volatility; the thicker the tail, the faster the
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volatility dynamics. According to Airoldi (2001), jumps and extreme events cause hypergrowth in volatility. Thus, the assumed linear relation between volatility dynamics
(updating in volatility) and volatility levels would no longer hold during jumps and
extreme events (fat tails), hence a non-linear representation of volatility dynamics
becomes necessary. Additionally, if we accept the non-linear dynamics of volatility
updating, Hsieh’s (1993) suggestion becomes essential. Hsieh (1993) suggests that when
non-linear dynamics emerge in finance data, conditional densities provide better
description of short-term movements compared with unconditional densities, which has
very important implication in risk management.
1.3 The Purpose of the Work
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an approximate analytical estimate
of VaR for a class of non-normally distributed portfolio’s P&L that allows for the
maximum tail thickness and fast volatility updating.
To obtain such non-normal distribution and nonlinear relationship, the dissertation
assumes that trading revenues on financial institution’s portfolio is evolving according to
a mix of a non-affine stochastic volatility-jump diffusion model (NASVJ) in a form
mentioned by Chacko and Viceira (2003). Such a model allows for both sources of tail
thickness in financial data. It allows as well, through the non-affine stochastic volatility
specification, for fast updating in volatility that usually combines thick tails and extreme
events, as Airoldi (2001) suggests. In this non-affine stochastic volatility model, volatility
grows according to a non-linear square relation with its current level.
A VaR estimate based on such distribution should be able to predict the losses
that banks experienced during the stock market crash in October 1987. It should be able
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to explain also the large bank losses occur in September 1998 during the Russian crisis
and the near collapse of the LTCM, what internal banks’ VaR models failed to capture, as
reported by Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002).
With certain restrictions on the set of parameters of the NASVJ, as shown later,
five well-known processes emerge: the diffusion process with no jumps, jump diffusion
process, stochastic volatility process, non-affine stochastic volatility, and stochastic
volatility with jumps. Those processes are well-known in finance literature. However, it
received limited use in VaR literature. A limited number of works including El-Jahel,
Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) and Duffie and Pan (2001) use those processes. To my
knowledge, this is the first work that combines stochastic volatility, jumps, and nonaffine structure of volatility in deriving an analytical solution for VaR.
1.4 Methodology
To derive an analytical estimate for VaR under thick tails and fast volatility
updating, the dissertation assumes that trading revenues of the bank follow a non-affine
mixed stochastic volatility with jump process. An explicit form of VaR is derived by
obtaining the conditional distribution function of trading revenues. The necessity of using
the conditional distribution rather than the unconditional one comes from Hsieh’s (1993)
concern that conditional densities provide a better description of asset price movements
in the presence of non-linear dynamics.
Deriving the conditional density crucially depends on the transformation approach
developed by Shephard (1991) and utilized by Duffie, Pan, and Singleton (2000), and
Chacko and Das (2002) for affine processes. According to this transformation method,
the conditional probability function (cpf) is derived from the conditional characteristic
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function (ccf). When the conditional probability function (cpf) becomes known, it
becomes straightforward to calculate an estimate for VaR based on the statistical
definition of VaR as:
Pr [∆P( N ) < -VaR] = F [∆P(− VaR )] =

−VaR

∫ f (∆P(x ))dx = 1-c

(1 - 1)

−∞

Where F[∆P(.)] is the cumulative distribution function, (cdf) of trading revenues, ∆P, and
f(∆P(.)) is the probability density function of (pdf) of ∆P.
Thus the first task would be to derive the conditional characteristic function, and
then by the standard Fourier-inversion, we obtain the cumulative density function from
which we can directly calculate VaR. The dissertation derives an analytical VaR for the
mixed non-affine stochastic volatility --jumps and for the five special cases of the process
mentioned above based on the same procedure.
This methodology of deriving the conditional probability distribution is applicable
directly for affine processes. As a matter of fact, it is applicable only for affine processes
as shown in Shephard (1991), Duffie, Pan, and Singleton (2000), and Chacko and Das
(2002. For non-affine processes, we need first to transform the non-affine processes to
affine processes, mostly by using some of the perturbation methods of Kevorkian and
Cole (1981), and then perform the Fourier-inversion.
The procedure of deriving VaR estimate from the characteristic function has been
used before. El-Jahel, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) and Duffie and Pan (2001) show how
to replace the simulation step in VaR with a stochastic volatility process for derivative
portfolio through Delta-Gamma approach. Duffie and Pan (2001) apply similar principle
on a jump diffusion process. Cardenas, Fruchard, Koehler, and Michel (1997) also
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replace a Delta-Gamma approach for option’s portfolio with analytical solution for VaR
for a pure diffusion model with no jumps or stochastic volatility. Chapter Four describes
this method in details, and derives VaR estimates and characteristic functions for the
NASVJ process and other processes.
As mentioned earlier, a crucial issue in estimating VaR is the estimation of
current volatility. Current volatility will be estimated from historical data by estimating
the assumed processes for stock returns using spectral GMM estimator of Chacko and
Viceira (2003). Spectral GMM estimator depends on the empirical characteristic
function, where the unobserved variable (volatility, for example) can be integrated out.
Singleton (2001) and Jiang and Knight (2000) estimate continuous time processes
through the characteristic function. Note that volatility in the jump diffusion process
would be constant.
Empirically, the dissertation applies the analytical VaR model developed in this
context on a sample of six largest banks’ trading portfolios in the United States. In the
empirical part, the dissertation proceeds through comparing among different VaR
estimates based on different processes with a performance criterion of actual trading
profits and losses for those banks during the period 1995: Q1-2002: Q3. The compared
models include internal VaR estimate, the Geometric Brownian Motion VaR model
(GBM VaR), the stochastic volatility model VaR (SV-VaR), the jump diffusion VaR, (JD
VaR), the stochastic Volatility with jump diffusion VaR (SVJ VaR), the non-affine
stochastic volatility VaR (NASV VaR), and non-affine stochastic volatility with jump
diffusion VaR (NASVJ VaR).
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1.5 Data
This part of the dissertation uses quarterly data published by the largest US banks,
for a sample starting from 1995:Q1-2002: Q3. Banks start to publish their internal VaR
calculations almost with the beginning of 1995, Jorion (2002). The probability
distribution for profit and losses is not published on daily or weekly bases. It is only
published on quarterly and yearly bases.
For their “1-day” VaRs, banks measure only price fluctuation risk, and they
ignore expected returns. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) use the banks’ 1-day trading
revenues (unpublished P&L), which include fee income from trading and possibly trading
position net interest income for some banks, as well as gains and losses on positions.
This is, of course, inconsistent with the risk being measured in their VaR models.
Accordingly, trading revenues are modified using the moving average method of Jorion
(2002) to extract unexpected trading revenues from the published trading revenues. As
mentioned before, the expected trading revenues component includes fees income and
interest rate income. Banks’ internal VaR models ignore those expected components from
trading revenues when calculating VaR.
On a quarterly basis, there is an item of "trading revenue" reported in the bank’s
call reports, which includes position’s gains and losses and fees and expenses incidental
to trading. The call reports also report separately interest income and expense on trading
positions. These trading revenue components are available in the banks’ quarterly (10Q)
and annual (10K) reports filed with the SEC. The sample period is chosen to include the
third quarter of 1998 where banks experienced large losses because of the Russian crisis
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and the near collapse of the LTCM. Chapter Three provides a fully detailed explanation
for the data and its statistical proprieties.
The dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter Two provides a detailed
explanation of various risk facing financial institutions, detailed definition of VaR,
methods of VaR, developments of VaR, comparisons among VaR methodologies, and
VaR weaknesses.
The third chapter introduces the data and manipulations for the data. The chapter
explains the data sample, sources of the data, data statistics. It also tests for the degree of
accuracy of banks’ VaR models in capturing actual losses for banks during the period
1995-2002. The test for accuracy of VaR models follows Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002)
and Jorion (2002). The results of those tests show that banks’ VaR are very conservative
compared with actual losses occurred during the third quarter of 1998. Those results
indicate the need for new VaR models that account for tail thickness and fast volatility
updating.
Chapter Four explains in detail the methodology deriving VaR estimates. It
reviews the general methodology and reviews the literature concerning the characteristic
function and the use of the Fourier inversion theorem and its uses in economics and
finance. In Chapter Four also, the dissertation introduces the derivation of the models,
the characteristic functions, and the Fourier inversion for the processes.
The fifth chapter applies VaR solutions developed in Chapter Four on the trading
revenues of the banks in the sample. Additionally, the different estimate of VaRs based
on the proposed models will be compared with each other to a reference point of the
distribution of the actual losses that banks incurred in the last eight years. This includes
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the period where banks incurred massive losses during the Russian crisis and the near
collapse of the LTCM, where most of VaR models fail.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW LITERATURE
Two methodologies of VaR measures have evolved during the last decade. One
obtained by deriving an analytical valuation of VaR, which depends on certain parameter
estimates, called the parametric approach. The other derives VaR by repeatedly
performing several simulation steps, including historical and Monte Carlo simulations.
This chapter reviews the concepts of VaR, VaR measurement techniques, developments
of VaR techniques, and the strengths and weaknesses of such techniques.
2.1 The Need for Unified and Quantified Risk Measure
Modern finance theory emphasizes risk as a major determinant of return. Merton
(1980) argues that expected return has a linear relationship with risk. According to his
view, it is easier to measure risk – defined as volatility of return – than to measure
expected return itself. Merton’s idea sounds intuitively clear when applied to an equity
portfolio replicating an index. However, it is questionable when applied to a globally
diversified portfolio with positions traded in completely segmented markets, as in the
case of trading portfolios of financial institutions.
Taking a look at a trading portfolio of a financial institution like JP Morgan Chase
& Co. or CitiCorp as it is published in their reports suggests the following two
observations: The great diversity of trading positions, and the difficulty of and the need
for combining all risk classes underlying those positions in one single measure. The
trading portfolio of JP Morgan Chase & Co. contains, among others, positions in U.S and
foreign governments
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securities, corporate securities, and derivative securities of interest rates, foreign
exchange rates, bonds, equities, and commodity contracts. Each of those positions is
associated with a different source of risk and a different risk calculation method, as
follows.
The major risk underlying U.S Government securities is the interest rate risk.
Duration is a simple measure for estimating volatility in the prices of those securities and
their relationship with interest rates. By estimating convexity and sensitivity parameters
in the case of non-parallel shift in the term structure of interest rates, duration can be
modified to account for nonlinearity in the relationship between interest rates and
government security prices. A more complicated analysis may involve a parametric
quantifying of the corresponding risk factors affecting the term structure of interest rates
(see for example Golub and Tilman [2000] and Fabozzi, [2000]). For foreign
government securities, the foreign exchange rate is considered a distinctive risk factor in
determining returns. Foreign exchange rates have their own risk indices, spreads, and
volatilities. Recently, target zones have been added to several currencies, (Winer
[1997]).
Risk factors underlying corporate securities are dependent on the type of
securities held in the portfolio. For corporate bonds, in addition to the risk associated
with the interest rate, default is a major source of risk that correlates with other indices in
the economy. One way to quantify this risk is to use credit rating (Golub and Tilman
[2000]).
For equities, volatility of returns is a straightforward measure of risk. Many
models used in finance like the CAPM and the APT utilizes the correlation between the
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asset and the risk factor as a risk measure. For example, in the CAPM, where the only
risk factor is the market, the measure of risk (Beta) is the covariance between the market
and stock returns.
Risk factors underlying derivative securities are essentially the same as those
associated with the underlying assets of those derivatives. However, measuring the risk
associated with each derivative position depends on the shape of the relationship
between the derivative price and the underlying asset price. Forwards and futures prices
have a linear relationship with the prices of the underlying assets. Accordingly, the risk
associated with those contracts can be expressed as a linear transformation of the risk
associated with the underlying asset.
For options, where the relationship between the price of the option and the price
of the underlying asset is non-linear, risk can be measured by the Greeks, delta, gamma,
theta, vega and rho. Each of these letters reflects the rate of change in the price of the
option when only one of the parameters change, like the price of the underlying asset,
time to maturity, volatility and interest rate, (see for example Hull [2002]). To measure
the risk associated with interest rate and currency swaps we need a model of default and
recovery, which is necessary for measuring credit risk derivatives, (Saunders [1999]).
Risk is not limited to the above sources. The risk sources mentioned above are
coming basically from the market; the risk of unexpected changes in prices or rates.
Credit risk is another type of market risk (Duffie and Pan [1997]). Financial institutions
are subject to other types of risk like operation risk legal risk and liquidity risk.
However, for trading activities, market risk, the risk of unexpected changes in prices or
rates, might be the most important source of risk affecting the value of the trading
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portfolio. Jorion (2001) and Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2001) introduce a comprehensive
explanation of risk sources affecting financial institutions’ portfolios and propose risk
management tools for each risk factor.
Even if we focus our attention on the market risk, we still see that each position
in the financial institution’s portfolio, in the case of JP Morgan Chase & Co., is related
to a different market risk, requiring a different measurement technique. The
measurement technique is unique to that risk factor and not applicable to other factors.
Clearly, those measures are not additive, or even comparable. Thus all of those risk
measures cannot give a simple answer to the basic question regarding the level of risk
that a portfolio faces over a specific trading horizon.
Linsmeier and Pearson (1999) note that those complications were raised after
1973, the year that witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates and the publication of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. Those
events resulted in considerably high volatility in exchange rates, interest rates, and
commodity prices, and a proliferation of derivative instruments as useful tools for
hedging risks that emerge from market rates and prices dynamics. With those changes,
financial institutions increased their positions in financial derivatives for both hedging
and speculative purposes, a move that made the extent of market risk less obvious.
Ultimately, this led to an increased demand for quantitative measures of market risks for
trading portfolios. A different rationale is provided by Jorion (2001) and Crouhy, Galai
and Mark (2001) who argue that the recent financial distresses worldwide were the
primary motive behind the search for a simple risk measurement tool.
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One way to avoid these above complexities is to look at the probability of a given
loss to occur during a specified time horizon N, a straightforward statistical measure.
List all possible outcomes in each of the N periods and for each outcome, assign a
probability for the set of lower values to occur. If we know the probability distribution of
the profit and loss of a certain portfolio, then we can identify the probability of incur
losses exceeds each event (the left tail of the distribution). When we face the question, “
what is the maximum loss we may suffer over some time horizon, say N days?” we
answer, “ we are c% confident that we are not losing more than $V of our wealth over
this time horizon.” Notice here that $V is the event (loss) that would be exceeded by (1c)%. Equivalently, we can say that there is a (1-c)% probability of losing more than $V
of our wealth over the next N trading horizon. Our answer still implies that there is a
possibility of losing all of our wealth but with a minimal probability. However, the
probability of losing everything depends on our portfolio risk as defined by the standard
deviation of the profits and losses assuming normal distribution.
For example, given a time horizon of 100 trading days, and a confidence level of
95%, our losses will exceed $V1 only in 5 trading days. Here N = 1 day and c = 95%.
For 99% confidence level, we will incur losses exceeding $V2 only in one day out of 100
trading days or 2-3 days during a trading year, where |V1| < |V2|. This means additionally
that, for the next trading day, we are 95% sure that our losses will not exceed $V1, that is
we are 99% sure that our losses for the next trading day will not exceed $V2.
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2.2 The Concept of VaR
Before going to the formal definition of VaR, let us apply the above loose
definition to the distribution of the profit and losse (P&L) of the trading accounts for
Bank of America. Figure (2.1) below represents the histogram for the daily trading
revenues for Bank of America during the period Oct.1st 2001 to Sep. 30th 2002, which
represents 251 trading days. If we assume that the histogram represents the daily P&L of
the trading portfolio under the normal market conditions, then we can make our previous
statements as follows.
Figure 2.1
Histogram of Daily Market Risk –Related Results
For Bank of America, 12 Months Ended September 30, 2002.

Source: Bank of America Quarterly Report (Q10), September 2002.

We are 97.2% confident that losses of Bank of America will not exceed $20
millions over the next trading day. That means there is only 2.8% probability that Bank
of America will incur losses exceeds $20 millions during the next trading day. The 2.8%
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is the percentage of the number of days that the Bank incur losses more than $20 millions
to the total number of trading days. Additionally, we can say that at a 95% confidence
level, the losses of Bank of America will not exceed $14.5 millions over the next trading
day. Notice that 5% of the trading days is 12.5 days. We see from the histogram that there
are 17 days (6.8% of total trading days) the bank suffered from losses exceeding $10
millions and 7 days (2.8% of the total trading days) the bank suffered from losses
exceeding $20 millions. Interpolating, we find that the amount of losses that will be
exceeded by 5% of the trading days is $14.5 millions. The number $14.5 millions is VaR
at 95% confidence level over one trading-day time horizon.
Accordingly, we can define Value at Risk or VaR as a quantile measure4 to
quantify the risk for financial institutions. It measures the market risk of a financial firm’s
“book”, the list of positions in various instruments that expose the firm to financial risk.
Roughly speaking, VaR measures the worst expected loss over a given horizon under
normal market conditions at a given level of confidence, Duffie and Pan (1997).
As indicated in the loose form definition, VaR calculation models make the
following statement: “We are c percent certain that we will not lose more than V dollars
in the next N days”. The variable V is the VaR of the portfolio. It is a function of two
parameters: a time period (horizon), N, and a confidence level c. Thus, when we
calculate VaR for a portfolio of a financial institution we calculate the expected loss in
the portfolio’s market value over a given horizon such as one day or two weeks, N, that is
exceeded with a small probability say 1 percent, 1-c. Statistically speaking, value at risk

4

Other measures to quantify risk, in addition to quantile measures, include standard deviation, interquartile
range, and lower partial moments or shortfall measures.
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measure-in this case- is the 0.01 critical value of the probability distribution of changes in
market value as shown in figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2
0.01 Critical Value of Probability Distribution of Changes in Market Value
Assuming Normality

Accordingly, VaR is defined as the upper limit of the one-sided confidence
interval:
Pr [∆P(N) < -VaR] = 1-c

(2-1)

Where c is the confidence level, and ∆P(N) = ∆Pt (N) is the relative change in the
portfolio value ( P&L) over the time horizon N. ∆Pt (N) = P(t + N) - Pt . P(t + N) is the
natural logarithm of the portfolio value at time t + N and Pt is the natural logarithm of the
portfolio value at time t.
Statistically, equation (2-1) means that VaR values are obtained directly from the
probability distribution of P&L as follows,
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Pr [∆P(N ) < -VaR] = F [∆P(− VaR )] =

−VaR

∫ f (∆P(x ))dx = 1-c

(2 - 2)

−∞

Where F[∆P(.)] is the cumulative distribution function, (cdf) of the trading
revenues, ∆P, and f(∆P(.)) is the probability density function of (pdf) of ∆P.
2.3 VaR Conversion across Time Horizons and Confidence Levels
At a confidence level of 99%, a one day VaR is a one day loss that is expected to
be exceeded in only one trading day out of 100 trading days. A 99% two weeks VaR is a
two weeks loss that will be exceeded roughly once every 4 years. By the same argument,
a 99% three months VaR is a three months loss that will be exceeded once every 25

VaR 2 weeks = VaR1 day 10 ≈ 3.16 VaR1 day
VaR 3 Months = VaR1 day 63 ≈ 7.93 VaR1 day
VaR 3 Months = VaR 2 weeks

63
≈ 2.51 VaR 2 weeks
10

years. Here we need to recognize that:
Where we assume that the two weeks period contains 10 trading days and the 3 months
period contains roughly 63 trading days. So, in absolute value, VaR1 day < VaR2 weeks<
VaR3 Months, and so on.
For confidence level, if we assume normality, and constant volatility, then a 99%
confidence level VaR can be expressed as a 95% confidence level VaR as follows:

VaR 99% = VaR 95%

2.326
≈ 1.41 VaR 95%
1.645
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Where 2.326 and 1.645 (known as α’s) are the standard normal deviate
corresponding to a 99% and 95% confidence level. In the same way, the three-months
99% confidence level VaR can be expressed as a one day, two weeks or any horizon
length VaR at any confidence level as follows:
2.326 63
≈ 11.19 VaR 95%, 1 day
1.645
2.326 63
≈ 3.54 VaR 95%, 2 weeks
VaR 99% , 3 Months = VaR 95%, 2 weeks
1.645 10
VaR 99% , 3 Months = VaR 95%, 1 day

Worth to say that the above conversion method is mostly convenient and
applicable for trading revenues that are normally distributed, where we assume that the
standard deviation of trading revenues is constant.
2.4 VaR Users and VaR in Regulations
In spite of its recent advent as a risk management tool, the use of VaR has blown
up very quickly. VaR was used first by major financial firms in the late 1980’s.
Linsmeier and Pearson (1999) suggest that the releasing of JP Morgan to its
RiskMetricsTM system in 1994 was the reason behind this tremendous use of VaR in spite
of its relatively new age. VaR is now used by most of derivatives’ dealers, even small
financial firms, non-financial corporations, institutional investors and central banks.
Linsmeier and Pearson (1999) report results of some surveys about VaR use by different
types of institutions in their notes section. For more about the developments of using VaR
see Jorion (2001) and Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001).
Regulators, on the other hand, become increasingly interested in VaR as measure
for risk management, especially after the consecutive financial disasters during the late
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1980’s and 1990’s. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision allows banks to calculate
their capital requirements for market risk based on their own VaR models. The Securities
and Exchange Commissions requires U.S. companies to disclose quantitative measures of
market risk, with VaR listed as one of three possible market risk disclosure measures. For
detailed analysis of VaR in regulations, see Jorion (2001) and Crouhy, Galai and Mark
(2001). Khindanova and Rachev (2000) introduce very summarized and conclusive
review for the developments of VaR in use and VaR in Regulations.
2.5 Components of VaR Measures
In order to implement VaR measures, we should have a histogram like the one in
figure 2.1, or the components of equation 2-2, namely, the cdf, or the pdf that will enable
us to draw a figure as the one in figure 2.2. The histogram in figure 2.1 represents
basically the distribution function. To draw a figure like 2.1 or 2.2 we need to collect data
regarding the current portfolio positions or the trading revenues, P&L, for a specified
time interval, which represents the holding period or the trading horizon. We need also to
build a model to predict the distribution of the P&L of the portfolio as a function of the
market parameters. The last step means that we need to infer the cdf or the pdf. As we
will see later, VaR methodologies are exclusively different in the ways of constructing
pdf’s.
More formally, VaR measure for any trading portfolio depends on its quality on
the following components:
1- the distribution assumption
2- volatility and covariance estimates
3- the window length of the data used for parameter estimates

26

4- time horizon or the holding period
5- confidence level
In addition to the above components which assumes the mean of return zero,
some VaR measures as Jackson, Maude and Perraudin (1997) incorporate the mean of
return in VaR analysis. However, their results show no proof for any certain differences
when the mean of returns assumed to be zero.
2.5.1 The Distribution Assumption
As mentioned earlier, VaR methodologies are different basically because of the
way they construct the pdf. Traditionally, VaR techniques approximate the cdf’s in three
broad methods: the parametric method or analytical models, historical simulation or the
empirical based methods and the Monte Carlo simulation or stochastic simulation
method. The historical simulation and the Monte Carlo simulation are usually called the
non-parametric approaches. Section 2.6 deals with VaR methods in details.
2.5.2 Volatility and Covariance Estimates
Estimating current volatility is essential in VaR models. When the portfolio
includes several positions, VaR estimates need estimation for the variance-covariance
matrix and the correlation matrix, as we will see in the variance covariance VaR method.
However, with increasing the number of positions this process becomes more
cumbersome.
VaR methods apply different models to estimate current volatility. Traditionally,
VaR estimates use constant volatility models to predict current volatility. But we know
since Engle (1982) that volatility in financial data is not constant and it is moving over
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time. Hull and White (1998b) report that incorporating volatility updating into VaR
models improves substantially VaR estimates.
To account for volatility updating, researchers in VaR use different models. JP
Morgan (1995) uses a uniform exponential weighting volatility model. Lawrence and
Robinson (1995) use what is know as asset-specific exponential weighting volatility
model. Jackson, Maude and Perraudin (1997) show that certain parameters’ value in
volatility estimate (within the exponential weighting volatility models) leads to higher tail
probabilities. They show that there is a trade off between the degree of approximating
time-varying volatility and VaR predictions. Hendricks (1996) shows that there is a
negative relationship between the size of the parameters of the exponential weighting
volatility model and the variability of VaR measurements. For more about uniform and
asset-specific exponential weighting volatility models see Dowd (1998), Jorion (2001)
and Hull (2002).
Other models of time-varying volatility used in VaR context include the ARCH
models of Engle (1982), GARCH models of Bollerslev (1986), EGARCH models of
Nelson (1991), extreme value theorem EVT as in Bradley and Taqqu (2001), and implied
volatilities from option prices as in Duffie and Pan (2001). Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002)
find that VaR models that depend on GARCH estimation for volatility bound the actual
daily losses in banks’ portfolios closer than internal VaR models used by banks.
Eberlein, Kallsen and Kristen (2001) test the impact of using different methods of
estimating current volatility in VaR models and find that the estimation technique affects
substantially VaR estimates. For different techniques for estimating volatility in VaR and
its effect in VaR estimates see in addition to Eberlein, Kallsen and Kristen (2001), Duffie
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and Pan (1997), Dowd (1998), Khindanova and Rachev (2000), Gencay, Selcuk, and
Ulugulyagci (2001) and Bradley and Taqqu (2001), Jorion (2001) and Hull (2002).
VaR estimates for portfolios that contain many positions needs to estimate also
the correlation matrix beside the covariance matrix. Beder (1995) finds that VaR are
sensitive to correlation assumptions. She calculated VaR for a portfolio under different
assumptions of the correlation matrix. Her results show significant differences of VaR
estimates under those different assumptions of correlation matrix.
2.5.3 The Window Length
The window length is the length of the data sample (the observation period) used
for VaR estimation. The window length choice is related to sampling issues and
availability of databases. The Basle Committee suggests the 250-day (one-year) window
length.
Beder (1995) estimates VaR applying the historical simulation method for 100day and 250-day window lengths. Beder shows that VaR values increase with the
expanded observation intervals. Hendricks (1996) calculates VaR measures using the
parametric approach with equally weighted volatility models and the historical
simulation approach. Hendricks (1996) uses different window lengths ranging from 50
days to 1250 days. He reports that VaR measures become more stable for longer
observation periods. Jackson, Mauder and Perraudin (1997) reach to the same conclusion
of Hendricks (1996) by computing parametric and simulation VaRs for 1-day and 10day time horizons using window lengths from three to 24 months. They concluded that
VaR predictions based on longer data windows are more stable and reliable.
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2.5.4 The Holding Period and Confidence Level
The holding period or the time horizon in VaR analysis takes any trading
interval. In regulations it varies from one day to two weeks (10 trading days). The
choice of the length of the holding period depends on liquidity of assets and frequency
of trading transactions. A basic assumption in all VaR calculations is the portfolio
composition remains unchanged over the holding period. The Basle Committee
recommends 10-day holding period. RiskMetrics uses 1 day. Most of financial
institutions use 1 day holding period and report VaR estimates at daily basis in their
quarterly and annually reports. Long holding periods are usually recommended for
portfolios with illiquid instruments.
Beder (1995) investigates the impact of time horizon on VaR estimations. She
calculates VaR for three hypothetical portfolios applying four different approaches for
time horizons of 1-day and 10-day. For all VaR calculations with one exception Beder
(1995) reports larger VaR estimates for longer time horizons.
The confidence level, on the other hand, reflects some internal measures of the
financial institution. RiskMetrics uses 95% confidence level. The Basle Committee uses
99% confidence level. Jorion (2001) explains the Committee choice of 99% confidence
level as a reflection of the tradeoff between the desire of regulators to ensure a safe and
sound financial system and the adverse effect of capital requirements. Dowd (1998) and
Jorion (2001) discuss the internal and external rationales for financial institutions to
choose certain parameters (confidence level and holding periods).
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2.5.5 Basle Committee Parameters
As mentioned above, Basle Committee requires financial institutions to calculate
its VaR models at a 99% confidence level and 10-business-days horizon. The resulting
VaR then multiplied by a safety factor, K, equal 3 to provide the minimum capital
requirement for regulatory purposes. Khindanova and Rachev (2000) report that
financial institutions think that 10-day time horizon is inadequate for frequently traded
instruments and is restrictive for illiquid assets. Jorion (2001) suggests that the choice of
the 10-trading-day period reflects the trade off between the cost of frequent monitoring
and the benefits of early detection of potential problems.
According to Basle criteria, a 2 weeks loss value more than VaR would occur
once every 4 years. Jorion (2001) links between the confidence level and the safety
factor choice. That is with low probability of failure to occur once every 4 years, the
safety factor provides near absolute insurance against bankruptcy. Additionally, Jorion
(2001) explains that the safety factor accounts form model risk. Model risk includes
underestimation of VaR numbers because of inaccuracy of VaR components’ choice.
Stahl (1997) justifies the choice of the safety factor to be 3 based on
Chebyshev’s inequality. Other authors link the choice of the number 3 to the kurtosis of
the normal distribution, but this sounds a little unjustifiable.
2.6 VaR Methods
Section 2.5.1 above differentiates among VaR methodologies based on the way
they construct the pdf. This section deals with different VaR approaches and the recent
advancements to VaR methodologies.
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2.6.1 Parametric Methods
In the parametric method, trading revenues (P&L) are characterized by assumed
parametric distribution, as normal distribution, Gamma distribution, Student t-distribution
or any other distribution or a mixture of any set of distributions. Other parametric
methods include a linearization and quadratic approximation of portfolios’ value. VaR
estimates derived by this method appear as a function of the parameters of the assumed
distribution, and that is why it is called parametric.
Parametric methods are subject to some kind of inaccuracy. This inaccuracy arises
from the fact that the distribution assumption might be incorrect. For example, if the VaR
method assumes the P&L to have a multivariate normal distribution (as frequently
assumed) whereas the actual data exhibit excess kurtosis, resulted VaR estimate
underestimates the maximum potential losses at high confidence levels.
Under the parametric method with normality assumption, two VaR approaches
are usually used: the variance covariance approach, and the Greeks approach. Both of
those approaches reserve the normality assumption of risk factors underlying portfolio
returns. While the variance covariance approach assumes a linear relationship between
portfolio returns and the underlying risk factors, the Greeks approach deals with nonlinear cases as in the case of option portfolios and fixed income portfolios.
2.6.1.1 Variance Covariance
The most popular analytical approach for deriving VaR is the variance covariance
method. This approach assumes that all risk factors in the market are normally distributed
and the portfolio is a linear function of those normally distributed risks. This implies that
the P&L distribution for the portfolio is also normally distributed. Under such
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assumptions, VaR calculations become easy to handle. VaR basically is a multiple of the
portfolio standard deviation, and the standard deviation is a linear function of individual
volatilities and covariances of the underlying market risk factors. So, all we need to
calculate VaR is the variance covariance matrix and information about the sizes of
individual positions to determine the portfolio standard deviation. Then, multiply this
standard deviation by a confidence level parameter and scale variable reflecting the size
of the portfolio, as follows in matrix notations, Dowd (1998) and Jorion (2001):
VaRP = -ασPP =-α[wΣwT]1/2 P =[VaR*ρ* VaRT]

(2-3)

Where α is the standard normal deviate corresponding to a specific confidence
level. σP is the standard deviation of the portfolio, P the scale variable reflecting the size
of the portfolio. w represents n x 1 vector of sizes of individual positions in the portfolio.
ρ is the correlation matrix of positions held in the portfolio and VaR represents n x 1
vector of individual positions’ VaRs (undiversified VaRs), where VaR for individual
positions is -ασW and W is a scaling variable reflects the initial value of individual
positions.
The normality assumption gives VaR estimate great advantages such as
tractability and informativity. Informativity includes translatability across confidence
levels and holing periods (section 2.3 above) and informativity about expected tail losses,
Dowd (1998) and Jorion (2001).
Unfortunately, the variance covariance approach to VaR does not always fit actual
financial institutions’ portfolios. Portfolio returns may be nonlinear in risk factors, as in
the case when the portfolio contains positions in options or fixed-income instruments. In
response to non-linearity, authors use the Taylor series expansion or linear approximation
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for returns to these instruments, and then use the linear approximation to work out the
VaR estimate. This kind of approximation includes the delta-normal method and delta –
gamma approximation (Greeks). Delta-normal is the first order Taylor series expansion
of the portfolio value, and delta – gamma approximation is the second order Taylor series
expansion.
2.6.1.2 The Greeks Methods
The Greeks methods come basically from the sensitivity parameters of option
prices to different risk factors underlying an option portfolio. Assume the value of the
portfolio depends on the price of the underlying asset, and time to expiration, such that
P = P( S , t ) . Taking Taylor series expansion or alternatively applying Ito’s Lemma to get
the process for dynamics in the portfolio value, we get:
dP =

∂P
1 ∂ 2 P 2 ∂P
∂2P
dS +
dS
+
dt
+
dSdt
∂S
2 ∂S 2
∂t
∂S∂t

(2-4)

Note that all higher order of change in t goes to zero, thus the last term in the
right-hand-side of (2-4) goes to zero. The first part in the right hand side of (2-4) is delta
of the portfolio, ∆ , which defined as the change of the portfolio value with respect to the
change in the price of the underlying asset. The second term is gamma of the portfolio,
Γ , which is the second derivative of the value of the portfolio with respect to the
underlying asset price (first derivative of delta to underlying asset price). The third term,
known as theta, Θ , is the change of the value of the portfolio with respect to time to
expiration.
1
dP = ∆dS + ΓdS 2 + Θdt
2

(2-5)

34

The simplest approximation produces the so-called delta-normal approach.
Delta-normal by definition is the first order Taylor series expansion of a portfolio’s value
with respect to stock returns. In this case we ignore the second and the third argument in
the right hand side of (2-5). If we ignore Γ and Θ then the potential loss in the value of
the portfolio is then computed as dP = ∆dS which involves potential change in prices.
This relationship is linear and the worst loss in P is associated with an extreme value of S.
When the distribution of dS is normal the portfolio VaR, VaRP, will be a product of the
sensitivity parameter ∆ and the VaRS of the underlying asset as follows:
VaRP = ∆ VaR S = ∆ × ασS0

(2-6)

For fixed income securities the underlying asset (risk factor) is the yield, and the
first order Taylor series expansion will be a function of the yield, and the constant in this
case is the modified duration, as follows:
dP = − DPdy

(2-7)

Where D is the modified duration and y is the yield. And the portfolio VaR in this case
will be:
dP = − DP × ασ

(2-8)

Where σdy is volatility of changes in the level of yield. Of course with this procedure, we
assume that changes in yield are normally distributed.
Delta-normal restores the linear normality and makes VaR estimation easy.
However, such a simple approximation produces inaccurate VaR estimate. Wilson (1996)
argues that delta-normal approach would produce reliable estimate for VaR for small
holding periods or/and when the portfolio has few option positions (close to normality).
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To get more accurate VaR for non-linear positions (options and fixed income),
some literature including Wilson (1994, 1996), Pritsker (1996), Jamshidian and Zhu,
(1996), and Zangari (1996 a, b) use the quadratic model or the second Taylor series
expansion known as delta- gamma approaches. In terms of equation (2-5), we add the
second term that includes Γ . Then the change in the portfolio value that includes
1
positions in option would be dP = ∆dS + ΓdS 2 . Gamma is the first derivative of delta
2
with respect to underlying asset price. It measures the curvature of the relationship
between the portfolio value and the underlying market variable. A non-zero gamma
implies skewness in the distribution of P&L of the portfolio. When gamma is positive
(negative), changes in the portfolio is positively (negatively) skewed.
For a portfolio with positions in fixed income securities the relationship between
the value of the portfolio and the yield will be as follows:
1
dP = − DPdy + CVdy 2
2

(2-9)

Where the second-order coefficient C is the convexity parameter and it is equivalent to
Γ.
The task now is to deal with dS and dS2 for option portfolios or dy and dy2 for
fixed income portfolios. Pritsker (1996) deals with those terms by taking the variance for
the both sides of the quadratic approximation (2-5). This is what is called delta-gammadelta method. If dS is normally distributed then all odd moments will be zero. And with
the assumption that dS and dS2 are jointly normally distributed then dP is normally
distributed and then VaR can be calculated directly.
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Pritsker (1996) use another method to infer VaR estimates based on delta gamma
approximation. In his method known as delta-gamma-Monte Carlo, Pritsker (1996) in the
first place creates a random simulation of the risk factor S. Then he uses the Taylor
approximation to create simulated movement in the option value. VaR in this case can be
calculated from the empirical distribution of the portfolio value. Other modifications of
delta-gamma methods include delta-gamma-minimization of Wilson (1994) and Fallon
(1996).
Zangari (1996 a, b), Fallon (1996) and Pritsker (1996) improve over delta-gamma
method by using Cornish-Fisher expansion which accounts for skewness. In this method,
α , the standard normal deviate corresponding to a specified confidence level is replaced
1
by α ′ = α − (α 2 − 1)γ , where γ is the skewness parameter. For more about Cornish6
Fisher expansion see Hull (2002).
Zangari (1996 a, b), and Pritsker (1996) include another modifications for deltagamma approach, the delta-gamma-Johnson. This method chooses a distribution function
for dP and estimates its parameters to match the first four moments of the delta-gamma
approximation.
Jamshidian and Zhu, (1996), Zangari (1996 a, b) and Fallon (1996) report that
delta-gamma approaches improved VaR estimates tremendously compared with deltanormal. For more about detailed analysis of the developments on delta normal approach
see Khindanova and Rachev (2000).
The Greeks methods still assume normality for the risk factors. Unfortunately,
normality is very strong assumption for finance data, since many empirical studies in
time series data, Bollerslev (1987) for example, show that the rate of return (the
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percentage change) of many financial variables is not normally distributed. It tends to be
skewed and leptokurtic.
The normality assumption of risk factors or P&L of the portfolio would certainly
affect VaR estimates since it depends crucially on the distribution of the tail. Thus, if we
have thicker (thinner) tail compared with the normal distribution, then VaR estimates
based on normality would be under- (over-) estimated. Zangari (1996 c) discusses VaR as
a technique of risk management under departure from normality. He shows that VaR
calculated under normality assumption underestimates risk since the observed
distribution of many financial return series have tails that are flatter than those implied by
conditional normal distribution.
With deviation from normality assumption, we still can use the parametric
(analytical) approach to construct VaR. However, many researchers use non-parametric
approach (the simulation approach) to account for non-normality. In the parametric
approach, an alternative distribution is explicitly assumed instead of the normal
distribution, and based on this assumed distribution; a formula to describe the confidence
interval is analytically derived.
In the non-parametric approach, no particular distribution assumption is needed.
VaR is calculated from the standard theory of order statistics, as in Kupic (1995), or from
Monte Carlo simulations, where VaR is deduced from multiple runs that might be
representative of the possible market price outcomes. In some cases, actual historical
return distribution is used by bootstrapping rather than simulations.
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2.6.1.3 Analytical VaR Approaches with Deviation from Normality
Generally, the parametric approach for VaR estimates with non-normal
distribution classes aims at modifying for kurtosis since VaR estimates depend on the
distribution of the left tail. A probability distribution with fat tails has greater probability
mass out in the tails of the distribution, where large price movement occurs compared
with the normal distribution. Accordingly, VaR estimates tend to under or over estimate
risk if the normal distribution is assumed, Zangari (1996c).
Fat tails in actual finance data comes from stochastic volatility of the underlying
market factor (like stock returns). The size of the “tail fatness” depends on the correlation
between volatility of returns and returns themselves (Duffie and Pan 1997), Das and
Sundaram (1999) and Lewis (2000). However, Bollerlev (1987) reports that actual
market data are typically found to have flatter tails compared with that would come from
stochastic volatility alone.
Another source of fat tails in the distribution of financial data comes from price
jumps, Bates (1996), Duffie and Pan (1997), Das and Sundaram (1999), Lewis (2001)
and Airoldi (2001). New evidences from Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (1999),
Chourdakis (2000), Lewis (2002) and Chacko and Viceira (2003) find that stochastic
volatility and jumps are both significant in explaining the dynamics of stock returns for
different frequencies. Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (1999) find that non-affine
jumps and stochastic volatility are significant in finance time series data.
To account for Kurtosis “tail fatness” in the distributions of underlying risk
factors in VaR estimates, authors use different methods. Fong and Vasicek (1997) assume
that the changes in the portfolio value follow gamma distribution. Additionally, they
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assume that the risk factors underlying the portfolio returns are jointly normally
distributed. Fong and Vasicek (1997) use basically the delta- gamma approximation with
allowing for skewness parameter (not kurtosis) to appear in VaR. Fong and Vasicek
(1997) argue that their model accounts for thick tails in spite that the forth moment does
not appear explicitly in VaR estimate. Worth to say that delta-gamma approximation that
Fong and Vasicek (1997) use differs from Cornish-Fisher approximation of Zangari
(1996 a, b), Fallon (1996) and Pritsker (1996).
Rachev and Mittnik (2000), Khindanova, Rachev, and Schwartz (2001), Rachev,
Schwartz and Khindanova, (2002) use stable Paretian models for modeling the
distribution of the P&L in the portfolio. Stable Paretian models allow for both skewness
and thick tails. The above set of papers apply VaR measure derived from the stable
Paretian distribution on eight international financial series including S&P 500. They
conclude that stable models produce VaR estimates with higher values compared to
normal distribution.
Zangari (1996 d & e),Venkataraman (1997), and Hull and White (1998a) use a
mixture of two normal distributions to achieve tail thickness for their VaR estimates.
Duffie and Pan (1997 and 2001) and Gibson (2001) adopts event risk (jumps) as s source
of tail thickness. Duffie and Pan (1997) and El-Jahel, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) use
stochastic volatility to achieve kurtosis in the underlying risk factors for a portfolio with
derivatives’ positions. El-Jahel, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) include the first four
moments in their VaR estimation. Levin and Tchernitser (2001) account for tail fatness
by assuming time varying volatility and Levy Processes. Li (1999), on the other hand,
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includes skewness and kurtosis explicitly in VaR estimates. Another wave of literature
utilizes the extreme value theory (EVT) to account for tail dynamics and thickness.
2.6.2 Non-Parametric Approaches
As we mentioned earlier, a basic component on VaR estimate is the probability
density function. Non-parametric approaches infer the P&L distribution directly from the
standard theory of order statistics, with no need for pre-assumption about the distribution.
The following two sections, examine the two non-parametric approaches and the recent
advances on those approaches.
2.6.2.1 Historical Simulation
This method is the simplest method to construct VaR. It makes no preassumptions about the distribution of trading revenues. Instead, the distribution is
constructed from the historical behavior of the portfolio P&L. The current portfolio is
subjected to actual changes in the market factors during the past. The only assumption
that is made in this method is that the past trends of profits and losses will continue in the
future. One advantage of this method that it is free from any estimating inaccuracy,
Khindanova and Rachev (2000).
However, it has a problem of the trade of between the length of the historical data
used for the simulation process and the irrelevancy. It is important to use as long
historical data as we can to take in to account any rare event happened in the past that
lead to heavy losses. In the same time, the further we go into the past for data, the less
relevant this information is to today’s market, Wiener (1997). Wiener (1997) points out
to another problem of the historical simulation that is it is not applicable for technical

41

trading strategies develop on the basis of historical data. That is because we can not use
the same data used to construct VaR for the calibration of technical trading strategies.
To overcome the problem of using older data Duffie and Pan (1997), Show
(1997), and Jorion (2001) suggest the bootstrapped historical simulation method to
generate returns of risk factors by bootstrapping from historical observations. By this
approach, volatilities and correlations are updated rather than estimated from old data.
Butler and Schachter (1996, 1998) suggest combining the historical simulation
with the kernel estimation. They perform this combination in three steps: at the beginning
they approximate the pdf and the cdf of portfolio returns. After that, they approximate the
distribution of the order statistics corresponding to the confidence level. In the last step,
they estimate VaR using the first and the second moments of the pdf for the order
statistics determined by (1-c)th quantile. This modification allows to estimate the
precision of VaR estimate and to construct confidence intervals around them.
Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1998) enter different modification to the
historical simulation method. They combine the historical simulation method with
exponential smoothing. Basically, this method attaches exponentially declining weights
to historical portfolio returns starting from current time and going back. The future
returns are obtained from past returns and sorted in increasing order (regular historical
approach). After that, VaR estimate is computed from the empirical density function.
This modification is know as hybrid approach, and it also ties to overcome the problem of
using past information by accentuates the most recent observations. One advantage of
this method is that it takes into account time varying volatility and it is suitable for fattailed series.
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Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1998) perform the hybrid approach to a
different financial series and compared the results with exponential smoothing and plain
vanilla historical simulations. Results for 99% confidence level VaR, applied to the S&P
500, show a reduction in the absolute error estimation ranging from 30%-40% compared
with the exponential smoothing method. The improvement over the historical simulation
was less obvious. The absolute error reduced by 14%-28% compared with the historical
simulation. Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1998) report that hybrid approach
works better for exchange rate portfolios and heavy-tailed series.
2.6.2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
The Monte Carlo method is one of the most popular methods among
sophisticated users, Wiener (1997). It has a number of similarities to the historical
simulation. The most significant difference is that Monte Carlo methods apply the
simulation using observed changes in the market factors over the last N periods to
generate N hypothetical portfolio P&L. However, this method simulates the behavior of
risk factors and asset prices by generating random price paths. Monte Carlo simulations
provide N possible portfolio values on a given future date (t + N). The VaR value can be
determined from the distribution of simulated portfolio values.
To perform Monte Carlo approach, we first specify stochastic processes and
process parameters that we think it is the best to capture risk factors dynamics. Then
simulate the hypothetical price trajectories for all risk factors. Hypothetical price
changes are obtained by simulations drawn from the specified distribution. At the end,
we obtain asset prices at time t + N from the simulated price trajectories and compute the

43

portfolio value and VaR. One major disadvantage of this method is that it takes long
time to converge.
The modifications for the Monte Carlo method were aiming basically at
improving the accuracy of VaR estimates without much additional timing cost. VaR
estimates by Monte Carlo methods are subject to a tradeoff between accuracy and time
of convergence. Wiener (1997) reports that to increase the precision by a factor of 10
you must perform 100 times more simulations.
Owen and Tavella (1997) use Paskov and Traub (1995) quasi-Monte Carlo idea
to obtain faster valuation financial derivatives and apply it to VaR estimates. Owen and
Tavella (1997) application of the quasi-Monte Carlo method noticeably improve the
convergence of the simulation compared with the traditional Monte Carlo method with
the same level of accuracy.
Pritsker (1996) make two improvements on Monte Carlo methods. The first is
grid Monte Carlo approach, and the other one is the modified grid Monte Carlo. In the
first improvement, he forms a grid of changes in the risk factors. Then he computes the
portfolio values at each node of the gird. The possible realizations of the grid are
obtained from random drawings from pre-decided models. Portfolio values for new
draws are approximated by interpolating portfolio values at adjacent grid points.
However, this method is subject to a problem Pritsker (1996) call it dimensionality
problem.
To alleviate the dimensionality problem in the grid Monte Carlo approach,
Pritsker (1996) tries to lower the dimension grid and combine them with a linear Taylor
approximation. This modification assumes that changes in the portfolio value are caused
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by two types of factors, linear and non-linear. Each type of those changes subject to
different estimation method. Changes in the value according to linear factors are
evaluated by linear approximation. Changes in the portfolio values that are resulted from
non-linear factors are estimated through grid points. Pritsker (1996) find that the
modified gird Monte Carlo method entails the level of accuracy close to delta-gamma
Monte-Carlo approach. However, delta-gamma Monte-Carlo requires less computational
time. Gibson and Pritsker (2000) extend the modified gird method to portfolios contain
positions in fixed income securities.
2.6.3

Comparison Among Different Methods

Application of different VaR methods provides different VaR estimates. The
resulted estimate from different VaR methodologies sometimes not even close. Generally
speaking the choice of the method depends on the composition of the portfolio. VaR
methods always compared among each other regarding several considerations. The first
is the ability to capture risk factors underlying portfolio returns, with the assumption that
the portfolio includes positions in options and fixed income securities. The second
consideration is the easiness of implementation. The third is how quick in terms of time
computations can be implemented. Other considerations that usually take into account are
the easiness to explain to senior management. Table 2.1 includes a summary of
comparisons among different traditional methods. However, the most important
comparison among different methods includes the tradeoff between the accuracy of the
estimate and the cost of implementing computations in terms of time and the easiness of
implementation.
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The variance covariance method becomes burdensome when the number of
positions in the portfolio increases, because this method requires a computation for the
variance covariance matrix and the correlation matrix of all positions. In implementing
the Monte Carlo simulation method, we face a tradeoff between accuracy and
computation time. One advantage for the Monte Carlo simulation is that it can be
performed under alternative assumptions, which is not available for other methods.
However, the Monte Carlo simulation method subjects to the model risk and
measurement error. Monte Carlo simulation method models risk factors according to a
pre-assumed stochastic process and this pre-assumed stochastic process might be
incorrect. Measurement errors involve in all VaR estimates, because the true parameters
should be estimated.
Dowd (1998), Linsmeier and Pearson (1999), and Jorion (2001) provide a detailed
explanation for traditional VaR approaches. Pritsker (1997) and Pearson and Simthson
(2000) investigate the developments on VaR methodologies to improve the speed of
computations and accuracy.
, Pearson and Simthson (2000) provide Figure 2.3 for comparison. The figure
shows that the full Monte Carlo method is the most accurate and the most time
consuming method. Delta normal on the other side is the least accurate and the fastest to
implement. We notice also that delta-gamma Monte Carlo outperforms the modified gird
Monte Carlo. In the same time, delta-gamma-delta outperforms delta-gammaminimization. Roughly speaking, delta-gamma Monte Carlo is the best among the
quadratic approximation methods in terms of balancing between accuracy and speed of
computation

46

Table (2.1)
Comparisons of Traditional VaR
Method
Factor
Ability to capture risk
Factors for position with
nonlinear dependence on
risk factors
Assumptions
Accounting for thick tails
Accuracy

Variance-Covariance
Ineffective at all

Impose normal
distribution
assumption
No

Inaccurate with thick
tails data and when
recent past is
anomalous(2)
Easiness of
Yes, when the number
implementation
of positions in the
portfolio is limited,
difficult with large
number of positions
Quickness of computation Relatively quick,
depending on the
number of positions
Easy to explain to senior
No
management
Performed under different No
assumption

Quadratic
Approximations(1)
Can handle it, but the
accuracy diminishes
with their existence.
VaR value understated.
Impose normal
distribution assumption

Historical Simulation

Monte Carlo Simulation

Effective

Effective

Past trends continue in
the future

Impose stochastic model
for risk factors

No

Yes, if the past data
imply it
Future might have
extreme events, or the
opposite

Yes, if the modeled risk
imply it
Misleading when the past
is anomalous

Inaccurate with thick
tails data and when
recent past is anomalous

Yes, with the availability Yes, with the
of data and few number
availability of data
of position

Yes, with complex
software

Relatively quick,
depending on the
number of positions
No

Yes

Time consuming, tradeoff
between computation
time and accuracy
No

No

No

Yes

(1) Includes delta normal and delta-gamma
(2) Different correlations and volatility may be used to account for that

Relatively quick
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2.6.4 VaR Drawbacks
There are three major weaknesses for VaR methodologies: the implementation
risk, inability to be applied during transition periods and the assumption of constant
portfolio components during the time horizon (holding period). Implementation risk
means that implementation of the same model by different users produces different VaR
estimates. Marshall and Siegel (1997) conduct a study of implementation risk. They
compare VaR results obtained by several risk management developers using JP Morgan's
RiskMetrics approach. Marshal and Siegel (1997) find that different systems do not

Figure 2.3
Comparisons of VaR Methods Advancements,
Accuracy versus Speed of Computation
Accuracy
Full
Monte Carlo
Delta-Gamma
Monte Carlo
Modified
Grid Monte
Carlo
Delta-Gamma
Delta
Delta Normal
Delta-Gamma
Minimization
Speed of Computation
Source: Pearson and Simthson (2000), VaR: The State of Play.
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produce the same VaR estimates for the same model and identical portfolios. They
explain the varying in estimates by the sensitivity of VaR models to users' assumptions.
The degree of variation in VaR numbers was associated with the portfolio composition.
Nonlinear securities entail larger discrepancy in VaR results than linear securities. In
order to take into account implementation risk, it is advisable to accompany VaR
computations for nonlinear portfolios with sensitivity analysis to underlying assumptions.
Additionally, VaR measures generally reflect observed risks and they are not
useful in transition periods characterized by structural changes, additional risks,
contracted liquidity of assets, and broken correlations across assets and across markets.
Finally, VaR methodologies assume that trading positions are unchanged during
time horizon. In fact, financial institutions change its portfolio composition frequently.
Therefore, extrapolation of a VaR for a certain time horizon to longer time periods
might be inappropriate. Duffie and Pan (1997) point out that if intra-period position size
is stochastic, then VaR measures obtained under the assumption of constant position
sizes, should be multiplied by a certain factor.
2.7 Back Testing
The Basle Standard requires financial institutions to perform back testing for its
internal VaR models. Back testing is a posterior procedure in which the financial
institution checks how often actual losses have exceeded the level predicted by VaR. A
financial institution that conduct daily VaR over a 99% confidence level should not
observe more than 1% cases of losses exceeds VaR. For 250 days trading period, the
financial institution should notice that actual losses during that period exceeded VaR
estimate only by 3 times.
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Basle Standard computes the market risk capital requirement at time t by:
 1 60

Ct = At × Max  ∑VaRt − i ,VaR  + SRt
 60 i =1


(2 - 10)

Where Ct is the market risk capital requirement at time t. At is a multiplication factor
ranging between three and four. SRt is the capital specific risk.
The capital specific risk is part of the market risk. According to the new capital
requirements market risk is classified into general market risk and specific risk. The
general market risk is the risk from changes in overall market factors like equity prices,
commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates. Specific risk is the risk from changes
in prices of assets for non-market reasons.
In equation (2-10), the value of At depends on the accuracy of the internal VaR
model during the past periods, say past trading year. Basle Standard divides the number
of violations (the number of times when actual daily losses exceeded VaR estimates
during the last 250 days) into three zones: the green zone, the yellow zone and the red
zone. The green zone applies when there are four or less violations, or violations
happened in 1.6% of the time. In this case A takes a value of 3. The yellow zone applies
if the number of violations is between five and nine (violations happened 2% to 3.6% of
the time). In this case A takes a value between 3 and 4. The red zone applies when there
are more than nine violations (more than 4 % of the time) and A takes a value of four. If
A is in the red zone, the whole model should be revised.
Wiener (1997) argue that this procedure prevents banks from setting low levels of
VaR, and with enough capital reserve safety, banks may only set upper bound level for
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VaR rather than precise value. For more details regarding back testing and Basle
Standard, see Jorion (2001).
2.8 Stress Testing (Scenario Analysis)
As we said earlier, VaR is a single, summary, statistical measure of normal
market risk. According to this definition, VaR is just a normal loss that occurs according
to normal market conditions. But when VaR is exceeded, the question becomes by how
large this normal loss can be exceeded?
Stress testing attempts to answer this question. Stress testing is not one of VaR
methods. It is rather a general method that performs a set of scenario analyses to
investigate the effect of extreme market events on portfolio returns. There is no standard
way to apply stress testing, and no standard set of scenarios to consider. The process
depends crucially on the judgment and experience of the risk manager.
Stress testing often begins with a set of hypothetical extreme market scenarios.
These scenarios might be created from stylized extreme scenarios, such as a movement of
the market rates and prices by large amounts expressed in numbers of standard deviation
moves. That might come from actual extreme events. For equity portfolio for example,
the scenarios might be based upon the extreme movements of the U.S. equity prices that
happened on October 19, 1987 when the S&P 500 moved by 22.3 standard deviations.
Or for a less extreme case when the S&P 500 moved by 6.8 standard deviations on
January 8, 1988.
For fixed income securities portfolio, we can use the changes in US dollar interest
rates and bond prices experienced during the winter and spring of 1994. For foreign
exchange rate we can use the changes in some of the European exchange rates that
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occurred in September 1992, or the dramatic changes in the exchange rates of several
East Asian countries during the summer and fall of 1997. After developing a set of
scenarios, the next step is to determine the effect on the prices of all instruments in the
portfolio, and the impact on portfolio value. This requires knowledge of the covariances
and correlations among different positions in the portfolio.
The are two well-known types of stress testing, the worst case scenario analysis
(WCS) of Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1997) and the factor-based interest rate
scenarios of Frye (1997). Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1997) reports that WCS
result exceeds VaR estimates and WCS can be used beside VaR estimates. Frye’s (1997)
method is suitable to portfolios of bonds and interest rate positions. It generates the
scenarios based on changes in the yield curve and factors underlying it. For details about
the scenario analysis and the modifications on it see Khindanova and Rachev (2000) and
Jorion (2001).
2.9 Conclusion
VaR techniques essentially model a prediction of the maximum expected loss for
a given portfolio during a given time period. In VaR, losses are approximated by the left
tail quantile in portfolio returns distribution. So VaR estimates basically depends on the
distribution of the tail of the P&L of the portfolio. As explained in section 2.6.1.3,
empirical observations exhibit fat tails and excess kurtosis for the distribution of the
underlying risk factors, time varying volatility and discontinuities in the data sample path.
Khindanova and Rachev (2000) conclude that neither the traditional methods of VaR nor
its improvements do give satisfactory and unified estimation for VaR that captures the
above properties of real financial data.
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The variance covariance method and the Greeks approximations do not cope with
the observed thick tail aspect with financial data. The historical method is not reliable in
estimating low quantiles. Monte Carlo simulation, on the other hand, depends on the
stochastic modeling (distribution assumption) of risk factors, which is usually assumed to
be normally or log-normally distributed.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) test the accuracy of the daily VaR models used by
the largest six U.S banks in predicting actual daily losses during the period January 1998
to March 2000. They find that non of the used VaR models could predict the daily P&L
in an acceptable manner. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) report that Banks’ VaR have no
significant ability in predicting Banks’ losses during the periods of the Russian crises and
the near collapse of the LTCM in August and September 1998. Jorion (2002), on the
other hand, test the informativity of VaR disclosures in quarterly and annually reports for
the largest eight U.S. Banks. He reports that published VaR estimates disclose the actual
quarterly P&L for those banks. However, he makes the same point of the inability of
those VaR estimates to predict losses during the third and the forth quarter of 1998.
The witness from Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) and Jorion (2002) is as follows:
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) report their results for the largest six U.S banks without
naming the banks. But we would know from the quarterly reports what are the major
banks that used VaR models during that period and what VaR methods they used. For
example Bank of New York reports that they use Monte Carlo simulations. Bankers Trust
use proprietary simulations, JP Morgan Chase & Co. use historical simulations, CitiCorp
covariance matrix, and Bank of America describe its method as “sophisticated
techniques”. These methods are disclosed in the quarterly reports (Jorion 2002 report
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them in table 1). So, According to Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) non of those methods
could predict the Banks’ losses especially in the second half of 1998.
Jorion (2002) is more optimistic compared with Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002).
Jorion (2002) deduced his results based on a regression analysis between the
unpredictable P&L and daily volatility. For me, Jorion’s results are questionable since he
takes quarterly VaR over a 99% confidence level. According to this VaR specification,
we expect to see that a three months loss exceeding VaR occurs once every 25 years, and
any violations should be tested along 25 years or 100 quarters period. However, no data
available with that long.
The conclusion from those works is that non of the VaR methods could predict
the actual banks’ losses even with inclusion of time varying volatility. Berkowitz and
O’Brien (2002) find that VaR estimates that GARCH models for volatility bound actual
daily losses in banks’ portfolios closer than internal VaR models. However, even those
models could not describe actual portfolio dynamics during the periods of the Russian
crises and the near collapse of the LTCM in August and September 1998.
Generally speaking, accounting for thick tails may improve the performance of
VaR estimates. However, VaR estimates that deviate from normality assumption in an
attempt to account for thick tails (section 2.6.1.3) do not consider for the following
aspects:
1. The full kurtosis cannot be captured totally by time varying volatility alone or
jumps (event risk) alone. In Gibson (2001 p.2) language “what is needed is a
model that can combine time varying volatility with event risk” and Gibson
(2001) considers this task is challenging. Similarly, Lewis (2002) reports that
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mixing the stochastic volatility with jumps gives much better fit to both actual
stock price distribution with their wide tails and smile patterns. However, he
considers this as a tough task but it deserves trying for the benefit of getting
more accurate modeling of financial data. Additionally, Chenov, Gallant,
Ghysels and Tauchen (1999), Chourdakis (2000), and Chacko and Viceira
(2003) find that both stochastic volatility and jumps are significant in their
estimations for mixed stock returns processes. Those studies even employ a
non-affine stochastic process and jump-diffusion process.
2. As Airoldi (2001) suggests, with fat tails, volatility grows and updates faster.
The thicker the tail, the faster the dynamics of volatility. Thus jumps and
extreme events cause hyper growth in volatility. Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and
Tauchen (1999) report similar evidences in their non affine estimations.
Accordingly, the assumed linear relation between volatility dynamics
(updating in volatility) and volatility levels would no longer holds during
jumps and extreme events (fat tails) hence a non-linear representation of
volatility dynamics becomes necessary.
3. When non-linear dynamics involve (even in the case of linear dynamics),
point 2 above, conditional densities provide better description of short term
asset price movements compared with the unconditional densities, which has
very important implication in risk management, (Hsieh 1993). Hence, the
dependence of VaR models on the unconditional densities would not give the
best estimate for VaR when we assume nonlinear dynamics (or even linear).
And we know that there are strong evidences of nonlinear dynamics in short
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term movements of asset returns structure, see Hsieh (1989 and 1991),
LeBaron (1988), and Scheinkman and LeBaron (1989).
4. Kurtosis has non-flat term structure that changes over time and this deepens
the dependence of VaR estimates on the time horizon. As a matter of fact if
we assume that volatility is time varying this means that the fatness of tail
would be time varying, Duffie and Pan (1997), and Das and Sundaram (1999).
And this may create some covariance between the confidence level and the
VaR horizon.
Any efficient VaR estimates should take the above four considerations into
account, and this is the task of the following chapters of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA ANALYSIS
The purpose of this part is to analyze the data set used for back testing of the
proposed VaR models under thick tails developed in this study. In addition to describing
the data set and data sources and the data manipulation, we performed some back testing
for the internal VaR models used by the banks compared with the actual trading revenues
using Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) and Jorion (2002) methodologies. The analysis aims
at shedding more light on the need for different kind of VaR models that accounts for fat
tails, stochastic volatility and jumps in underlying risk factors. Here, we are deducting
those features through focusing on VaR violations by actual losses incurred in the trading
portfolios of a sample of six U.S banks.
3.1 Selecting the Sample
Because of its recent advent, VaR data available publicly are very limited. Before
1995, only few banks disclosed VaR in its quarterly and annually publications. After June
19985, the number of financial institutions disclosing VaR numbers in its public reports
increased tremendously. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Accord 1999
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In its market disclosure rule FRR No. 48, effective, June 1998, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) require all large U.S. publicly traded corporations to report quantitative information
about their market risk in financial reports filed with the SEC. The SEC requires the corporation to choose
among three methods for quantitative market risk disclosure, tabular presentation, sensitivity analysis and
VaR. For more details, see Linsmeier and Pearson (1997).
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(BCBS 1999) reports that 86 percent of financial institutions that Basle Committee
surveyed disclose VaR in their public financial reports6. Work that uses actual trading
revenues (P&L) of financial institutions portfolios and the associated internal VaR
estimates are really limited. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) and Jorion (2002) are
pioneers in this area. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) check the accuracy of VaR model
used by banks using a sample of six largest U.S. dealer banks with daily trading revenues
and daily VaR estimates over a two years period spanning from January 1998 to March
2000. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) use private internal data that is not available at all
for anyone else. They even do not include the names of the six banks that included in the
sample.
Jorion (2002) on the other hand, try to check how informative value at risk
numbers disclosed in the quarterly and annually (10-Q and 10-K) reports. He uses a
sample contains the largest eight U.S. banks. Jorion uses quarterly trading revenues and
daily VaR estimates published on a quarterly basis over almost 6 years period, spanning
from 1995: Q1-2000: Q3. Jorion’s sample includes Bank of America, Bank of New York,
Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, CitiCorp, First Chicago, JP Morgan and Nations Bank.
Except for Nations Bank that includes only 14 observations, Jorion’s (2002) sample
includes 23 observations for each bank.
The criterion for inclusion a bank in the analysis is the availability of VaR
estimates, assuming that trading revenues are available too. All banks that Jorion (2002)
include in the sample started to disclose VaR since December 1994. However, Jorion

6

Most of small and regional banks are exposed to the interest rate risk, thus they report sensitivity analysis
to shocks in interest rate rather than reporting VaR.
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(2002) derives his data set from the SEC website (the only public available source),
where the quarterly and annually reports are available beginning of December 1993.
For the purpose of testing VaR models under thick tails developed in this
dissertation, this study uses the same bank sample that Jorion (2002) uses but for a time
period extended from 1995:Q1–2002: Q3. In terms of banks number, the sample includes
six banks rather than eight banks. The reason is that some banks witnessed merging
activities during the sample period. During the sample period, Nations Bank merged into
Bank of America and Chase Manhattan and JP Morgan Merged into JP Morgan Chase.
Accordingly, banks used in this dissertation for back testing are Bank of America, Bank
of New York, Bankers Trust, Bank One/First Chicago, CitiCorp, and JP Morgan Chase.
The data collecting from the quarterly (10Q) and annually (10K) reports available in the
companies filling in the SEC website.
Figure 3-1 below, shows example of Bank of New York VaR disclosure. Bank of
New York illustrates that they use VaR as one of three measures to manage trading risk.
The bank measures VaR at the 99 percent confidence level over one day. Bank of New
York also tells that he uses Monte Carlo Simulation approach to calculate VaR. The
breakdown by type of risk indicates that this is a diversified portfolio. Bank of New York
reports the average, high, low of the quarter, the average, high, low of the report period,
and end-of-period VaR across categories of market risk and for the portfolio as a whole.
By September 2002, all banks included in the sample (except Bank of America) disclose
VaR in this manner. Other banks' disclosures include some back testing through a
histogram of P&L compared with VaR of a graph. Some banks (JP Morgan Chase) report
their stress testing results.
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Table 3-1 summarizes the characteristic of VaR estimates disclosed in companies
filling in the SEC. Table 3-1 shows that all banks in the sample started to announce VaR
numbers at December 1994. VaR estimate is available until September 2002 (the most
recent Q10) except for Bankers trust, which is available only for December 2001. Table
3-1 shows also that banks in the sample are diversified in using VaR method.
Figure (3-1)
Excerpts from the Quarterly Report of Bank of New York, September 2002
Dealing with Value at Risk
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Table (3-1)
Description of VaR Disclosure of 6 U. S. Commercial Banks
Bank

Bank of America
Bank of New
York
Bankers Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp
JP Morgan
Chase & Co.

VaR
Method
Used
Historical
Simulation
Monte Carlo
Simulation
Proprietary *
Simulation
Statistical
Model ***
Covariance
Matrix
Historical
Simulation

Reporting
Details as of
Sep. 2002

First VaR
Disclosure

Reported
Average
Since

Reported
EndQuarter

VaR Confidence Level

Average, Min,
Max, End
Average, Min,
Max and End
Average, Min,
Max and End
Average, Min,
Max and End
Average, Min,
Max and End
Average, Min,
Max and End

Dec. 1994

1998:3

Dec.1994

1996:4

1995:41998:3
1997:4

Dec.1994

1998:3

1998:3

95%, 97.5% and 99%
since 98:3
95% until 1997:4
99% since 1998:1
99% **

Dec.1994

1994:1

1997:4

Dec.1994

1997:4

1997:4

Dec.1994

1994:4

1997:4

%99.87 until 98:2, 99%
97:4 and after 98:2
97.7% until 97:3 and
99% since 97:4
97% until 95:3, 95%
until 97:3, 99% after 97:4

* Bankers Trust stopped publishing VaR disclosure in Dec. 2001. The VaR method as Reported in 10K 2001.
** Bankers Trust Report VaR at 10 days horizon until 1999:Q3, after that VaR reported at 1 day 99%.
***Bank One reports that VaR is calculated based on a statistical model applicable to cash and derivative
positions, including options. However, they mentioned that VaR calculated at 2.33 standard divination from the mean.
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3.2 Trading Revenues
Quarterly trading revenues are collected from banks' quarterly reports (10-Q) and
annual reports (10-K), along with the banks' VaR disclosures. Quarterly trading revenues
are available in the SEC fillings beginning of March 1993. However, because banks
begin disclosing VaR data in 1994, trading revenue data are collected from 1994 to the
third quarter of 2002.
Most banks report "total trading-related revenues," which includes (1) direct
trading revenues, (2) fees, and (3) interest revenues on trading assets net of the costs to
fund trading positions. Fees and net interest earned on assets and liabilities are more
stable over time than are trading revenues. When banks construct VaR they exclude
those stable items from trading revenues and they calculate VaR for trading revenues
abstracted from fees and interest revenues, see Jorion (2002) and Berkowitz and O’Brien
(2002). To abstract the expected component from of trading revenues -to construct a
measure of unexpected trading revenues- I follow Jorion (2002) methodology. Jorion
(2002) correct for the expected component of the trading revenue by measuring the
unexpected component as the difference between the quarterly trading revenue and its
moving average over the previous four quarter. He reasons the use of the previous four
quarters as a benchmark due to the fact that trading revenues are not seasonal.
Accordingly, the unexpected trading revenues are defined as
Rt +1 − E[ Rt +1 ] = Rt +1 −

1 4
∑ Rt +1−i
4 i =1

(3-1)

Jorion (2002) concludes that this transformation should produce an expected
value of unexpected trading revenues indistinguishable from zero. Additionally this
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transformation imposes a non-autocorrelation among trading revenues. However, with
this transformation, we expect to see some kind of autocorrelation. A quarter with large
negative trading revenues will pull down the estimate of expected trading revenues
E[ Rt +1 ] for the next three quarters which will result in positive values for unexpected
trading revenues for the next three quarters, Jorion (2002).
Empirically, as Table 3-2 and Figure 3-2 show that real data proves the
improvement of unexpected trading revenues over the reported trading revenues. The
new aspects of unexpected trading revenues (zero expected value and zero
autocorrelation) are necessary for a certain types of back testing of VaR models, like the
one Jorion (2002) uses.
Table 3-2 reports the average and standard deviation of quarterly trading related
revenues in millions of dollars. It shows in the same time some statistics on the measure
of unexpected component of trading revenues. The average trading revenues differs
widely across banks, ranging from almost 40 millions for Bank One/First Chicago to 746
millions for JP Morgan Chase. The standard deviation is ranging widely among the
banks in the sample. It is ranging from 24 million for Bank of New York to 784 million
for JP Morgan Chase.
Table 3-2 show that the mean of unexpected trading revenues is far less than the
mean of trading revenues. The average unexpected trading revenues ranging from –9
millions for Bankers Trust to 69 millions for CitiCorp. The null hypothesis that the mean
of unexpected trading revenues is indistinguishable from zero could not be rejected for
four banks and could not be accepted for two banks (Bank of New York and CitiCorp).
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Table (3-2)
Descriptive Statistics of the Trading Revenues and the Unexpected Trading Revenues in the Banks Sample
Bank
Average***
Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers Trust

227.90

Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp

Trading Revenues
Std.
ρ(1)(1)
Deviation
249.42
0.37**

JarqueBera(2)
3.61

Unexpected Trading Revenues
Average
Std.
Jarqueρ(1)(1)
Bera(2)
Deviation
11.98
220.39
0.011
8.25**

44.97

24.29

0.85***

1.60

4.79**

12.18

0.293*

0.62

87.3

196.97

0.18

8.56**

-9.02

196.47

-0.05

16.82***

39.55

33.34

0.04

8.33**

4.51

34.53

-0.02

1.19

619.94

262.65

0.86***

2.62

69.44***

138.67

-0.081

0.29

JP Morgan
764.03
Chase & Co.
*** Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.

784.22

0.46***

35.48***

10.12

700.48

0.162

150.69***

* Significant at 1%
(1) First order autocorrelation.

(2) Test for normality, H0: the null hypothesis is the trading revenues are normally distributed. H1: the alternative hypothesis,
the distribution does not follow normality.
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This is different from the mean of trading revenues that is statistically different
from zero at high significance level for all banks.
Table 3-2 shows also, that unexpected trading revenues satisfy the condition of
zero autocorrelation. The first order autocorrelation, ρ(1), for unexpected trading
revenues is indistinguishable from zero for five banks, with weak degree of significancy
(10%) for Bank of New York. The case is not the same for the related-trading revenues,
where the first order and other higher orders autocorrelation are significant for most of
the banks in the sample.
From Table 3-2, we can see that the transformation used to deduct the
unexpected trading revenue almost keeps the same distribution assumptions of trading
revenues. Jarque-Bera test for normality indicates that we can not reject the normality
assumption for three banks. This analysis is almost the same for both the related-trading
revenues and unexpected trading revenues.
Figure 3-2 shows that both unexpected trading revenues and the related trading
revenues took the same path over time. This reflects the fact that all dynamics in related trading revenues comes basically from the dynamics in unexpected trading revenues.
Which approximately means that related-trading revenue is just a scalar transform of the
unexpected component.
Figure 3-2 deducts also a very volatile upward trend in the banks' trading-related
revenues and unexpected trading revenues. Volatility was very high, with some banks’
big losses during the third quarter of 1998. The period of turmoil in financial markets,
beginning with the Russian default and the near collapse of Long-Term Capital
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Figure (3-2)
Unexpected and Reported Trading Revenues for the Banks’ Sample
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Figure (3-3)
The Distributions of Unexpected Trading Revenues (P&L) For Banks in the Sample during the Period 1995Q1-2002Q3(1)
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Management (LTCM). Financial markets were severely disrupted when it appeared that
LTCM might collapse, due to the huge size of LTCM's positions.
Figure 3-3 on the other hand, shows the detailed statistical characteristics of
unexpected trading revenues. Figure 3-3 represents histograms of unexpected trading
revenues for all banks in the sample with additional statistical characteristics like
skewness and kurtosis. Consistent with financial data series, unexpected trading revenues
for banks in the sample are negatively skewed and five banks exhibit kurtosis exceeds 3.
However, negative skewness is not significant in many cases. Actually test for normality
(Jarque-Bera) rejects normality assumption only in three cases.
3.3 Value at Risk
A normal practice, as reported in Figure 3-1, financial institutions measure VaR
over a short period horizon, one day to two trading weeks, assuming the current positions
are fixed over that horizon. However, we know that financial institutions change
positions actively during the trading horizon. Additionally, the actual losses may be less
than VaR estimate if management takes corrective actions when losses start to appear.
With long holding periods, like quarterly horizons, the assumption of fixed positions in
the portfolio during the holding period becomes more problematic.
From the definition of VaR, the maximum loss that will be exceeded with a small
percentage over the next N days, back testing implies, Ideally, matching VaRt (VaR
estimate at time t) with the TRt+N (subsequent trading revenue at time t+N). With N =
three months, we have to match the VaR estimate at the end of quarter t with the t+1
quarter trading revenues.
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As Table 3-1 shows, banks began disclosing annual VaR numbers in 10-K forms
in 1994. However, because the SEC’s market disclosure rule FFR-48 was effective on
January 1, 1998, some banks start to disclose VaR estimates in 1998, see Table 3-1.
VaR data for trading activities were collected from the 10-K and 10-Q reports. As
mentioned earlier, the standard is to use the end of the quarter VaR to match it with the
subsequent quarter trading revenues. As Table 3-1 indicates, most of the banks started to
publish end of quarter VaR in the 1997 10-K. Bank of America published the end of the
quarter VaR during the period March 1995 to March 1998, and then they started to
publish the average only. However, we can deduce the end of quarter VaR for recent
quarters from daily VaR graphs. Bankers Trust also started to publish end of quarter VaR
since March 1998.
Because of those differences, the following decision rule is used in collecting
VaR estimates:
1) If quarterly VaR data are available
a) End-of-quarter VaR data for the previous quarter when available.
b) Average VaR for the previous quarter.
2) If quarterly data are not available, I resort to annual data.
a) VaR reported at the end of the previous year.
b) Average VaR for the previous year.
This approach selects the VaR number that is the closest to the beginning of the
subsequent quarter over which trading revenue is measured.
Additionally, banks report VaR on daily basis in their reports while publish
trading revenues on quarterly basis. More over, in previous periods, some banks used to
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disclose VaR at confidence level different than 99% (see Table 3-1). Accordingly, we
need to convert the daily VaR at different confidence levels to quarterly VaR at 99%
confidence level. For that, we used the conversion rules described in section 3 of chapter
two.
3.4 The Accuracy of Banks’ Disclosed VaR
The aim of this section is to test for the ability of VaR models developed by
banks to predict future losses. It is very important to evaluate banks VaR models to
know the need for developing more accurate VaR models accounting more for financial
data aspects. As shown in chapter 2, if we define the quarterly P&L distribution by Rt ,
so that at the end of each quarter t the bank forecasts the next quarter P&L (Rt+1) using
VaR technique. The forecast is the amount VaRt that is calculated at the end of t quarter
such that Pr[Rt+1 < VaRt] = 1-c over the next quarter. Here c = 99%, so the model
predicts a lower bound on losses not to be exceeded with 99 percent confidence. Using
the definition of unexpected trading revenues from equation (3-1)
Pr[Rt+1 – E(Rt+1 ) < VaRt] = 1-c

(3-2)

Where E(Rt+1 ) as defined in equation (3-1). Here we use VaRt instead of VaRt+1 just to
match the notation with our data set. To investigate whether VaR accurately predict
future losses we use the usual back testing method or forecast evaluation as in Berkowitz
and O’Brien (2002) where the number of violations or realizations beyond VaR are
counted. Or we can use VaR based volatility regressions used by Jorion (2002).
3.4.1 Forecast Evaluation
This approach basically performed by comparing the targeted violation rate 1-c
with the observed violations. As we know a 99% confidence level quarterly VaR predicts
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to observe one quarter loss exceeding VaR once in 25 years (100 quarters) trading period.
However, we can not apply this principle easily, since we have only 31 quarter of data.
Accordingly, we expect to see this violation only 0.31 quarters during the sample period.
The 0.31 trading quarters are equivalent to 20 trading days, assuming the quarter contains
63 trading days. As long as we do not have the daily P&L we can not use this daily
definition. Thus the best would be to analyze the number of violations during the sample
periods. Figure 3-3 that represents the histograms for unexpected trading revenues can
help in that to see the number of quarters that VaR has been exceeded by. Or the number
of quarter can be transformed into percentage to see the percentage of violations if it
exceeds 1% of the sample.
The analysis is clearer in Figure 3-4, which shows unexpected trading revenues
bounded by VaR from below and absolute VaR from above. Figure 3-4 roughly shows
that there are 4 banks that had violations more than once during the sample period.
Violations mean times where actual losses exceed VaR. Figure 3-4 shows that VaR could
bind actual trading revenues totally for two cases, Bank of New York and Bank One/First
Chicago. For the other 4 banks, VaR could not bind actual losses regardless of actual
profits. Figure 3-4 shows that violations are not limited to the third quarter of 1998, the
period that witnessed the Russian crises and the near collapse of the LTCM. Actually, 3
banks out of those 4 banks witness violations after the third quarter of year 2000 in
addition to the period of the Asian crisis.
Table 3-3 gives more details of those violations. The first column shows the 99th
percentile losses. The 99th percentile loss represents 2.326 standard deviations below the
mean assuming normal distribution. For four banks in the sample, the average VaR lies
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outside the 99th percentile loss. The numbers in column 3 are the banks’ mean VaR but
standarized with unexpected trading revenues’ standard deviation. A bank with a
standarized average VaR less in absolute value than 2.326 means that the mean of VaR
lies outside the 99th percentile and we expect to see violation in this bank. Again column
3 emphasizes The conclusion that 4 banks have mean VaR lies outside the 99th percentile
and 2 banks their average VaR lies within the 99th percentile. Accordingly we expect to
observe violations in 4 banks.
Column 4 reports the number of violations (Losses went beyond VaR) in each
bank of the four banks that have violations. The number of violations is relatively big. If
we compare it with the 1% percent target, we conclude that VaR estimates were very
conservatives. VaR is exceeded with more than 6 % in two banks and with more 20% in
the other two banks.
The last four columns in Table 3-3 show the mean size of violations and the
maximum violation for each bank. The violation size represents the difference between
the actual loss and VaR estimate. The largest violation in terms of mean happened in
Bank of America. The mean violation for Bank of America is 1.47 standard deviation.
The violations in columns 6 and 8 are bigger than expected value conditional on
exceeding the quantile for the normal distribution. The expected value conditional on
exceeding the quantile (known also as expected shortfall, tail conditional expectation,
conditional loss or tail loss) for normal distribution is 2.667. For normal distribution, the
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Figure (3-4)
Internal VaR Estimates and Unexpected Trading Revenues P&L For Banks in the Sample during the Period 1995Q1-2002Q3
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Table (3-3)
VaR Violation Statistics
Bank

99th
Percentile(1)

Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers
Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp

-512.63

-213.48

-0. 948

2

Mean(2)
Size of
Violations
$ Millions
-320.9

-28.33

-35.70

-2.93

0

NA(4)

NA

NA

NA

-456.99

-169.24

-0.86

7

-113.61

-0.58

-364.75

-1.86

-80.32

-155.1

-4.49

0

NA

NA

NA

NA

-322.55

-297.85

-2.15

2

-42.35

-0.31

-51.00

-0.37

Mean VaR
$Millions

Mean
VaR(3)
In Stds

No. of
Violations

Mean(3)
Size of
Violations
in Stds
-1.47

Max
Violation
$Millions

Max
Violation
Std.

-479.76

-3.19

JP Morgan
-1629.32
-274.38
-0.39
8
-342.06
-0.49
-864.83
-1.23
Chase & Co.
(1) Calculated as the multiplication of the standard deviation of the unexpected trading revenues and the 99th percentile of
normal deviate. This is by definition -2.236 standard deviation below the mean.
(2) The amount of loss exceeding VaR, which equal to average loss – VaR.
(3) Normalized in standard deviation.
(4) NA: Not Applicable
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tail conditional distribution exceeds the normal deviate of 99% confidence level
by 0.341 standard deviations which is close to violations in 3 banks but it is less than the
maximum violations in the four banks that have such violations. Berkowitz and O’Brien
(2002) report relatively higher violations in their daily samples and VaR estimates.
Generally, based on quarterly data and disclosed VaR, and using the expected
forecast method, we report the following conclusion. Disclosed banks’ VaR data do not
accurately measure the maximum expected loss for the banks. So there is a need to find
more accurate measure. As Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) conclude, there is a need for
VaR estimates that takes into account tail fatness, time varying volatility, and high
correlation among positions especially during the times of collapse and crisis. As
reported by Airoldi (2002) volatility updates faster and correlation increase among asset
returns during periods of collapses.
3.4.2 VaR Based Volatility Method
Jorion (2002) uses different method to test for the informativeness of VaR
disclosure in the banks’ quarterly and annual reports. Jorion’s (2002) method retrieves
volatility of the trading revenues from VaR estimate and then looking for a certain
distributional relationship between volatility and the expectations of trading revenues.
The first step in this method is to retrieve trading revenue’s volatility from VaR
estimates. As we know, for normally distributed risk factors, VaR measure is the
forecasted volatility st multiplied by the standard normal deviate α for selected
confidence level. α = 2.326 for one tailed confidence level of 99%. Then
VaR = α st

(3-2)
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With normally distributed risk factors, the expected absolute value | Rt+1| is

E ( Rt +1 ) =

2

π

× st = 0.8 × st

(3 - 3)

Equation 3-3 shows that the expected absolute value of trading revenue is linearly
increasing with the forecasted volatility of trading revenues that are proportional to VaR.
Jorion (2002) claims that this setup is valid for a wide class of trading revenues provided
that the conditional distribution of trading revenues is fixed and symmetric. However,
the coefficient of this relationship depends on the type of the distribution. For example,
with the six degrees of freedom Student-t distribution (typical distribution for daily
financial time series) this coefficient is 0.74.
Jorion (2002) tests the predictive power of banks quarterly VaR disclosure by
estimating an equation of the form:
Rt +1 = a + bσ t + ε t +1

(3 - 4)

Where Rt+1 is the trading revenues for quarter t+1, and σt is the forecasted
volatility of quarterly trading revenue inferred from VaR at quarter t. As we know,
trading revenues are published quarterly as a summation of daily trading revenues.
Whereas VaR is disclosed quarterly based on one-day horizon. Jorion (2002) uses the
conversion method explained in chapter 2 section 3, assuming that the quarter includes
63 trading days, as the following:

σ t = s t 63

(3 - 5)
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According to this analysis, VaR is informative about future trading revenues risk
if b in equation 3-4 is significantly positive. However, the accuracy of this estimate and
the closeness of b estimation to its theoretical value of 0.8 depend on several
assumptions. The first factor is the error in measuring σt. This approximation assumes
that trading revenues daily volatility is almost constant and does not move quickly across
trading days in the quarter. The other source of error in σt estimation is that VaR models
assume that composition of the trading portfolio is constant over the trading horizon that
VaR calculated for. This also might create error in trading revenues themselves.
An important assumption to apply equation 3-3 is that the Rt+1 has a mean zero
and is normally distributed. Additional important assumption is that trading revenues are
not autocorrelated. Then Rt+1 should be the unexpected component of trading revenues.
As mentioned earlier, the reported trading revenues contain expected components like
fees and interest rate. Even banks do not take this expected component into account when
calculate VaR.
As showed above in equation 3-1, this expected component is factored out by
taking the unexpected trading revenue as a difference between the latest trading revenue
and the average over the previous four quarters. Unlike reported trading revenues,
unexpected trading revenues are closer to have zero expected mean and zero
autocorrelation as in table 3-2 and figure 3-2. This transformation could overcome the
last problem. By replacing trading revenues with unexpected trading revenues in equation
3-1, equation 3-4 can be rewritten for the purpose of estimation in the following fashion:
Rt +1 − E [Rt +1 ] = a + bσ t + ε t +1

(3 - 6)
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The same criterion still applies. If banks’ VaR is informative, b should be
positively significant from zero and the regression R2 should be high implying that σt
captures much of the variations in unexpected trading revenues. As we know, the
regression will produce meaningful results only if σt varies across the quarters.
Unfortunately, using annual VaR-based volatility data instead of quarterly data, should
reduce the accuracy of the risk forecast because in the regressions four quarterly trading
revenue observations correspond to the same value of the VaR-based volatility.
Before testing for the accuracy of disclosed VaR, it is important to see the
correlation structure among unexpected trading revenues for the banks in the sample.
Table 3-4 reports relatively high correlation among unexpected trading revenues in the
sample. It exceeds 60% between certain banks.
To test for the accuracy of disclosed VaR, equation 3-6 is estimated first for
Table 3-5 reports the results of the six banks specific time-series regressions of
unexpected trading revenues of VaR based volatility. Generally speaking, regression
results did not report any form of informativeness of disclosed VaR about future risk
expectations. For OLS results, only Bankers Trust shows the assumed positive
relationship between unexpected trading revenues and VaR based volatility. However,
the relationship seems very weak as indicated by OLS regression. As the table shows,
the confidence level of rejecting H0 (the slope coefficient equal zero) for Bankers Trust
is less than 95% (t-statistic is significant at 10%).
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Table (3-4)
The Correlation Matrix of Unexpected Trading Revenues for Banks in the
Sample
B.A

B.NY

B.T

B.ONE

CITI

JP

B.A

1.00

0.41

0.56

0.43

0.63

0.38

B.NY

0.41

1.00

0.16

0.39

0.21

0.28

B.T

0.56

0.16

1.00

0.09

0.46

0.27

B.ONE

0.43

0.39

0.09

1.00

0.52

0.09

CITI

0.63

0.21

0.46

0.52

1.00

0.12

JP

0.38

0.28

0.27

0.09

0.12

1.00

* BA stands for Bank of America, B.NY stands for Bank of New York, B.T stands for
Bankers Trust, B. ONE stands for Bank One, CITI stands for CitiCorp, and JP stands for
JP Morgan Chase and Co.
However, this confidence level improved with using SUR regression. The b
coefficient for Bankers Trust is significant at 95% confidence level under VaR
regression. Although the joint test for all coefficients in SUR model significantly
different than zero, the joint test for slops only is not significant. Those results are
different than the results reported by Jorion (2002). Jorion reports positive significant
result for Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and Bank One/First Chicago. One reason
may explain this difference in results is the different data set. Jorion’s (2002) estimation
does not include recent quarters where many banks witnessed high violations of their
VaR estimates.
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Table (3-5)
Bank-Specific Regression of Absolute Value of Quarter t+1 Unexpected Trading
Revenues on Quarter t VaR-Based Volatility

[R

i , t +1

Bank
Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp

Period
No. of
Observations
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q1
29
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q3
31

− E [Ri ,t +1 ]] = ai + biσ i ,t + ε i ,t +1
OLS
Constant Slope
(t-Statistic)
161.452
-0.153
(2.488) (-0.239)
10.024
0.026
(2.478)
(0.104)
55.9639
1.009*
(1.1745) (1.840)
38.168
-0.145
(3.502) (-0.937)
135.343
-0.077
(3.725) (-0.305)
338.177
0.484
(1.697)
(0.324)

R2
0.002
0.0004
0.111
0.030
0.003

SUR
Constant
Slope
(t-statistic)
143.103
0.0188
(3.131)
(0.0456)
10.272
-0.013
(2.930)
(-0.063)
77.175
0.717**
(2.165)
(2.065)
23.870
0.030
(3.104)
(0.284)
103.295
0.119
(3.518)
(0.619)
347.007
0.285
(1.663)
(0.165)
368
P<0.001

JP Morgan
0.004
Chase & Co.
Joint test of
all Parameters
=0
• * Significant at 10%.
• ** Significant at 5%.
• Number of observation for SUR is 29. Another SUR performed without including
Bankers Trust with 31 observation for each bank. The results are qualitatively the same.
• The joint test for the slopes = 0 is not significant.
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Figure (3-5)
Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues in
Quarter t+1 and VaR-Based Volatility in Quarter t:
Pool Sample
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In contrast to single bank data that do not show the significant positive
relationship between absolute unexpected trading revenues and VaR based volatility,
figure 3-5 shows this relationship. Figure 3-5 displays the pool sample data. From figure
3-5 we can notice that higher VaR based volatility is associated with greater variationf in
unexpected trading revenues.
Table 3-6 reports the results of a cross-sectional estimation of equation 3-6, with a
sample of 185 observations. The pool sample OLS results (with and without intercept)
report significant relationship of coefficient of VaR based volatility. Tests applied on
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Table (3-6)
Pooled Regression of Absolute Value of Quarter t+1 Unexpected Trading Revenues on
Quarter t VaR-Based Volatility

[R

i , t +1

− E [Ri ,t +1 ]] = ai + biσ i ,t + ε i ,t +1

Pooled Method

Period
Constant
Slope
(t-Statistic)
Observations
Pooled Sample OLS
95,Q1-02,Q3
NA
1.452**
without Intercept
184
(7.213)
Pooled Sample OLS
95,Q1-02,Q3
59.077
0.986**
184
(1.740)
(2.945)
Pooled GLS
95,Q1-02,Q3
12.221
0.788**
Cross weighting
184
(1.243)
(5.883)
Pooled SUR
95,Q1-02,Q1
30.624
0.577
184
(4.718)
(6.517)
Fixed Effect Pool OLS 95,Q1-02,Q3
NA
0.274
184
(0.704)
Fixed Effect Pool GLS 95,Q1-02,Q3
NA
-0.036
184
(-0.314)
Fixed Effect Pool
95,Q1-02,Q3
NA
0.155
SUR
184
(1.596)
GLS Random Effect
95,Q1-02,Q3
103.929
0.434
Pool
184
(1.830)
1.159
• * Significant at 5%.
• ** Significant at 1%.
• NA: I did not report the fixed effect intercept.
single bank’s data reject both heteroskedasticity and serialcorrelations7, but the case is
different for pooled data. To correct for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation
in the pool data a cross section weights Generalized least Squares (GLS) method is
applied. The results are reported in raw 3 in table 3-6. I checked for the random and fixed
effects in the pool data, but the results do not show distinctive results for either random or
fixed effect, so I report the results for both of them. However, it is insignificant.

7

LM test, White and ARCH tests applied to test for heteroskedasticity and all show that there is no
heteroskedasticity on a single bank level. Serial correlation for single banks is also rejected using LM test
except for CitiCorp. The result are different for pooled data, figure 3-5 might give some ideas about
heteroskedasticity.
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Pool regression results give some indications for the informativeness of VaR models used
by banks to predict extreme losses. However, bank-specific regression do not show such
a relationship. Maybe with longer data set we can discover such relation. In conclusion,
VaR based volatility method (like the forecast evaluation method) do not give distinctive
proof for the accuracy of banks VaR models. As table 3-1 indicates banks used different
VaR techniques, which means that those VaR techniques do not usually give accurate
estimation for the maximum expected loss at a certain confidence level. As Berkowitz
and O’Brien (2002) suggest any VaR model that takes into account tail fatness and time
varying volatility would be more appropriate for capturing banks’ losses especially in
times of crisis and collapse.
3.5 Trading Portfolios
Trading portfolios’ sizes are necessary for calculating VaR. For the purpose of
back testing of VaR models developed in this dissertation, I collect trading portfolios
from the 10Qs and 10Ks starting of December 31, 1994. One thing we should note here is
that changes in trading portfolios do not reflect trading profit and losses. Trading
portfolios are defined in the 10Qs and 10Ks as the trading assets and liabilities and
derivative positions, and this is modified daily. Derivative positions widely exceed
trading assets and liabilities for equities and bonds. Trading portfolios in all banks in the
sample exceeds $1 billions (Thus they are all required by the SEC to disclose a measure
for market risk). Table 3-7 reports the mean and the standard deviation of trading
portfolios for the set of banks included in the sample.
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Table (3-7)
The Mean and Standard Deviation of the Trading Portfolios
(Trading Assets and Liabilities including Derivatives)
Bank

Trading Portfolio
($Millions)
Average

Std. Deviation

Bank of America

71,776.53

36780.34

Bank of New York

253,283.55

129551.95

Bankers Trust

56064.62

28437.87

Bank One /First Chicago

14989.47

3972.09

CitiCorp

61516.94

9247.01

156,735.34

111974.83

JP Morgan Chase & Co.

From table 3-7, we see that all banks in the sample have average trading assets
and liabilities including derivatives of more than $14 billions. The lowest trading
portfolio is for Bank One/ First Chicago and the highest is for Bank of New York. Figure
3- 6 shows the movement of trading portfolios as measured of trading asset and liabilities
including derivative securities over time. Figure 3-6 shows that Bank of America, Bank
of New York and JP Morgan Chase’s trading portfolios are upward trending. Bankers
Trust and Bank One show downward trending over the sample period, and CitiCorp
shows a flat trend in its trading portfolio. Figure 3-7 below compares trading portfolios
over time, where we see that Bank of New York maintains the highest trading portfolio
over time, and Bank One has the lowest and the most stable portfolio over the sample
period. The portfolio trending and levels explains significant part of the trending and the
levels of VaR estimates as we will see later.
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(Figure 3-7)
Trading Portfolios Sizes for Individual Banks in The Sample during The Period 1994:Q4-2002Q: Q3
Bank of America

Bankers Trust

Bank of New York

140000

100000

500000

120000

80000

400000

100000
80000

60000

300000

60000

40000

200000
40000

20000

100000

20000
0
95

96

97

98

99

00

01

0

0

02

95

96

97

Bank of America

98

99

00

01

95

02

96

97

98

Bank of New York

CitiCorp

Bank One
30000

100000

25000

80000

20000

99

00

01

02

Bankers Trust

JP Morgan Chase & Co.

400000

300000

60000
200000

15000
40000

10000

0

100000

20000

5000

0

95

96

97

98

99
Bank One

00

01

02

0
95

96

97

98

99
CitiCorp

00

01

02

95

96

97

98

99

00

JP Morgan Chase

01

02

85

(Figure 3-8)
Trading Portfolio Sizes for All Banks over The Sample Period.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
As mentioned in Chapter three, VaR estimates that banks announce or use
internally can not capture losses experienced by banks during the Russian Crisis and the
near collapse of the LTCM. Additionally, as in chapter two, VaR models that account for
tail thickness do not account for many aspects of financial data. Table 4-1 summarizes
the literature that investigate VaR under the assumption of thick tails distribution, more
explanations are available the literature review, chapter 2.
Table (4-1)
Summary of the Literature Deals with VaR under Thick Tails Distribution
The Paper
Zangari(1996),
Venkataraman (1997), and
Hull and White (1998)
Duffie and Pan (2001,
F&S) and Gibson (2001)
Levin and Tchernitser
(2001)
Li (1999)
El-Jahel, Perraudin and
Sellin (1999)

Sources of Kurtosis
Mixture of two
distributions

VaR Method
VaR percentile

Event risk (jumps)

Delta-Gamma Approach

Gamma – Variance
Model/ Maximum
Entropy Approach
Includes skewness and
kurtosis explicitly in VaR
Stochastic Volatility

Delta-Gamma Approach
VaR percentile,
(Cornish-Fisher Expansion).
Delta-Gamma Approach

For example non of the models above account for full thickness of the tail
distribution, by taking a model that combine both jumps and stochastic volatility, the two
sources of kurtosis in financial data, see Gibson (2001) and Lewis (2002). As mentioned
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earlier, both jumps and stochastic volatility are significant in financial data as in Chenov,
Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen (1999), Chourdakis (2000), and Chacko and
Viceria(2003). Additionally, non of the models deals with fast volatility during crashes
and collapse as Airoldi (2001) suggests.
4.1 The Assumed Processes for P&L
To account for those gaps in the previous literature, we derive an approximate
analytical estimate of VaR for a class of non-normally distributed market risk factors and
non-normally distributed portfolio’s P&L that allows for the maximum tail thickness and
fast volatility updating. To obtain such non-normal distribution, it is assumed that the
P&L and the underlying market risk factors are evolving according to a mix of a nonaffine stochastic volatility-jump diffusion model (NASVJ) in the form used by Chacko
and Viceira (2003). According to this specification, trading revenues are assumed to
evolve according to the following process:
dPt
= µdt + vt dWP + [exp( J u − 1]dN u (λu ) + [exp(− J d − 1]dN d (λd )
Pt
γ

dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σvt 2 dWv

(4 - 1)

Where WP ,Wv are Wiener processes with instantaneous correlation ρ , µ is the
expected return on the banks portfolio or trading revenues, vt is the instantaneous
variance of the portfolio, J u , J d > 0 , are stochastic jump magnitudes. λu , λd > 0 are
constants the determine jump frequencies. Hence, [exp( J u − 1]dN u (λu ) is a positive jump
and [exp(− J d − 1]dN d (λd ) is a downward jump. Here, the upward and downward jumps
are asymmetric. κ ,θ , σ , γ are constants. κ represents the speed of adjustment, θ is the
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long term mean, and σ is volatility of the instantaneous volatility. When γ takes value
greater than 1, (γ > 1) , stochastic volatility is described to be non-affine stochastic
volatility process, with (γ = 1) , stochastic volatility process would be described as affine
process. Following Chacko and Das (2002) and Chacko and Viceira (2003), we assume
here that jumps magnitudes are determined by draws from exponential distribution rather
than a Poisson distribution, with the densities
f (Ji ) =

 J 
exp − i 
ηi
 ηi 
1

(4 - 2)

Where i = u, d.
The stochastic differential equation in 4-1 (even if we disregard stochastic
volatility) is a mixed of normal process, Geometric Brownian Motion, (GBM), and
Poisson-Exponential process in the jump part. This mixture result in an unknown
conditional density function for Pt. Additionally, with discretely sample data, it is
difficult to know which returns have a discontinuous component in it and which one does
not. The matter becomes worse when we add stochastic volatility, since it is unobservable
stochastic variable, and also the density function is unknown (even with jumps
exclusion).
Jumps are regularly used in finance to capture discontinuous behavior in asset
pricing. Merton (1976) was one of the first who use jump diffusion processes in finance.
Returns discontinuities typically exhibit themselves in discretely sampled data in the
form of excess kurtosis. So, one part of kurtosis in trading returns can be captured by
jump diffusions. The other part of kurtosis is captured by the instantaneous correlation
between the Brownian Motions of portfolio returns and volatility of returns on the
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portfolio ρ . Notice here that dynamics in volatility are non-linear of the squared
volatility, which makes volatility updating faster.
Thus a process in such form allows for the complete kurtosis in trading revenues
(portfolio returns). The non-affine stochastic process gives faster updating in volatility
compared with affine volatility stochastic processes, which might explains the case of
hyper volatility that arises with thick tails, Airoldi (2001). A VaR estimate based on such
distribution should be able to predict losses that banks experience during market crashes.
The cases where internal banks’ VaR models and GARCH based VaR models failed to
capture, as reported by Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002).
With certain restrictions on the parameters of the NASVJ, five well-known
processes are emerged. If we suppress λu , λd = 0 and vt = σ , (dv = 0), we get the popular
Geometric Brownian Motion process (GBM). On the other hand of we restore jump
intensities λu , λd > 0 , with the assumption that vt = σ (dv = 0) we would be left with a
jump diffusion process with asymmetric jumps (JD). If we suppress the jump frequencies
( λu , λd = 0 ) and γ = 1 , we get the square root process (SV) as in Heston (1993). With

λu , λd > 0 and γ = 1 , we get a mixed stochastic volatility process with jumps (SVJ).
Finally, if we restrict γ to be greater that 1 ( γ > 1 ) and restrict jump intensities to equal
zero ( λu , λd = 0 ), we get the non-affine stochastic volatility (NASV). Table 4-2
summarizes those restrictions and the resulted special cases processes.
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Table (4-2)
Restrictions on the NASVJ and the Resulted Special Cases
Restrictions

Resulted Process

Notes

λu , λd = 0 and vt = σ ,

Log-normal Distribution,
zero skewness and kurtosis

λu , λd > 0 , and vt = σ

dPt
= µdt + vt dWP
Pt
Jump diffusion

λu , λd = 0 and γ = 1

Square Root process

λu , λd > 0 and γ = 1

Mixed stochastic volatility
process
Non-affine stochastic
volatility

λu , λd = 0 and γ > 1

Part of skewness and
kurtosis is captured
Part of skewness and
kurtosis is captured
The whole skewness and
kurtosis is captured
Part of skewness and
kurtosis is captured, but
volatility updates faster.

Those processes are well known in finance literature. However, it got limited use
in VaR literature. Cardenas, Fruchard, Koehler and Michel (1997) and Rouvinez (1997)
derive an analytical estimate for VaR assuming that mark to market evolves according to
a multidimensional GBM process. El-Jahel, Perraudin and Sellin (1999) derive VaR
estimate for portfolio contains derivative securities based on stochastic volatility model.
Duffie and Pan (2001) derive an analytical delta-gamma VaR estimate for jump diffusion
process. On the other hand, Levin and Tchernitser (2001) derive VaR model under
different levy processes one of which Ornestein Uhlenbeck process.
4.2 The General Methodology
VaR deals with the probability of loss. Thus the first task is to identify the
distribution of the left tail. To derive an explicit solution of VaR, the dissertation assumes
that trading revenues’ of the bank follow NASVJ and the other special cases processes
summarized in Table 4-2. Unfortunately, the probability distribution function (pdf) and
the cumulative distribution function for those processes are unknown. So the first step is
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to derive the conditional distribution function for those processes. The necessity of using
the conditional distribution rather than unconditional one comes from Hsieh’s (1993)
concern that conditional densities provide better description of asset price movements in
the presence of non-linear dynamics.
As mentioned earlier, the cdf for those processes is unknown. However, we can
solve explicitly for the characteristic function (cf). Epps (1993) defines the characteristic
function for a random variable X at some real number ω as the center of mass of the
distribution of ωX wrapped around the unit circle in the complex plane. The
characteristic function can be represented by:
∞

φ (ω ) = E[eiωX ∫ eiωu dF ( x)

(4 - 3)

−∞

The cf uniquely defines the distribution function, cdf through the Fourier
inversion theorem of the cf that gives the cdf. According to the Fourier transforms
theorems if:

φ (ω ) =
f ( x) =

1
2π
1
2π

∞

∫ f (u )e

iωu

du

−∞
∞

∫ φ (ω )e

− iωx

dω

(4 - 4)

−∞

The function φ(ω) is called the Fourier transform of f(x), and the f(x) is the
inverse Fourier transform of φ(ω). The constants preceding the integral sign in equation
system 4-4 can be any constant different from zero as long as their product is

1
. In our
2π

case φ(ω) is the characteristic function and f(x) is the probability density function.
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However, in our analysis we are in need for the cdf rather than the pdf. For more about
the characteristic function and the Fourier transformation theorems see Sturat and Ord
(1994: chapter 4), and Pollock (2000: chapter 13).
Inferring the distribution function from the characteristic function has a long
history in statistics. Imhof (1961) and Bohman (1961) start this effort. Bohman (1970,
1972, 1975,1980), Davies (1973) and Schorr (1975) originally propose algorithms to
invert numerically characteristic function to obtain cumulative distribution function.
Bohman (1975) gives five methods for numerical inversion of cf to get the cdf. However
his five methods are applied for random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
Waller, Turnbull and Hardin (1995) and Waller (1995) apply the first method of Bohman
(1975) which is the least accurate among the five methods at some known distributions
and they conclude that the numerical inverse of the characteristic function distinguish the
distribution function.
Using the characteristic function to infer the distribution function in economics
starts with Shephard (1991). He derives the Fourier theorem version to infer the
cumulative distribution function and he extends it to multivariate random variables.
Additionally, Shephard (1991) establishs the condition of this inversion theorem.
Shephard (1991) setup the cdf function as an inversion of the characteristic function
according to the following equation:
∞
φ (ω )eiωx 
1 1
Re
−

dω
2 2π ∫0  iω 
Where Re[.] is the real part of the imaginary root.

F ( x) =

(4 - 5)

After that the theory of inversion used extensively in both option pricing and
estimation. In option pricing, Stein and Stein (1991) use the inversion method for the
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moment generating function rather than the characteristic function. However, the moment
generating function does not uniquely identify the distribution as Waller, Turnbull and
Hardin (1995) and Waller (1995) indicate. Heston (1993) uses the Fourier theorem in
deriving option pricing under stochastic volatility. Bates (1996 a, b) use the same
methodology for deriving option pricing under jumps. Schobel and Zhu (1999) apply the
inversion method in option pricing stochastic volatility with Ornstein-Ublenbeck process.
Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997) and Scott (1997) use the Fourier inversion to calculate
option prices under different stochastic process with jumps in pricing and evaluating the
performance of different option pricing models. Benhamou (1999), on the other hand,
uses the fast Fourier transform (discrete algorithm) to evaluate discrete Asian options.
Many authors try to generalize the Fourier inversion of the characteristic function
for pricing certain type of derivatives. Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000) generalize the
Fourier transform method for pricing assets with affine jump diffusion returns. Chacko
and Das (2002) generalize this approach for pricing interest rate derivatives. Lewis (2000,
2001, 2002) introduce a general derivation for a fundamental transform method of the
characteristic function depends on the payoff of the option and the type of the stochastic
process of the underlying asset. In his work, Lewis could specify the imaginary strips
where the fundamental transform method applies.
Using the characteristic function for the purpose of estimation starts to appear
recently in economics and finance as a substitute of the unknown distribution function.
Most of the work in using the characteristic function in estimation uses the
generalizations of Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000) and Chacko and Das (2002). Jiang
and Knight (2002), Knight and Yu (2002), and Knight, Satchel and Yu (2002) use the
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empirical characteristic function to develop a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for
continuous time processes. Yu (1999) uses the empirical characteristic function to
estimate a jump diffusion model. Singleton (2001) uses this method in developing EMM
estimation of affine processes. Finally Chacko and Viceira (2003) use the conditional
characteristic function to estimate the NASVJ and its special cases for the S&P 500 data.
Using the inversion of the characteristic function to obtain the cumulative
distribution function in VaR context is very limited. Cardenas, Fruchard, Koehler and
Michel (1997) assume that the mark to market follow multidimensional pure Ito’s
process. In their work they derive the characteristic function and then they numerically
invert it with fast Fourier inversion method. Using Taylor expansion, they expand trading
revenues to include vega rather than delta and gamma only. After they numerically obtain
the cumulative distribution, they include this estimation into delta-gamma approach for
option portfolios with analytical solution for VaR for a pure diffusion model. The source
of skewness and kurtosis in their model is gamma.
El-Jahel, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) use the characteristic function to derive
numerically the third and the fourth moments for stochastic volatility process and include
them in the delta-gamma approach to calculate VaR for derivative securities. El-Jahel,
Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) do not invert the characteristic function to obtain the
cumulative distribution but instead they calculate the higher moments of the stochastic
volatility model numerically and include them in the delta gamma method.
Duffie and Pan (2001) use a jump diffusion model with return jumps at Poisson
arrival. They infer the tail distribution by deriving the characteristic function and then
invert it numerically via Fourier inversion theorem. Duffie and Pan (2001) in their
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method replace the simulation step in VaR with a jump diffusion model for option
portfolio through delta-gamma approach.
This work differ from the above three papers in four aspects:
1- We do not use the delta-gamma or any Greeks. Instead, we derive analytical
solution for VaR that is a function of the tail distribution (the tail percentile)
and its deviates. Then we estimate tail percentile using the numerical
inversion of the conditional characteristic function. After that we substitute
the percentile deviate into VaR equation to get VaR estimate.
2- This work assumes diffusion processes that contain both stochastic volatility
and jumps simultaneously to capture the full skewness and kurtosis.
3- This dissertation adopts a non-affine stochastic volatility model that allows for
fast updating of stochastic volatility.
4- In the back testing part, this dissertation applies its theoretical VaR estimate
on a real sample of portfolio trading returns, in a try to mimic actual trading
losses of those actual portfolios during high volatility periods and market
crashes. This method of testing has not been applied by any of the papers who
produced analytical VaR estimates. Most of the papers apply the VaR estimate
on a hypothetical portfolios contain one option position written on the S&P
500.
Table 4-3 summarizes the differences between this work and other work that use
the characteristic function. The comparison includes those who use the Fourier inversion
like Cardenas, Fruchard, Koehler and Michel (1997) and Duffie and Pan (2001). Or those
how use the characteristic function to derive the moments rather than the distribution like
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El-Jahel, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999). As a matter of fact, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999)
methodology in calculating VaR is a bit different from the method used here. Their
methodology does not use the Fourier inversion, and Fourier inversion is crucial in this
work.
In deriving an analytical VaR for the NASVJ and the special cases (SV, JD, SVJ,
and NASV) we proceed according to the following steps:
1- Deriving an analytical VaR estimate as a function of the distribution deviate α
associated with a specific confidence level (99%).
2- Derive the cumulative distribution function for each process, to get α, and this
can be obtained by:
a- Deriving the conditional characteristic function for each process
b- Invert the characteristic function according to equation 4 –5 for each
characteristic function
c- Obtain the deviate α that is associated with the 99% confidence level and
substitute is in the derived analytical solution for VaR.
The methodology of deriving the conditional probability distribution mentioned
above is applicable for affine processes. As a matter of fact, it is applicable only for
affine processes as Shephard (1991), Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000) and Chacko and
Das (2002) show. For non-affine process, we need first to transform the non-affine
processes to affine process, mostly by using some kind of Taylor series expansion and
then perform the Fourier-inversion.
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Table (4-3)
Summary of the Existing Literature Using the Characteristic Function in VaR Estimate
Paper
Indicator
Source of Dynamics
Source of Tail
thickness

Cardenas
et.al.(1997)

El-Jahel et.al
(1999)

Duffie and Pan
(2001)

Mark to market in
Options Portfolio
Ito’s Process for
stochastic
Volatility, Vega
Term

Underlying Assets
Underlying Assets
in Options Portfolio in Options Portfolio
Square
Root Jumps
Stochastic

The
Proposed Work
The whole trading
revenues (P&L)
Non affine
Stochastic
Volatility and
Jumps

Volatility
Inferring The
Distribution
Volatility Estimate
VaR Method

Inverting The
Characteristic
Function
Assumed
Parameters
Delta-Gamma
Approximation

Including higher
moments into VaR
Assumed Volatility
Parameters
Delta-Gamma
Approximation

Inverting The
Characteristic
Function
Pre-Exist Data
Delta-Gamma
Approximation

Inverting The
Characteristic
Function
Historical
Volatility
VaR Percentile
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Schobel and Zhu (1999) argue that applying the inversion formula and solving the
integral in equation 4-5 is not a trivial issue. Even they consider the numerical solution
for such integral of real value is also not trivial. In Schobel and Zhu (1999, p. 28)
language “Numerical integration of these real valued probability integrals is not trivial.
Heston (1993) as well as Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997) did not report their numerical
procedures in detail. Bates (1996) evaluated the integrals in his formula using Gaussian
quadrature software and obtained sufficiently accurate results except for extreme and
implausible jump parameters”.
Scott (1997) compared the Fourier inversion method with Monte Carlo
simulations and finite difference methods and report that the Fourier inversion method is
superior with respect to accuracy and computing time. Schobel and Zhu (1999) results
support Scott (1997) results in the superiority of Fourier inversion method to Monte
Carlo simulations. As mentioned earlier, Bohman (1961, 1970, 1972, 1975, and 1980)
invent five accurate methods to solve this integral numerically. Bohman (1975)
summarizes those methods and test those methods in terms of accuracy and time
consuming.
4.3 Deriving VaR Estimator
In this section, the formal derivations of VaR for the NASVJ and all other special
cases including the GBM are introduced. As stated earlier, the derivation procedure starts
with the confidence level (α). After that, we derive the conditional characteristic function
for each process, which is known with a closed form. Finally, using the Fourier inversion
theorem introduced in equation 4-5, we infer the cumulative distribution function (cdf)
for each process.
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Through the derivation, the following notations will be used,
Pt: The portfolio size at time t.
τ: The holding period or time horizon over which the portfolio held without
change in position. τ is the holding period over which we calculate VaR.
∆Pt+τ: The profit and the loss of the bank or the trading revenue over the period τ.
c: The confidence level (99% for example).
α: The deviate associated with the confidence level, 2.326 for 99% confidence
level of a standard normal distribution. We use αsn for standard normal distribution.
pt : lnPt
∆pt+τ : ∆lnP t+τ, and it represents return on the portfolio over τ holding period.
vt: The volatility at time t, v without subscript is used when the volatility is
constant. When volatility is constant v = σ 02 and

v =σ0 .

4.3.1 Value at Risk (VaR)
Value at risk (VaR) is defined as the maximum expected loss in the market value
that would be exceeded by a small probability (1-c)% over a defined trading time horizon
τ. if we assume that Pt is the value of the portfolio at time t and ∆Pt is the profit and loss
(P&L) of the bank or the trading revenues over the time horizon τ, then the Pr (-∆Pt+τ ≥
VaRτ) = (1-c)%. Expressed in terms of the percent point function Pr (-∆Pt+τ ≥ G(1-c)) =
(1-c)%, where VaR = G(1-c) = G(F(-VaR)).
Following Jorion (2001) in constructing VaR, assume that there is a lowest value
of the portfolio donated P* at a confidence level of c%, which means that there is a
probability of (1-c)% that the portfolio value would be less than P*. Assume that the
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lowest level of the portfolio is associated with a return on the portfolio of ∆P*. Where

 Pt *+ τ 
∆ P * = ln 

 Pt 

 P*
Pr  ∆ ln Pt +τ ≤ ln  t +τ
 Pt


. Then:


  = (1 − c)%


(4-6)

Notice here that P*satisfies the definition of VaR. Then:

 VaRτ
Pr  ∆ ln Pt +τ ≤ ln 1 −
Pt




  = (1 − c)%


(4-7)

4.3.1.1 The GBM Case (Log-Normal Case)
Assume that the P&L (trading revenues) follow a Geometric Brownian Motion
process of the form:
dPt
= µ P dt + v dWP
Pt

(4-8)

Where µP is the expected return on the portfolio. Then by Ito's Lemma
1 

dpt = d ln Pt =  µ P − v dt + v dWP
2 


So,

(4-9)



1 
∆ ln Pt ~ N  µ P − v τ , σ 0 τ 
2 



In case of standard normal equation (4-7) becomes

 VaRτ  
1 

ln 1 −
 −  µ P − v τ
Pt  
2 

Pr  ∆ ln Pt +τ ≤ 
σ0 τ







 = (1 − c)%




(4-10)
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From equation (4-10) we recognize that

G (1 − c) = α sn

 VaRτ
ln 1 −
Pt
= 

 
1 
 −  µ P − v τ
2 
 

σ0 τ

(4-11)

For equation (4-11) we can obtain αsn from the standard normal cumulative
distribution tables. For confidence level of c = 99%, αsn = -2.326. Accordingly,
1 


 µ P − v τ +α snσ 0
2 

VaRτ = Pt 1 − e


τ





(4-12)

4.3.1.2 VaR under Thick Tails
Since VaR is related to the distribution of the tail of the P&L of the bank, in this
part, we are looking to get an estimate for the VaR under different processes that allow
for thick tails. We start with generalizing a model for the non-affine stochastic volatility
process with jump (NASVJ). Then we find stochastic Volatility process (SV), the jump
diffusion process (JD), a mixed process of stochastic volatility and jump (SVJD), nonaffine stochastic volatility process (NASV), all as special cases. The stochastic volatility
process and the jump diffusion process allow for skewness and excess kurtosis, the mixed
process allows for the maximum tail thickness. Whereas the non-affine structure
(including the general model) allow for hyper volatility updating as in the cases of stock
market crashes. Airoldi (2001) argues that in case of thick tails, volatility updates faster
than linear relation with past volatility, as in the case of the near collapse of the LTCM.
Under those processes, the probability of getting trading revenues under certain
level, like, α can be written as
Pr (∆ ln Pt +τ ≤ α ) = (1 − c)%

(4-13)
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 VaRτ 
From equation (4-7) above ln 1 −
 = (G (1 − c)) = α , accordingly, we find
Pt 

VaRτ to be:

[

VaRτ = Pt 1 − e α

]

(4-14)

The task now is to infer α associated with the confidence level, i.e. deriving the
cumulative distribution function. As mentioned earlier, because the cdf is unknown for
those processes, deriving the cdf requires first deriving the conditional characteristic
function (ccf) for each process and then using the Fourier inversion theorem.
4.3.2 The Conditional Characteristic Function of Non-normal Processes
Deriving the ccf will be implemented according to the following steps:
1. Deriving the Kolomogorov Backward Equation (KBE) or Fokker-Plank
Forward Equation (F-PFE), two names for same equation. The KBE or the
F-PFE is a partial differential equation with a known solution form. The
conditional characteristic function is the solution for that equation. And this
whole procedure is known as Feynman-Kac Formula.
2. To solve KBE we conjecture a solution for the characteristic function and
substitute this conjecture into the KBE.
3. When substituting the conjecture into the KBE, we get two ordinary
differential equations (ODE) of the form of Raccati equations.
4. Solving those two Raccati equations gives the parameters of the
characteristic function.
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4.3.2.1 Deriving the ccf for the NASVJ Process
Assuming that the trading revenues evolve according to NASVJ, means that the
P&L are evolving according to equation (4-1) in section 4-1 above:

dPt
= µ dt + vt dWP + [exp(J u − 1]dNu (λu ) + [exp(− J d − 1]dNd (λd )
Pt
γ

dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σvt 2 dWv
Parameters are as defined in section 4.1 above. Applying Ito’s Lemma, to get the
log transformation gives the following
1
dpt = d ln Pt = ( µ P − vt )dt + vt dWP + J u dN u (λu ) − J d dN d (λ d )
2

(4-15)

γ

dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σvt 2 dWv
Donate the ccf by φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ ) , the Feynmann-Kac formula, implies that
E [dφ (ω , p t , vt ,τ )] = 0 . This is the same as Heston (1993) assumption that φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ )
is martingale. The solution for the partial differential equation (pde)
E [dφ (ω , p t , vt ,τ )] = 0 is the characteristic function φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ ) with the terminal
condition φ (ω , pt , vt ,0) = e iωp . ω is a real valued dummy variable and i is the imaginary
root, where i = − 1 .
By Feynmann-Kac formula:
∂φ
1
∂φ
1 ∂ 2φ
1 ∂ 2φ 2 γ
( µ P − vt ) +
v
κ (θ − vt ) +
+
σ vt +
t
∂p
∂vt
2
2 ∂p 2
2 ∂v 2
γ +1

∂ 2φ
∂φ
σvt 2 ρ pv −
+ λu E [φ (ω , pt + J u , vt ,τ ) − φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ )]
∂v∂p
∂τ
+ λ d E [φ (ω , pt − J d , vt ,τ ) − φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ )] = 0

(4-16)

Equation 4-16 is known as Kolomogrov Backward Equation (KBE) or
Fokker - Plank Forward Equation and the conditional characteristic function
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φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ ) is the solution for this equation. The last two terms concerning jumps in 416 are very familiar in the jump literature. Kushner (1967) and Gihman and Skorohod
(1972) provide a full derivation to such terms. Merton (1971,1976) Ahn and Thompson
(1988), Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000), Singleton (2001), Chacko and Das (2002) and
Chacko and Viceira (2003) use Kushner (1967) and Gihman and Skorohod (1972).
To solve for the conditional characteristic function explicitly, we guess a
functional form for the characteristic function of the form

φ (ω , pt , vt ,τ ) = e iωp + A(τ ) + B (τ )

(4-17)

with the terminal condition φ (ω , pt , vt ,0) = e iωp
Substituting the conjecture in equation (4-17) and its derivatives in the KBE,
equation (4-16) we get:
1
1
1
iω ( µ P − vt ) + A(τ )κ (θ − vt ) + (iω ) 2 vt + A 2 (τ )σ 2 vtγ +
2
2
2
γ +1
dB(τ ) 
 dA(τ )
iωA(τ )σvt 2 ρ pv − 
vt +
+ λu E e iωJ u − 1 + λ d E e iωJ d − 1 = 0

dτ 
 dτ

[

γ
t

The term (4-18) contains v , v

[

]

γ +1
2
t

[

]

]

[

[

]

(4-18)

]

+ λu E e iωJ u − 1 and λ d E e iωJ d − 1 which are non-

[

]

linear. For the terms λu E e iωJ u − 1 and λ d E e iωJ d − 1 we apply the moment generating
function (mgf) method for the exponential distribution as reported in Rose and Smith

[

]

[

]

(2002, p.142) for E e iωJ u and E e iωJ d , which gives:

[

E e iωJ u

[

1
] = 1-iωη

E e −iωJ d

(4-19)
u

] = 1 + i1ωη

(4-20)
d

105

Chacko and Viceria (2003) adopt the transformation above for those non-linear
terms. Another way is to follow Chacko and Das (2002), by applying the mgf method for

[

]

[

]

]

ωη u
i + ωη u

(4-21)

ωη d
i − ωη d

(4-22)

the whole terms E e iωJ u − 1 and E e iωJ d − 1 :

[

E e iωJ u −1 = −

[

]

E e −iωJ d − 1 =

Here we follow Chacko and Viceria (2003) by adopting the transformation shown
γ +1

in (4-19) and (4-20). For the terms vtγ and vt 2 , we apply some kind of perturbation
method to linearize the parameters in vt. This approximation is basically a Taylor series
expansion around the unconditional mean volatility process θ as follows:
γ

vt ≈ θ γ (1 − γ ) + γθ γ −1vt
v

γ +1
2
t

≈θ

γ +1
2

(

1− γ
1+ γ
)+(
)θ
2
2

(4-23)
γ −1
2

vt

(4-24)

Substituting the terms (4-19), (4-20), (4-23), and (4-24) into (4-18) and
rearranging,

 1
λu
λd

+
− (λu + λ d )  +  iω (iω − 1)vt  +
 iωµ P +
1 − iωη u 1 + iωη d

 2

γ +1
γ −1

 
1− γ  
1+ γ  2
2 



− κ vt  A(τ ) +
  +  iωσρ 
θ
 κθ + iωσρθ 
 2  
 2 
 


(4-25)

 1 2 γ
dA(τ )
dB(τ )
  1 2 γ −1   2
 2 σ θ (1 − γ )  +  2 σ γθ vt  A (τ ) − dτ vt + dτ = 0
 
 

Redefining 4-25 as
1
dA(τ )
dB(τ )
c + aA(τ ) + bA 2 (τ ) −
vt +
=0
2
dτ
dτ

(4-26)
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Each parameter of c, a, and b consists two parts, the first part is independent and
the second part depends on the state variable vt. We can rewrite those parameters in the
following formats:
a = a1 + a 2 vt

(4-27)

b = b1 + b2 vt

(4-28)

c = c1 + c 2 vt

(4-29)

Where, a1 = κθ + iωσρθ
1+ γ 
a 2 = iωσρ 
θ
 2 

γ −1
2

γ +1
2

1− γ 

,
 2 

−κ ,

b1 = σ 2θ γ (1 − γ ) ,
b2 = σ 2 γθ γ −1 ,
c1 = iωµ P +

λu
λd
1
+
− (λu + λ d ) and c 2 = iω (iω − 1)
2
1 − iωη u 1 + iωη d

Now, substituting a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, and c2 into 4-26
dA(τ )
dB(τ )
b b

(c1 + c 2 vt ) + (a1 + a 2 vt ) A(τ ) +  1 + 2 v 2  A 2 (τ ) −
vt +
=0
dτ
dτ
2 2 

(4-30)

(4-30) can be written in the following fashion:
1
dB(τ )  
1
dA(τ ) 

2
-  c1 + a1 A(τ ) + b1 A 2 (τ ) −
 =  c 2 + a 2 A(τ ) + b2 A (τ ) −
vt (4-31)
2
dτ  
2
dτ 

As in Ingersoll (1987, chapter 18), the equality in (4-31) can only hold if both
sides of the equation are zeros, because the state variable vt is stochastic. This leads to the
following ordinary differential equations
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1
dB(τ )
c1 + a1 A(τ ) + b1 A 2 (τ ) =
2
dτ

(4-32)

1
dA(τ )
c 2 + a 2 A(τ ) + b2 A 2 (τ ) =
2
dτ

(4-33)

With the boundary conditions A(0)=0, and B(0)=0.
Equations (4-32) and (4-33) are the well know imaginary Raccati equations,
Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000), Liu (2001) and Duffie, and Schachermayer (2002)
introduce a general solution for such kind of equations. However, the solution for
equation (4-33) is given by:
u1τ
u 2τ
2  u1u 2 e − u1u 2 e 
A(τ , ω ) = 
,
b2  u1 eu2τ − u 2 eu1τ 


(4-34)

Where
u1 = a 2 + a 22 − 2b2 c 2
u 2 = a 2 − a 22 − 2b2 c 2
The solution for B(τ ) in (4-32) is given by:
τ

1
dB(τ ) 

B (τ ) = ∫  c1 + a1 A(τ ) + b1 A2 (τ ) −
du
2
dτ 
0

(4-35)

Where u here is the integral dummy. From (4-33),
A 2 (τ ) =

2c
2 dA(τ ) 2a 2
−
A(τ ) − 2 , Accordingly, we can rearrange the terms inside the
b2 dτ
b2
b2

integral and (4-35) can be written as
 b dA(τ ) 
ba
B(τ ) = ∫  1
+  a1 − 1 2
b du
b2

0  2
τ



bc
 A(τ ) +  c1 − 1 2
b2




 du


Distributing the integral through out the expressions, we get:

(4-36)
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τ

τ

b1
ba
dA(τ ) + ∫  a1 − 1 2
b
b2
0
0 2

B(τ ) = ∫

τ


bc
 A(τ )du + ∫  c1 − 1 2
b2

0


du


(4-37)

Since A(0) = 0, then integrating the first and the third terms:

b
ba
B(τ ) = 1 [ A(τ )] +  a1 − 1 2
b2
b2


τ

bc
 ∫ A(τ )du +  c1 − 1 2
b2
0



τ


(4-38)



u 2 − u1
2
∫0 A(τ )du = b 2 ln  u 2 u1τ − u 1 u 2τ  ,
e 
 e
τ

Where u1, and u2 as defined above.
Accordingly, the solution for the ODE (4-32) is given by:
B(τ ) =


b1
[A(τ )] +  c1 − b1c2
b2
b2


 
ba
τ +  a1 − 1 2
b2
 


 2 
u 2 − u1
 ln 

u1τ
u 2τ
 b2  u 2 e − u1 e 

(4-39)

To get the value of the characteristic function for the NASVJ process, we
substitute the values of a1, a2, b1 b2, c1 and c2 in A(τ) equation (4-34) and B(τ) equation
(39), in the conjectured form of the characteristic function in (4-17).
After substituting the values of a1, a2, b1 b2, c1 and c2 in A(τ) and B(τ) then we find
that
A(τ , ω ) =

2

σ 2 γθ γ −1

 u1u 2 u1τ − u1u 2 u2τ 
e
e ,

u 2τ
u1τ
 u1 e − u 2 e


(4-40)
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B (τ ,ω ) =



θ
(1 − γ )[A(τ )] +  iωµ Pτ + λuτ + λdτ − (λu + λd )τ  −
1 − iωηu 1 + iωηd
γ



θ
(ω − γω ) − 1 ω − 1 i τ
2 
γ
 2
γ +1

1− γ
+  κθ + iωσρθ 2 
 2


2

σ γθ
2

γ −1

 1

1
  θ
1

θ γ  iρσω + iρσγω  − κ 
  − (1 − γ )
2
 γ
2

 θ




u2 − u1
ln 
u1τ
u 2τ 
 u2 e − u1 e 

(4 - 41)

Where
2

1+ γ 
u1 = iωσρ 
θ
 2 

γ −1
2

γ −1


1+ γ  2

− κ +  iωσρ 
− κ  − iωσ 2 γθ γ −1 (iω − 1)
θ
 2 



1+ γ
u 2 = iωσρ 
 2

γ −1
2


1+ γ
− κ −  iωσρ 
 2



θ



θ


γ −1
2

2


− κ  − iωσ 2 γθ γ −1 (iω − 1)


4.3.2.2 Deriving the ccf for the Special Cases Processes
Depending on the restrictions we impose on the parameters in the process, we can
derive the characteristic function for the special processes. All we need to do, is to adjust
the values for a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, and c2 taking into account the restrictions on the
parameters estimate. Restrictions are shown in table 4-2.
As mentioned above, cdfs for such processes are not known in a closed form, but
the characteristic function (cf) are known. The cf has 1 to 1 correspondence with the cdf,
∞
φ (ω ,τ )eiωα 
1 1
Pr( P ≤ α ) = −
Re 
dω
2 2π ∫0 
iω

and the Fourier inversion of the cf gives the cdf, as indicated in section 4.2 above

according to equation
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Where Pr(∆p≤α) is the probability of the portfolio value to be less than or equal α where
α any quantile in the distribution. So by solving the integral in (4-5) we can get a value
for α at any confidence level and then substitute it in (4-14) to get VaR under thick tails
distributions, represented by the above processes. Unfortunately, the integral in the (real
part) above does not have closed form solution, and the only way is to solve it
numerically. Solving the integral above numerically is not a trivial step as Schobel and
Zhu (1999). Most of papers that use this method did not report how the solve this
integral. Using this method of obtaining the cdf is the most efficient method in terms of
accuracy and time compared with the Monte Carlo simulations and finite difference
methods, Scott (1997). As mention earlier, a great credit for inventing methods to solve
this integral goes to Bohman work listed earlier especially Bohman (1975).
4.4 Estimating Volatility of Trading Revenues
As mentioned earlier, estimation of current volatility is a crucial issue in estimating VaR.
As explained in section 2.5.2 of chapter 2, VaR literature use different models for
estimating current volatility including constant volatility models, exponential weighting
volatility model, ARCH, GARCH, EGARCH models and implied volatility from option
pricing. VaR models that use stochastic volatility as a risk factor including Cardenas,
Fruchard, Koehler and Michel (1997) and El-Jahel, Perraudin, and Sellin (1999) preassumed the volatility process parameters rather than estimate them.
We can use the characteristic function in estimating the diffusion processes above to
get the current volatility and all continuous time processes. Recently, authors including
Yu (1999), Singleton (2001), Jiang and Knight (2002), Knight and Yu (2002), Knight,
Satchel and Yu (2002), and Chacko and Viceira (2003) start to use the characteristic
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function for estimation continuous time processes because it is known in closed form for
many continuous time processes. A great advantage of those methods depend on the
characteristic function that they do not need to discretize the data. Chacko and Viceira
invented a GMM estimator ( they called it Spectral GMM) in which they integrate the
unobserved variable (volatility in this case) in estimating the continuous time processes.
In our case, we already derived the characteristic functions which is the most
challenging part in the estimation processes. With the existence of volatility and non
zero correlation between the portfolio trading revenues and the portfolio revenue the
portfolio revenue is Markovian. Thus the conditional characteristic function that we
calculated is conditional only on the previous portfolio value. Accordingly, the
characteristic function do not condition on the entire path of portfolio value, but on the
portfolio value in the previous period.
For Chacko and Viceira's (2003) estimation method, volatility is latent variable and it
is unobservable. Thus, to implement their GMM method, we have to integrate volatility
out. In this case, we still condition on the previous portfolio level, but the portfolio
trading revenues is no longer Markovian. It is only Markovian if it is associated with the
volatility process through the correlation between volatility and returns on the portfolio.
When we integrate volatility out, the previous portfolio level will not reflect the entire
path of the portfolio level, because we lost the knowledge of volatility. With this
necessary modification, our estimation loses some efficiency but the estimation timing
improves tremendously. For more details see Chacko and Viceira (2003).
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CHAPTER FIVE: APPLICATION OF VaR MODELS UNDER
THICK TAILS
This chapter applies VaR models under the six different stochastic processes
derived in chapter four on the data sample discussed in chapter three. In each section, we
compare VaR estimate based on each process with unexpected trading profits and losses,
and disclosed banks’ VaR estimate. Additionally, we compare VaR model derived based
on different processes to explore the effect of jumps, stochastic volatility and non-affine
stochastic volatility on VaR estimate. This comparison considered is as a form of back
testing, where the two back testing methodologies explained in chapter three sections
3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are used.
5.1 The GBM VaR Model (Log-Normal Case)
As indicated in chapter four earlier, VaR based on the GBM process takes the
form shown in equation 4-12.
1

( µ − v )τ +ασ 0 τ 
VaRτ = Pt 1 − e 2



Where α represents the normal deviate. At a 99% confidence level, α = -2.326. The

parameters µ and σ0 are estimated based on the method discussed in chapter four using
the actual banks’ sample unexpected trading revenues. Appendix A-1 shows parameter
estimates for the GBM process for the sample’s banks unexpected trading revenues. With
knowing the parameters µ and σ0 and the size of the trading portfolio we can calculate
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GBM VaR. Figure 5-1 gives GBM VaR estimate compared with unexpected trading revenues for
the banks in the sample during the period 1995: Q1-2002: Q3.
5.1.1 Forecast Evaluation Back Testing
This section uses the back testing methodology described in section 3.4.1 to evaluate the
performance of GBM VaR and compare it with the performance of the disclosed banks’ VaR.
Figure 5-1 is similar to figure 3-4, in that it shows the number of violations under GBM
VaR. Violations are the numbers of times that actual trading losses exceed GBM VaR. As
mentioned earlier in chapter three, a 99% confidence level quarterly VaR means that a quarter
losses can exceed VaR estimate once every 25 years. For our 31 quarters sample, a 99%
confidence level quarterly VaR should be exceeded only 0.31 times during the sample period.
In our sample period, figure 5-1 shows that all banks in the sample witness at least one violation
during the sample period. If we compare this result with banks VaR estimate in figure 3-4, we
find that violations under GBM VaR occur more frequent across the banks in the sample. For
banks’ VaR there are violations only in four banks in the sample as figure 3-4 indicates.
However, the size and the number of violation under GBM VaR are different. Figure 5-1 shows
that violations for GBM VaR in four banks of the sample occur also during the last quarter of
1997 and the third quarter of 1998, the periods of the Asian crisis, Russian debt crisis and the
near collapse of the LTCM. Except for JP Morgan Chase. GBM VaR could not bind trading
losses accurately. The violation occurs after the crisis periods of 1997 and 1998. Table 5-1 gives
a detailed look at the number and sizes of those violations in terms of dollar value and standard
deviations.
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Figure (5-1)
Unexpected Trading Revenues and GBM VaR For the Banks in the Sample During the Period 1995:Q1-2002: Q3.
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Table (5-1)
GBM VaR Violation Statistics
Bank
Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers
Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp
JP Morgan
Chase & Co.

Mean
VaR
$Millions
(test-stat)
376.31
16.22
183.60
44.94
144.62
1220.83

Mean VaR –
Minus 99th
Percentile(1)
(Test-stats)(2)
-136.32***
(-4.09)
-12.11***
(-8.43)
-273.39***
(-15.45)
-35.38***
(-16.581)
-177.93***
(-44.85)
-408.49**
(-2.67)

Mean
VaR(3)
In Stds

No. of
Violations

0.67

2

1.39

2

0.96

3

1.29

4

1.04

3

1.70

1

Mean(4) Size of
Violations
$ Millions
(test-stat)(5)
325.39***
(3.46)
1.25***
(10.29)
189.73***
(6.86)
5.50***
(10.97)
61.27***
(4.66)
234.09

Mean Size
of
Violations
in Stds(6)
1.48

Max
Violation
$Millions

Max
Violation
Std.

513.2

2.329

0.09***

1.35

0.11

0.94

331.04

1.65

0.16***

8.95

0.26

0.44

82.29

0.59

0.33

234.09

0.33

(1) Calculated as the difference between the mean VaR in millions and the 99th percentile. The 99th percentile is multiplication of the standard deviation
of unexpected trading revenues and the 99th percentile of normal deviate, the numbers are provided in table 3-3. This is by definition -2.236
standard deviation below the mean.
(2) H0: the absolute Mean of GBM VaR equals the absolute 99th percentile.

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Normalized by the standard deviation of unexpected trading revenues.
The amount of loss exceeding VaR, which is equal to average loss – VaR.
H0: Mean violations = 0
H0: Mean violations in terms of standard deviation is different than the expected value conditional on exceeding the 99th
percentile (0.341 standard deviations) for normal distribution. H0: |mean violation of GBM| - 0.341= 0.
(7) *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
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The first column in table 5-1 shows the difference between the mean of GBM
VaR and the 99th percentile losses. As indicated earlier, the 99th percentile loss represents
2.326 standard deviations below the mean assuming normal distribution. For the six
banks in the sample, the average GBM VaR significantly lies outside the 99th percentile
loss (absolute value of GBM VaR is significantly less than the absolute value of the 99th
percentile loss). The numbers in column 3 show this fact in a clear way. It tabulates the
mean GBM VaR standarized with unexpected trading revenues standard deviation. A
bank with a standarized average GBM VaR less in absolute value than 2.326 means that
the mean of GBM VaR lies outside the 99th percentile and we expect to see violations in
this bank. Unlike table 3-3, in table 5-1, we see that both Bank of New York and Bank
One/ First Chicago are now falling outside the 99th percentile loss, which means that we
expect to see violations in those two banks also.
Column 4 reports the number of violations (Losses went beyond GBM VaR) in
each bank of the sample. The number of violations is relatively big. If we compare it with
the 1% percent target, we conclude that GBM VaR estimates are relatively conservative.
GBM VaR is exceeded with more than 6 % for two banks and with more than 9% in
other three banks.
The last four columns in table 5-1 show the mean size of violations and the
maximum violation in each bank. Violation size represents the difference between the
actual loss and GBM VaR estimate. In the six banks, we see that the mean of violations is
significantly different from zero. The largest violation in terms of mean (in dollar value
and measured in standard deviation) happened in Bank of America. The mean violation
in Bank of America is 1.48 standard deviation, however, it does not differ from zero
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significantly. The mean violations in 3 banks of the six are bigger than the expected value
conditional on exceeding the 99th percentile (0.341 standard deviations) for normal
distribution, but the test statistics shows that those mean violations do not differ
significantly from 0.341 in those 3 banks. For other two banks (Bank of New York and
Bank One) the mean violation is significantly less than 0.341 standard deviation. The
case is similar when we look at the last column, which shows the maximum violations of
GBM VaR for banks’ sample.
Figure 5-2 and table 5-2, on the other hand, compare the disclosed banks’ VaR
and the GBM VaR estimate. Figure 5-2 shows that the absolute value of GBM VaR is
lower than the absolute banks’ VaR in 3 cases, (Bank of New York, Bank One and
CitiCorp), and higher in one case (JP Morgan Chase and Co.). Generally, the GBM VaR
and disclosed banks’ VaR takes the same trend in all cases. However, banks’ VaR
estimates are more volatile than GBM VaR for the reason that GBM VaR assumes
constant volatility.
In one case (JP Morgan Chase), GBM VaR is higher than the Bank’s VaR for all
portfolio positions, and during the whole sample period. For Bank One, GBM VaR is less
than the Bank’s VaR during the entire sample period. For Bank of New York, GBM VaR
is less than the Bank’s VaR for most of the quarters. Actually, the disclosed VaR of Bank
of New York equals GBM VaR in the third quarter of year 2000. For Bank of America,
GBM VaR and the Bank’s VaR are started to be close until the first quarter of 1998,
when the GBM VaR jumped and the Bank’s VaR plunged down. GBM VaR for Bank of
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Figure (5-2)
The Absolute Value of The GBM VaR versus The Absolute Value of The Disclosed Banks’ VaR (Logarithmic Scaling)

40

200

96

97

98

99

GBM VaR

00

01

02

400
300
200
VaR ($millions)

60

400

VaR ($ millions)

600

95

Bankers Trust

Bank of New York

80

20

95

96

Bank's VaR

97

98

99

GBM VaR

Bank One/First Chicago

00

01

100

95

02

96

97

Bank's VaR

CitiCorp

500

150

400

1000
VaR ($millions)

200

3000
2500
2000
1500

50

99

00

01

02

Bank's VaR

JP Morgan Chase & Co.

700
600

100

98

GBM VaR

300
250

VaR ($millions)

VaR ($millions)

VaR ($ millions)

Bank of America
800

300

200

500

100
95

96

97

98

GBM VAR

99

00

01

Bank's VAR

02

95

96

97

98

GBM VAR

99

00

01

Bank's VAR

02

95

96

97

98

GBM VAR

99

00

Bank's VAR

01

02

119

America increased suddenly because of the increase in the trading portfolio for
the Bank from $37 billions in June 1998 to $84.5 billions in September 1998. However,
the Bank’s VaR witnesses a similar jump in December 1999. As we see in figure 2, the
two VaR measures for Bankers Trust take the same path during the whole period. They
start the downward sloping at September 1998. CitiCorp VaR starts very high compared
with GBM VaR measure then it drops down towards GBM VaR, but it continues to be
higher after the first quarter of 1999.
Table (5-2)
GBM VaR versus Banks’ Disclosed VaR
($Millions)
No. of
No. of
Mean(3) Size of
Max
Violations Violations
Violations
Violation
Bank
GBM VaR Banks’ VaR Difference
Difference
(test-stat)(4)
Bank of
157.72***
2
2
4.5
33.44
America
(6.29)
(0.03)
Bank of New
-20.11***
2
0
1.25***
1.49
York
(-10.28)
(10.23)
Bankers Trust
16.26*
3
7
76.13
-33.71
(1.37)
(1.11)
Bank One /
- 105.61***
4
0
5.50***
8.95
First Chicago
(-12.99)
(10.97)
CitiCorp
-143.48***
3
2
18.92*
31.29
(-5.28)
(1.64)
JP Morgan
941.24***
1
8
-107.97***
-630.74
Chase & Co.
(7.32)
(-3.82)
(1)
Calculated as the difference between the absolute value of GBM VaR and the
absolute value of Bank’s Disclosed VaR.
Mean VaR
Difference(1)
(test-stats)(2)

(2)

H0: The difference between mean VaRs equals zero.

(3)

The difference between the absolute value of mean sizes of violation of GBM
VaR and the absolute value of mean sizes of bank’s VaR. Positive sign means that
GBM VaR violations are bigger than the Banks’ VaR violations.
H0: The difference of the mean violations equal to zero.
*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%

(4)
(5)

120

Table 5-2 analyzes closely the differences between the GBM VaR estimates and
the disclosed banks’ VaR. The first column of the table shows the differences between
the absolute mean of GBM VaR and the absolute value of the banks’ VaR. Positive
number means that GBM VaR is higher than the bank’s VaR, and negative numbers
imply the opposite. From table 5-2, we see that GBM VaR is significantly higher in 3
cases (Bank of America, Bankers Trust and JP Morgan Chase and Co.). In the other three
cases, the mean GBM VaR appears to be significantly less than the banks’ VaR disclosed
by the Bank of New York, Bank One and CitiCorp. And that is why we see some
violations under GBM VaR estimates in those banks.
Because the GBM VaR is significantly less in three banks, we see that those
banks witness higher number of violations under GBM VaR compared with the disclosed
banks’ VaR. GBM VaR is violated twice for Bank of New York and Bank One,
compared with now violations under their own VaR estimates. For CitiCorp, the number
of violations increases to 4 under GBM VaR estimates compared with 3 violations under
its own VaR measure. Bankers Trust and JP Morgan Chase and Co. that have high
number of violations under their own VaR measures, the number of violations decreases
significantly under GBM VaR estimates in those banks.
The last two columns in table 5-2 compare the mean violations and the maximum
violations respectively between the two VaR measures. The mean violation difference is
calculated as the difference between the absolute mean violation under GBM VaR and
the absolute mean violation under the banks’ disclosed VaR. The positive numbers for
the first five banks in the sample means that the absolute mean violation under GBM
VaR is higher than the absolute mean violation under the banks’ VaR, and the opposite
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for JP Morgan Chase. Statistically speaking, the means of violations under GBM VaR are
higher than the means of violations under the banks’ VaR for only 3 banks. For the other
two banks the means of violations are statistically insignificant. JP Morgan own VaR
estimates seemed to be very conservative, the high number of violations and the sizes of
violations are extremely higher than the GBM VaR calculations.
The last column shows the difference between the maximum violations under
GBM VaR estimates and the disclosed banks’ VaR estimate. The results are almost the
same as the means of violations comparison except for Bankers Trust, where the
maximum violation under the Bank’s VaR is higher than the maximum violation under
the GBM VaR.
From the analysis above, we see that GBM VaR estimates produce less desired
results compared with disclosed banks’ VaR. It produces higher number as well as higher
sizes of violations in most of the cases. In some cases GBM VaR produces more
favorable results compared with some banks results, but that is can not be generated.
5.1.2 Volatility Method
The first step in this method is to retrieve trading revenue’s volatility
from GBM VaR estimates according to equation 3-2, and then apply the regression
formula in equation 3-6 that describes the absolute value of unexpected trading revenues
as a linear function of volatility.
Rt +1 − E [Rt +1 ] = a + bσ t + ε t +1

As mentioned earlier, GBM VaR reflects the future trading revenues risk if the
parameter b is significantly positive. For the purpose of back testing of GBM VaR
model, equation 3-6 is first estimated for each bank individually using a univariate
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Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). The SUR
method is used to account for the correlation among of unexpected trading revenues
among banks as reported in table 3-4.

Table (5-3)
Bank-Specific Regression of Absolute Value of Quarter t+1 Unexpected Trading
Revenues on Quarter t GBM VaR-Based Volatility

[R

i , t +1

Bank
Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp

Period
No. of
Observations
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q1
29
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q3
31
95,Q1-02,Q3
31

JP Morgan
Chase & Co.
Joint test of
Slope
Parameters =0
• * **Significant at 1%.
•

** Significant at 5%.

•

* Significant at 10%.

− E [Ri ,t +1 ]] = ai + biσ i ,t + ε i ,t +1
OLS
Constant
Slope
(t-Statistic)
90.136
0.188
(1.381)
(0.985)
5.5465
0.687*
(1.864)
(1.831)
-8.935
0.843***
(-0.164)
(2.843)
40.581
-0.629
(2.979)
(-0.918)
5.057
1.949
(0.046)
(1.105)
295.372
0.199
(1.619)
(0.653)

R2
0.032
0.104
0.230
0.028
0.201
0.015

SUR
Constant
Slope
(t-statistic)
101.072
0.291
(1.844)
(1.844)
5.673
0.672501
(2.075)
(1.984**)
36.980
1.108***
(0.875)
(2. 684)
39.538
-0.573
(3.088)
(-0.891)
27.385
1.582
(0.282)
(1.020)
260.942
0.2679
(1.489)
(0.916)
16.5
P= 0.011

Table 5-3 reports the results of the six banks specific time-series regressions of
unexpected trading revenues of GBM VaR based volatility. For OLS results, Bank of
New York and Bankers Trust show the assumed positive relationship between
unexpected trading revenues and VaR based volatility. Those results improve over the
result in table 3-5 which shows a weak significant positive value of b only for Bankers
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trust. The OLS results in table 5-3 strongly suggest that b takes a positive value in case
of Bankers Trust, and Bank of New York.
Those significant positive values for b improve by using SUR regression for
both banks, and b coefficient becomes statistically significant at 1% level.
Additionally, the joint-test of all slopes in SUR model is significantly different from
zero. And this is additional improvement over the results in table 3-5 where the joint
test for slopes is insignificantly different from zero.
Figure 5-3 displays the pool sample data. The figure shows that higher VaR based
volatility is associated with greater variation in unexpected trading revenues for the cross
sectional and time series data. Accordingly, pool estimation for equation 3-6 is performed
to back test on the whole data set.
Figure (5-3)
Absolute Unexpected Trading Revenues in Quarter t+1 and GBM VaR-Based
Volatility in Quarter t: Pool Sample
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Table 5-4 reports the results of a cross-sectional estimation of equation 3-6, with
a sample of 184 observations. The pool sample OLS results (with and without intercept)
report significant relationship of coefficient of VaR based volatility. To correct for
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation in the pool data across section weights
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method is applied. The results are reported in raw 3 in
table 5-4, which still shows significant positive results for the coefficient b. Unlike the
case for the disclosed bank’s VaR, the fixed effect and random effect pool regression
are both showing significant positive b coefficient for the GBM VaR based volatility.

Table (5-4)
Pooled Regression of Absolute Value of Quarter t+1 Unexpected Trading
Revenues on Quarter t GBM VaR-Based Volatility

[R

i , t +1

− E [Ri ,t +1 ]] = ai + biσ i ,t + ε i ,t +1

Pooled Method

Period
Constant
Slope
(t-Statistic)
Observations
Pooled Sample OLS
95,Q1-02,Q3
NA
0.338***
without Intercept
186
(3.088)
Pooled Sample OLS
95,Q1-02,Q3
3.088
0.297***
186
(2.496)
(2.720)
Pooled GLS
95,Q1-02,Q3
52.592
0.498***
Cross weighting
186
(2.076)
(5.477)
Pooled SUR
95,Q1-02,Q1
21.049
0.296***
186
(2.043)
(121.614)
Fixed Effect Pool OLS 95,Q1-02,Q3
AUR
0.308***
186
(2.764)
Fixed Effect Pool GLS 95,Q1-02,Q3
AUR
0.519***
186
(5.642)
Fixed Effect Pool
95,Q1-02,Q3
AUR
0.308***
SUR
186
(235.600)
GLS Random Effect
95,Q1-02,Q3
71.366
0.242**
Pool
186
(6.256)
(2.276)
• ** Significant at 5%.
• *** Significant at 1%.
• AUR: The fixed effect and random effect intercepts are not reported
here, but it is available upon request (AUR).
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In summary, volatility back testing shows that GBM VaR gives better result in
compared with the disclosed banks’ VaR, since it gives more significant results for the
related coefficient. The pool regression results indicate that GBM VaR gives some
informativeness about future risk, but the specific OLS and SUR regressions could not
provide the same power of anticipating future risk in each single bank.
5.2 VaR Models Under Thick Tails
As derived in chapter four earlier, VaR based on processes allow for thick tails
takes the form

[

VaRτ = Pt 1 − eα

]

Where α represents the distribution deviate at 99% confidence level. We obtain α
parameter by numerically inverted the characteristic function of each process using
equation 4-5. Thus, the processes’ parameters are estimated and then substituted in the
inversion formula of the characteristic function (equation 4-5). As explained in chapter 4,
the estimation method proposed by Chacko and Viceira (2003) for estimating continuous
time processes is used to estimate parameters. The parameters are estimated based on
actual banks’ data of unexpected trading revenues.
Tables A-1 to A-6 in appendix show parameters’ estimate for those processes.
One important notice on the parameter estimate is that the correlation coefficient between
the stochastic volatility process and the trading revenue process ρ is significant in some
cases, which imply skewness and thick tails distribution. On the other hand, the inclusion
of jump diffusion with the stochastic volatility could in some cases capture part of the
skewness and kurtosis, through reducing the estimated value of the correlation coefficient
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ρ., Tables A-4 and A-6 show additionally that for certain banks in the sample, both the
stochastic volatility parameters and the jump diffusion parameters are significant.
Another important feature we deduce from the estimate that in certain cases, the
estimate for the updating volatility parameter, γ, seems to be significantly exceeding 1, a
required condition for non-affine stochastic volatility. Which means that volatility could
be updating faster than what the square root process assumes.
After obtaining α, equation 4-5 is applied for specific portfolio sizes. For each
bank in the sample, within every single process, α has been calculated 31 times (except
for Bankers Trust, where it has been calculated 29 times). Across the five thick tail
processes, α has been calculated 155 times for each bank, and almost 775 times for all
banks across all processes. In a clear way, α (and hence a VaR estimate) have been
calculated for the six banks in the sample across the five thick tail processes for the
period 1995:Q1 – 2002:Q3. The total VaR estimates that have been calculated for the
thick tail process are 775 times in addition to 184 GBM VaR. VaR numbers in the
following analysis are presented through graphs and averages rather than tables because
of the large number entries.
Parameters’ estimate is also used to estimate volatility updating in the five thick
tail processes (SV, SVJ, NASV, and NASVJ) that assume stochastic volatility. We need
the estimated parameters to obtain the updated volatility level based on equations 4-59 to
4-62 in chapter 4 also α in the cases where volatility is changing. Basically, this might be
the reason for seeing that thick tail processes in general produce a more volatile VaR
estimate compared with the GBM VaR.
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Figure 5-4 plots VaR estimates for all banks, for all processes during the study
period in addition to the disclosed banks’ VaR. As seen from the figure different
processes yield different levels of VaR numbers. Roughly speaking, we can say that the
GBM process produces the lowest VaR and the non–affine stochastic volatility with
process yields the highest VaR. Among those two high and low VaR estimates, other
processes produce mixed results of VaR sizes. Additionally, we can see that all processes
provide more volatile VaR estimates compared with the GBM VaR method.
Table 5-5 on the other hand, shows the mean and the standard deviation of the
absolute value of VaR estimates derived based on the assumptions of thick tails and faster
volatility updates compared with the GBM VaR and disclosed banks’ VaR. The first note
that we deduce from table 5-5 is that the mean and the standard deviation of all thick tails
and updating volatility VaR models exceed the GBM VaR mean and standard deviation,
and this is one of the basic assumptions of the analysis. Regarding the proposed models,
except for Bankers Trust and Bank One, VaR estimates are coming in the following
acceding order, GBM VaR, SV-VaR, JD VaR, NASV VaR, and NASVJ VaR. In the
other two cases, the mean of JD VaR exceeds SV-VaR.
Regarding the banks’ disclosed VaR, table 5-5 indicates that the disclosed VaR
measures of Bank of New York and Bank One have exceeded all the proposed VaR
measures (except NASVJ VaR for Bank of New York). The last note from table 5-5 is
that the proposed VaR models, started from the GBM VaR to the NASVJ VaR have
exceeded with a big difference the disclosed VaR by JP Morgan Chase. Actually, we
conclude that JP Morgan Chase’s VaR estimates are very conservative since it suffers 8
violations during the sample period.
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Figure (5-4)
Derived VaR measures Compared to the Bank’s Disclosed VaR, 1995:Q1-2002:3

Bankers Trust

Bank of New York

Bank of America

500

80

1200
1000

400

60

VaR

VaR

300

600

40

200

400

20

100

200

0

0

0
95

96

97

98

GBM
SV
JUMP

99

00

SVJ
NASV
NASVJ

01

95

02

96

Bank's VAR

97

98

GBM
SV
JUMP

Bank One

99

00

SVJ
NASV
NASVJ

01

95

02

96

VAR

98

99

00

SVJ
NASV
NASVJ

01

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

4000

600

3000
VaR

VaR

150
400

100
200

50
0
96

97
GBM
SV
JUMP

98

99

SVJ
NASV
NASVJ

00

01

02

Bank's VAR

2000
1000
0

0
95

95

96

97
GBM
SV
JUMP

98

99

SVJ
NASV
NASVJ

00

01

02

Bank's VAR

95

96

97

GBM
SV
JUMP

98

99

SVJ
NASV
NASVJ

00

02

Banks VAR

5000

800

200

97
GBM
SV
JUMP

CitiCorp

250

VaR

VaR

800

01

02

Bank's VAR

129

Volatility of VaR estimates takes almost the same path as the mean with some
exceptions. Among the developed models, the NASVJ is the most volatile and the GBM
VaR is the least volatile. In between those two extremes, the volatility of the processes
(SV-VaR, JD VaR, SVJ VaR and NASV VaR) models, the volatility direction among
those processes is less obvious. Banks’ VaR seems to be more volatile compared with all
other developed VaR methods in three cases, Bank of New York, Bank One and
CitiCorp.
5.2.1 The Stochastic Volatility Process-Based VaR (SV-VaR)
The basic assumption for using stochastic volatility is that stochastic volatility is a
source of tail thickness in financial data. As mentioned earlier, the parameter that
determines tail thickness of the distribution is the correlation coefficient between the
stochastic volatility process and the trading revenue process, ρ. From Table A-2, we see
that ρ is significant in some cases. This implies that the distribution of trading revenues in
those cases exhibit some kind of deviation from the tail thickness of normal distribution.
Hence they should result in VaR estimates different from the VaR estimate based on the
GBM process.
The estimated parameters in table A-2 are used to estimate α parameter through
equation 4–5, and to estimate volatility dynamics for the purpose of computing VaR. We
calculated 184 stochastic volatility based VaR (SV-VaR) for the six banks during the
period 1995:Q1 – 2002:Q3. Figure 5-5 plots SV-VaR estimates as upper and lower
bounds for unexpected trading revenues for the six banks in the sample.
Two issues should be noted from figure 5-5, if it is compared with figure
5-1 and figure 3-4 that pertains to the GBM VaR and disclosed banks’ VaR respectively.
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Table (5-5)
Means and Variances for Different VaR Estimates
Bank
Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers
Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp
JP Morgan
Chase & Co.

Banks’VaR
Mean
St. D
218.58
107.73
36.33
13.62
167.34
114.04
150.55
49.91
288. 10
142.62
279.58
174.36

GBM-VaR
Mean
St. D
376.31
185.58
16.22
8.00
183.60
95.26
44.94
11.88
144.62
22.09
1220.83
852.09

SV-VaR
Mean
St. D
457.53
228.45
26.86
12.11
254.08
123.37
66.90
18.37
383.44
74.02
1499.00
1051.43

JD VaR
Mean
St. D
438.22
213.07
25.84
11.23
258.84
115.39
86.85
21.04
357.32
66.24
1416.01
994.58

* An F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the means of all VaR models are equal

SVJ VaR
Mean
St. D
536.26
262.49
33.59
14.67
285.78
124.93
110.35
28.91
452.12
81.75
1765.04
1215.99

NASV-VaR
Mean
St. D
491.75
244.82
30.28
13.38
267.78
129.04
99.83
23.28
411.90
77.23
1610.44
1124.94

NASVJ
Mean
St. D
603.75
296.85
37.52
16.51
303.28
121.38
123.90
31.91
507.48
88.91
1954.87
1339.00
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The first issue is that the number of violations (losses beyond VaR) reduces significantly
based on SV-VaR model. Violations appear only in 3 banks rather than in 4 banks as in
the case of the disclosed bank’s VaR estimate and in all six banks according to GBM
VaR estimate. Additionally, the maximum number of violations is two under SV-VaR,
rather a maximum of 8 violations as seen from table 3-4 pertain to bank VaR and 4
violations in all six banks according in GBM VaR estimate.
The other issue that we should note in figure 5-5 (and figure 5-4) compared with
figure 5-1is that SV-VaR is more volatile compared to the GBM VaR. This issue can be
seen from table 5-5 that tabulates the standard deviation of VaR according to each
measure. One reason is that GBM VaR assumes constant volatility whereas, by
assumption, the SV-VaR model assumes that volatility is changing over time.
Table 5-6 below shed more lights on the performance of SV-VaR for all six banks
in the sample compared with GBM-VaR and banks’ VaR. The first column in table 5-6 is
identical to that in table 5-1, in that, it gives the difference between the mean of 99%
confidence level SV-VaR and the 99th percentile of the banks’ unexpected trading
revenues distribution. Five out of six banks shows that the SV-VaR mean falls outside the
99th percentile. However, only two of those five banks appear to be significantly falling
outside the 99th percentile. The other one case (CitiCorp) shows that the mean of SV-VaR
falls significantly inside the 99th percentile.
The second two columns in table 5-6 compare the mean of absolute SV-VaR with
the mean of absolute banks’ VaR and GBM VaR. The mean of SV-VaR estimate appears
to be significantly higher than the GBM VaR estimate in all cases and this is what we
expect from using stochastic volatility in VaR. We expect stochastic volatility to produce
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Figure (5-5)
Stochastic Volatility VaR Compared With Unexpected Trading Revenues, 1995:1-2002:3
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Table (5-6)
Stochastic Volatility VaR Violation Statistics
Bank

Bank of
America
Bank of New
York
Bankers Trust
Bank One /
First Chicago
CitiCorp
JP Morgan
Chase & Co.

Difference
from 99
percentile(1)
(test-stat)(2)
-55.1*
(-1.34)
-1.47
(-0.67)
-202.91***
(-8.86)
-13.42***
(-4.06)
60.89***
(4.58)
-130.32
(-0.69)

Mean
Difference
Compared
with Banks’
VaR
(test stats)(3)
238.95***
(7.31)
-9.47***
(-3.90)
86.74***
(6.97)
-83.65***
(-10.59)
95.34**
(2.84)
1219.42***
(7.40)

Mean
Difference
Compared
with GBM
VaR
(test-stats)(4)
81.23***
(9.01)
10.64***
(9.33)
70.48***
(6.99)
21.96***
(13.76)
238.82***
(23.46)
278.18***
(4.81)

No. of
Violations

SV-VaR
Mean(5) Size
of
Violations
(test-stat)(6)

Max SVVaR
Violation

2

82.287***
(3.06)
0

466.56

230.89

0

189.95***
(9.28)
0

0

0

0

1

29.60

29.60

0
2

0

0

Mean
Violation
Compared
with GBM
VaR(7)
(test-stat) (8)
-43.10
(-0.22)
-1.25
NA
0.21
(0.01)
-5.5
(NA)
-61.27
NA
-204.49
NA

Mean Violation
Compared with
Bank VaR(9)
(test-stat) (10)
-38.61
(-0.23)
0
76.34
(1.02)
0
-42.35
NA
-312.46***
(-4.09)

(1) Calculated as the difference between the absolute SV-VaR and absolute value of the 99th percentile. The 99th
percentile is reported in table 3-3.
(2) H0: The absolute Mean SV-VaR minus absolute 99th percentile=0.
(3) The difference between the mean absolute SV-VaR and the mean absolute banks’ VaR is zero.
(4) The difference between the mean absolute SV-VaR and the mean absolute GBM VaR is zero.
(5) The amount of loss exceeding SV-VaR, which equal to average loss minus SV-VaR.
(6) H0: Mean violation = 0.
(7) Defined as absolute mean violation of SV-VaR minus absolute mean violation GBM VaR.
(8) H0: the difference between the mean violation of SV-VaR and GBM VaR equal to zero.
(9) Defined as absolute mean violation SV-VaR minus absolute mean violations banks’ VaR.
(10) H0: the difference between the mean violation of SV-VaR and banks’ VaR equal to zero.
(11) *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
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higher VaR measure because it is one source of tail thickness in financial data. By
comparing SV-VaR with banks’ own VaR, we see that SV-VaR is significantly higher in
4 cases and significantly less in two cases. The two cases where the banks’ VaR is higher
are Bank of New York and Bank One. Those banks that have not experienced any
violations according to their own VaR estimates, which means that they have originally
representative VaR models.
Table 5-6 shows also the number of violations within SV-VaR estimate.
Compared to tables 3-3 and 5-1, we see that SV-VaR has performed better compared
with the banks’ VaR and GBM VaR. The numbers of violations in each bank and
maximum number of violations in all banks are decreased also. Under SV-VaR,
violations occur only in three banks with a maximum of two violations, compared with
violations in 4 banks with a maximum of 8 violations according under the banks’ VaR
and violations in all banks under GBM VaR with a maximum of 4 violations. With SVVaR violations happen in Bank of America, Bankers Trust and JP Morgan Chase.
Under SV-VaR model, the number of violations stays the same for Bank of
America as in GBM-VaR and bank’s VaR estimates. The mean size of violation
decreases noticeably under SV-VaR compared with the GBM VaR and the Bank’s own
calculated VaR. The mean size of violation decreases by $43.11 millions and $38.61
millions for GBM VaR and the Bank’s own VaR respectively. Even with this sizable
reduction in the mean of violation, those differences seem to be statistically
indistinguishable from zero. On the other hand, if we take the differences in the
maximum violations, we notice the same reduction, where the maximum violation drops
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from $479.76 millions and $513.2 millions under the Bank’s VaR and GBM VaR
respectively to $466.6 millions.
For Bankers Trust, the number of violations decreases from 7 violations and 3
violations according to the Bank’s VaR and GBM VaR measures respectively to only 2
violations under SV-VaR measure. According to the mean size of violation, it increases
under SV-VaR model rather than decreases as expected. The reason behind this negative
difference refers to the high number of violations under the Bank’s own VaR and GBM
VaR. However, this increase in the mean size of violations under SV-VaR is statistically
insignificant, and it is relatively small in dollar size. If we look at the maximum size of
violation occurs under SV-VaR compared with the Bank’s own VaR and GBM VaR we
see a different picture. The maximum violation decreases significantly from $364.75
millions and $324.3 under the Bank’s VaR and GBM VaR respectively to only $230.9
million under SV-VaR.
For JP Morgan Chase, the number of violations decreases from 8 violations under
the Bank’s VaR to 1 violation under GBM VaR, and this violation continues to appear
under SV-VaR measure. However, the size of this violation decreases from
$234.1millions according to GBM VaR to $29.6 millions under the SV-VaR. In case of
CitiCorp the number of violations decreases from 2 violations and 3 violations according
to CitiCorp’s VaR and GBM VaR calculations respectively to no violations at all. Bank
of New York and Bank One show no violations under SV-VaR model compared to two
violations under the banks’ own VaR and GBM VaR calculations.
In conclusion, the inclusion of SV process could improve the VaR performance of
compared with banks’ VaR and GBM VaR measures. In terms of VaR size, stochastic
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volatility produces higher VaR in all cases compared with GBM process and it also
produces higher VaR measures in 4 cases compared with the bank’s VaR. As a result of
the higher VaR measure based on stochastic volatility, the number and size of violations
are decreased numerically compared with GBM VaR and banks’ VaR, however, the
results are not so robust statistically.
5.2.2 The Jump Diffusion Process-Based VaR (JD-VaR)
Like in case of stochastic volatility VaR, the basic assumption for using jump
diffusion is that jumps are the other source of tail thickness in financial data beside
stochastic volatility. From Table A-3, we see that jump sizes and jump intensities (ηu, ηd
and λ u, λd ) are significant in certain cases. This implies that the distribution of trading
revenues in those cases exhibit some kind of tail thickness compared with normal
distribution. Hence they should result in VaR estimates higher than VaR estimates based
on GBM process.
The estimated parameters in the table A-3 are used to estimate α parameter
through equation 4–5. 184 jump diffusion based VaR (JD VaR) are calculated for the six
banks during the period 1995:Q1 – 2002:Q3. Figure 5-6 plots JD VaR estimates as an
upper and lower bounds for unexpected trading revenues for the six banks in the sample.
As in figure 5-5 belongs to SV-VaR, two issues should be noted from figure 5-6, if it is
compared with figure 5-1 and figure 3-4 that pertains to the GBM VaR and disclosed
banks’ VaR respectively.
The first issue, like in case of SV-VaR, the number of violations (losses
beyond VaR) reduces significantly based on JD VaR model. Violations appear only in 3
banks rather than in 4 banks as in case of the disclosed bank’s VaR estimate and in all the
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six banks according to GBM VaR estimate. Additionally, the maximum number of
violations is only two violations, rather than a maximum of 8 violations as in table 3-4
pertain to banks’ VaR and 4 violations in all six banks according to GBM VaR estimate.
Those results are identical to the results associated with using the stochastic volatility in
VaR estimate, however, the sizes of those violations in each bank are pretty much
different.
The other issue that we should note in figure 5-6 (and figure 5-4) compared with
figure 5-1is that JD VaR is more volatile compared to the GBM VaR. However, it is less
volatile compared with SV-VaR estimates. And this is assured almost by table 5-5, which
shows the standard deviation of VaR estimates under different stochastic processes.
Table 5-7 below addresses the differences in the mean between JD VaR estimates,
the banks’ VaR estimates, the GBM VaR and the SV-VaR. The first column in the table
shows the difference between the mean of JD VaR and the 99th percentile of the
unexpected trading revenues assuming normality. Negative numbers show that JD VaR
falls outside the 99th percentile of unexpected trading revenues. Table 5-7 shows that
average of JD VaR estimates for four banks fall outside the 99th percentile. However, two
of them (Bank of America and Bankers Trust) appear to be significantly falls outside the
99th percentile. On the other hand, averages of JD VaR estimates for Bank One and JP
Morgan are significantly fall within the 99th percentile of unexpected trading revenues.
According to the mean difference between JD VaR estimates and banks’ VaR
estimates, the absolute mean of JD VaR exceeds significantly the absolute mean of
bank’s VaR in four cases (Bank of America, Bankers Trust, CitiCorp and JP Morgan
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Chase). On the other hand, the absolute mean of banks’ VaR exceeds the absolute mean
of JD VaR significantly in the other two cases (Bank of New York and Bank One).
Compared with GBM VaR, the effect of inclusion jump diffusion in VaR models
is obvious. The absolute mean of JD VaR estimates exceeds significantly the absolute
mean of GBM VaR estimates in all cases. For the SV-VaR the case is a little different.
The absolute mean of JD VaR estimates appear to be significantly less than the mean of
SV-VaR estimate in 4 banks (Bank of America, Bank of New York, CitiCorp and JP
Morgan).
For Bankers Trust and Bank One, results are flipped over. The absolute mean of
JD VaR estimates appears to be significantly higher only in case of Bank One. In
conclusion, we can say that the absolute mean of SV-VaR is higher than the absolute
mean JD VaR in 4 cases, equal it in one case and appear to be significantly less in one
case. Based on that, we may conclude that the SV produces higher VaR estimate than the
jump diffusion. That is may be the case because SV affects VaR through two avenues,
the correlation issue (tail thickness) and the changing in volatility.
Table 5-8 below provides the number, size, maximum size of violations and mean
size of violations comparison. Banks that do not have violations under JD VaR estimates
are excluded from the table. As in case of SV-VaR, the number of violations drops
significantly. Only three banks suffer violations under JD VaR rather than 4 as in the case
of banks own VaR or in all banks as in case of GBM VaR. The number of violations in
each bank under the JD VaR is again less than the number of violations that appears
under the banks own VaR and GBM VaR. As a matter of fact, the number of violations
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Figure (5-6)
JD VaR and Unexpected Trading Revenues, 1995:1-2002:3
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Table (5-7)
JD VaR Absolute Mean Differences Compared with
Banks’ VaR, GBM VaR and SV-VaR
JD VaR
JD VaR
JD VaR MeanMean-Banks’ Mean-GBM
SV-VaR VaR
Bank
VaR Mean(3)
VaR Mean(5)
Mean(7)
(4)
(6)
(test stats)
(test stats)
(test stats)(8)
Bank of
-74.41**
219.64***
61.91***
-19.32***
America
(-1.94)
(7.20)
(7.84)
(-5.24)
Bank of New
-2.49
-10.49***
9.62***
-1.03**
York
(-1.23)
(-4.34)
(8.44)
(-1.84)
Bankers
-198.15***
91.49***
75.23***
4.75
Trust
(-9.25)
(7.52)
(8.44)
(0.53)
Bank One /
6.53**
-63.70***
41.91***
19.95***
First Chicago
(1.73)
(-8.39)
(21.37)
(12.49)
CitiCorp
34.77***
69.22**
212.70***
-26.12***
(2.92)
(2.14)
(24.55)
(-5.14)
JP Morgan
-213.31
1136.43***
195.19***
-82.99**
Chase & Co.
(-1.19)
(7.36)
(3.90)
(-1.76)
(1) The difference between the mean of JD VaR and the normal 99th percentile of
unexpected trading revenus.
(2) H0: the absolute Mean JD VaR minus the absolute 99th percentile equals zero.
(3) Absolute mean JD VaR minus absolute mean Bank’s VaR.
(4) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(5) Absolute mean JD VaR minus absolute mean GBM VaR.
(6) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(7) Absolute mean JD VaR minus absolute mean SV-VaR.
(8) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(9)*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
Difference from
99 percentile(1)
(test-stat)(2)

in each bank under JD VaR estimates is identical to the number of violations in each bank
under SV-VaR estimates.
For Bank of America, the number of violations appears to stay the same under the
four VaR models including the JD VaR. The mean size of violation under the JD VaR
decreases in case of Bank of America compared with the Bank’s own VaR, the GBM
VaR and the SV-VaR. However, this reduction in the mean size of violation is
statistically insignificant in the three cases in Bank of America, which means that we can
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not reject the hypothesis that the mean size of violations under the four VaR models
(under comparison) are equal. If we compare the maximum violations under JD VaR
estimates compared with the Bank’s own VaR, the GBM VaR and SV-VaR respectively
in Bank of America, we find that the maximum violation decreases by $15.4 millions,
$48.9 millions and $2.21 millions.
As in the case of SV-VaR, the number of violations decreases for Bankers Trust
from 7 violations and 3 violations under the Bank’s own VaR and GBM VaR to 2
violations under the JD VaR. Compared with Bankers Trust’s own VaR, the mean size
of violation increases by $63.43 millions under the JD VaR. This increase is attributed to
the large number of VaR violations under the Bank’s own VaR that contains small
violations that reduced the mean of violations under the Bank’s own VaR and then
disappeared under the JD VaR. Comparing the mean size of violations under JD VaR for
Bankers Trust with the GBM VaR and SV-VaR, we find that the mean of violations
under the JD VaR is less. However, the statistical test shows that the mean of VaR
violations for Bankers Trust does not differ significantly from the mean violations under
the Bank’s own VaR, the GBM VaR and the SV-VaR.
For JP Morgan Chase and Co. the number of violations decreases form 8
violations under the Bank’s VaR to one violation under the GBM VaR, SV-VaR and JD
VaR. Compared with the Bank’s VaR and the GBM VaR, the mean violation decreases
by $246.2 millions and $156.2 millions respectively. In comparison with the SV-VaR, the
mean of violations increases by almost $48.3 millions, which means that the SV-VaR
performs better than the JD VaR in the case of JP Morgan.
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Table (5-8)
JD VaR Violation Statistics Compared with Banks’ VaR, GBM VaR and SV-VaR, for The Banks that Have Violations
(Means of Violations in Absolute Value)
Bank

No. of
Violations
in JD VaR

JD VaR
Mean(1)
Size of
Violations
(test-stat)(2)

Max JD
VaR
Violation
(Millions)

Mean
Violation
Compared
with Bank
VaR(3)
(test-stat) (4)
-45.32
(-0.26)
63.43
(0.81)
-264.20***
(-4.03)

Mean
Violation
Compared
with GBM
VaR(5)
(test-stat) (6)
-49.80
(-0.26)
-12.70
(-0.14)
-156.23

Mean
Violation
Compared
with SVVaR(7)
(test-stat) (8)
-6.70
(-0.04)
-12.91
(-0.34)
48.26

Bank of
2
275.59***
464.36
America
(2.92)
Bankers
2
177.04***
211.25
Trust
(10.35)
JP Morgan
1
77.86
77.86
Chase & Co.
(1) The absolute mean of JD VaR violations.
(2) H0: The absolute Mean SV- VaR =0.
(3) Absolute mean of JD VaR minus absolute mean of Banks’ VaR.
(4) H0: The difference between the mean of absolute JD VaR and the mean of absolute banks’ VaR is zero.
(5) Absolute mean of JD VaR minus absolute mean of GBM VaR.
(6) H0: The difference between the mean absolute JD-VaR and the mean absolute GBM VaR is zero.
(7) Absolute mean of JD VaR minus absolute value of SV-VaR.
(8) H0: The difference between the mean absolute JD-VaR and the mean absolute SV-VaR is zero
(9) *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
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5.2.3 Stochastic Volatility-Jump Diffusion Based VaR Model (SVJ VaR)
This model combines both stochastic volatility and jump diffusion processes to
obtain the maximum tail thickness of the P&L distribution. Accordingly, with this
stochastic volatility jump diffusion process we expected to find VaR estimates that
exceed SV-VaR estimates and JD VaR estimates. Table A-4 does not show a lot of
significant numbers that relate to the stochastic volatility, jump sizes and jump intensities
(ρ, ηu, ηd and λ u, λd). This may be because of the short period of the estimation.
However, as mentioned earlier (in chapter 2) many of the studies find that both jumps and
stochastic volatility are significant in financial data in general.
The estimated parameters in the table A-4 are used to estimate α parameter
through equation 4–5. 184 stochastic volatility-jump diffusion based VaR (SVJ VaR) are
calculated for the six banks during the period 1995:Q1 – 2002:Q3. Figure 5-7 plots the
SVJ VaR estimates as an upper and lower bounds for unexpected trading revenues for the
six banks in the sample. As in figures 5-5 and 5-6 belongs to the SV-VaR and JD VaR
respectively, some issues can be distinguished from figure 5-7 if it is compared with
GBM VaR and disclosed banks’ VaR in one hand or the SV-VaR and the JD VaR on the
other hand.
The first issue is that number of violations under the SVJ VaR is less than the
number of violations under banks’ VaR and GBM VaR and this is very obvious. In spite
that figure 5-7 looks like figures 5-5 and 5-6, but we can see that the one violation that
appears under the SV-VaR and the JD VaR in JP Morgan has disappears under the SVJ
VaR. Accordingly, we have two violations in each of Bank of America and Bankers
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Trust. Even one of the violations in Bank of America is very small that even hard to
recognize from the figure. An immediate result that can we deduce from figure 5-7 is that
the SVJ VaR improves over both the SV-VaR and the JD VaR, especially in case of JP
Morgan Chase.
Table 5-9 below addresses the differences in the average between SVJ VaR
estimates in one hand, and the banks’ VaR estimates, GBM VaR, SV-VaR and JD VaR
estimates. As in table 5-7, the first column in table 5-9 shows the difference between the
mean of SVJ estimate and the 99th percentile of unexpected trading revenues assuming
normality. As mentioned before, negative numbers show that SVJ VaR falls outside the
99th percentile of unexpected trading revenues. Table 5-9 shows that only in one case
(Bankers Trust) the absolute mean of SVJ VaR falls significantly outside the 99th
percentile. Of the other five cases, the mean of SVJ VaR models in 3 banks (Bank of
New York, Bank One and CitiCorp) falls significantly inside the 99th percentile. The
other two cases (Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase) the positive differences
between the absolute mean of SVJ VaR estimates for those banks and the 99th percentile
of unexpected trading revenues are statistically insignificant.
Regarding the mean difference, table 5-9 shows that the mean of SVJ VaR
estimates significantly exceeds the mean of banks’ VaR estimates in four cases (Bank of
America, Bankers Trust, CitiCorp and JP Morgan Chase). On the other hand, the absolute
mean of banks’ VaR exceeds the absolute mean of SVJ VaR in the other two cases, only
the mean for Bank One’s VaR exceeds the SVJ VaR significantly.
The discussions of the SV-VaR and JD VaR shows that both (SV-VaR and JD
VaR) improve significantly over the GBM VaR. The previous analysis shows also that
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Figure (5-7)
Stochastic Volatility Jump VaR Models and Unexpected Trading Revenues, 1995:1-2002:Q3
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both SV-VaR estimates and JD VaR estimates are significantly higher than the GBM
VaR. Additionally, the violations in terms of size and number decrease significantly with
the inclusion of the stochastic volatility alone or jump diffusion alone into VaR analysis.
Accordingly, we expect to see that the SVJ VaR produces higher estimates compared
with the GBM VaR and that is clear from the table 5-9, where the absolute mean of SVJ
estimates is significantly higher than the mean of GBM VaR estimates in all cases. The
important issue here is whether the inclusion of the mixed stochastic volatility jump
diffusion into VaR analysis improves over the SV-VaR alone and the JD VaR alone.
Table 5-9 shows explicitly that the absolute mean of SVJ VaR estimates is significantly
higher than the absolute mean of SV-VaR and JD VaR estimates in the six banks. With
such results, we become sure that the SVJ VaR utilizes the maximum tail thickness in the
data and produces the highest VaR estimate compared with the SV-VaR and the JD VaR.
In conclusion, we see that the absolute mean of SVJ VaR estimates is
undoubtedly higher than the absolute mean of the GBM VaR, SV-VaR, JD VaR and in
some case (not all) the banks’ own VaR.
Table 5-10 provides the number, the size, the maximum size of violations and the
mean size of violations comparison. Under the case of SVJ VaR, the number of violations
drops significantly. JP Morgan Chase who experienced 8 violations under the Bank’s
own VaR appear now to have no violations under the SVJ VaR. Bank of America and
Bankers Trust are the only banks who still suffer violations under SVJ VaR. The number
of violations does not change it stays two violations, as in the cases of SV-VaR and JD
VaR. However, the mean sizes of violation in those two banks are different though.
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Table (5-9)
SVJ VaR Absolute Mean Differences Compared with Banks’ VaR, GBM VaR, SV-VaR and JD VaR
SVJ VaR
SVJ VaR
SVJ VaR
SVJ VaR
Mean-Banks’
Mean-GBM
Mean-SV-VaR Mean JD-VaR
VaR Mean(3)
VaR Mean(5)
VaR Mean(7)
VaR Mean(9)
(test stats)(4)
(test stats)(6)
(test stats)(8)
(test stats)(10)
Bank of
23.63
317.68***
159.95***
78.72***
98.04***
America
(0.50)
(8.35)
(11.14)
(12.15)
(9.93)
Bank of New
5.26**
-2.74
17.37***
6.72***
7.75***
York
(1.99)
(-1.04)
(10.77)
(10.41)
(9.85)
Bankers
-171.21***
118.43***
102.17***
31.69***
26.94***
Trust
(-7.38)
(9.29)
(10.07)
(3.60)
(2.90)
Bank One /
30.03***
-40.20***
65.41***
43.45***
23.50***
First Chicago
(5.78)
(-5.34)
(19.94)
(17.18)
(11.81)
CitiCorp
129.57***
164.02***
307.50***
68.68***
94.80***
(8.82)
(4.88)
(27.16)
(11.72)
(15.41)
JP Morgan
135.72
1485.45***
544.21***
266.03***
349.02***
Chase & Co.
(0.62)
(7.65)
(6.73)
(4.59)
(5.51)
th
(1) The difference between the mean JD VaR and the 99 percentile of the data assuming normality.
(2) H0: absolute Mean JD VaR minus the absolute 99th percentile equals zero.
(3) Absolute mean SVJ VaR minus absolute mean Bank’s VaR.
(4) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(5) Absolute mean SVJ VaR minus absolute mean GBM VaR.
(6) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(7) Absolute mean SVJ VaR minus absolute mean SV-VaR.
(8) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(9) Absolute mean SVJ VaR minus absolute mean JD VaR.
(10)
H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(11) *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
Bank

Difference from
99 percentile(1)
(test-stat)(2)
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Numerically speaking, the mean size of violation under the SVJ VaR is less than
the mean size of violation under all comparable VaR models in the table. Only one case
in Bankers Trust appears that the SVJ VaR violation is higher than the Bank’s own VaR
model. Statistically speaking, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the mean size of
violations under the SVJ VaR model is the same as the mean sizes of violations under the
banks’ VaR, GBM VaR, SV-VaR and JD VaR. In JP Morgan Chase where there are no
violations registered under the SVJ VaR we could see one case where a test statistic show
a significant difference from the Bank’s VaR estimate.
If we compare the maximum violations under the SVJ VaR model with the
Bank’s own VaR, the GBM VaR the SV-VaR and the JD VaR respectively in Bank of
America, we find that the maximum violations decrease by $50.0 millions, $83.5
millions, $36.8 millions and $34.6 millions respectively. For Bankers Trust, we see that
the maximum violation under the SVJ VaR decreases by $178.0 millions, $144.4
millions, $44.20 millions and $24.6 millions compared with the Bank’s own VaR, the
GBM VaR, the SV-VaR and the JD VaR respectively. Generally speaking, we find that
the SVJ VaR improves as expected over the SV-VaR and JD VaR estimates.
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Table (5-10)
JD VaR Violation Statistics Compared with Banks’ VaR, GBM VaR, SV-VaR and JD VaR, for The Banks that Have
Violations (Means of Violations in Absolute Value)
Bank

No. of
Violations
in JD VaR

SVJ VaR
Mean(1)
Size of
Violations
(test-stat)(2)

Max SVJ
VaR
Violation
(Millions)

Mean
Violation
Compared
with Bank
VaR(3)
(test-stat) (4)
-75.68
(-0.44)
35.71
(0.47)
-342.06***
(-4.13)

Mean
Violation
Compared
with GBM
VaR(5)
(test-stat) (6)
-80.16
(-0.43)
-40.42
(-0.46)
-234.09

Mean
Violation
Compared
with SVVaR(7)
(test-stat) (8)
-37.06
(-0.20)
-40.63
(-1.03)
-29.60

Mean
Violation
Compared
with JDVaR(9)
(test-stat) (10)
-30.36
(-0.16)
-27.72
(-0.77)
-77.86

Bank of
2
245.23***
429.74
America
(2.66)
Bankers
2
149.32***
186.70
Trust
(7.99)
JP Morgan
0
0
0
Chase & Co.
(1) The absolute mean of SVJ VaR violations.
(2) H0: The absolute Mean SVJ VaR =0.
(3) Absolute mean of SVJ VaR minus absolute mean of Banks’ VaR.
(4) H0: The difference between the mean absolute SVJ VaR and the mean absolute banks’ VaR is zero.
(5) Absolute mean of SVJ VaR minus absolute mean of GBM VaR.
(6) H0: The difference between the mean absolute SVJ VaR and the mean absolute GBM VaR is zero.
(7) Absolute mean of SVJ VaR minus absolute value of SV-VaR.
(8) H0: The difference between the mean absolute SVJ VaR and the mean absolute SV-VaR is zero.
(9) Absolute mean SVJ VaR minus absolute value of JD VaR.
(10) H0: The difference between the mean absolute SVJ VaR and the mean absolute SV-VaR is zero.
(11) *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
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5.2.4 The Non-Affine Stochastic Volatility VaR Models (NASV VaR and
NASVJ VaR)
The basic assumption behind including the non-affine stochastic volatility is the
assumption that volatility updates faster during crashes and collapses of financial
markets. As mentioned earlier, volatility is a crucial factor in constructing VaR estimates.
Faster updating of volatility affects positively VaR estimates, Hull and White (1998b).
This section deals basically with two VaR models developed in this dissertation; the nonaffine stochastic volatility VaR model and the non-affine stochastic volatility jump
diffusion VaR model. The later model considered the general model that compromises all
other VaR models developed in chapter four as special cases.
As mentioned above, the inclusion of non-affine stochastic volatility would lead
to higher VaR estimate because volatility updates according to non-affine specification
rather than the square root assumption that usually adopted. The basic parameter that
controls this faster updating is γ in equation 4-1. Tables A-5 and A-6 give estimation for γ
in equations 4-55 and 4-1 respectively. The basic assumption for non-affine stochastic
volatility is that γ should be significantly greater than one. However, actual data did not
give significant indication for that.
The estimated parameters in the tables A-5 and A-6 are used to estimate α
parameter through equation 4–5 with the characteristic functions of those processes as
shown in equations 4-18, 4-37, 4-43, 4-56 and 4-57. By calculating α for the NASV and
NASVJ we could calculate 184 non-affine stochastic volatility based VaR (NASV VaR)
and 184 non-affine stochastic volatility with jump based VaR (NASVJ VaR) for the six
banks during the period 1995:Q1 – 2002:Q3. Figures 5-8 and 5-9 plot the NASV VaR
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and the NASVJ VaR estimates respectively as an upper and lower bounds for unexpected
trading revenues for the six banks in the sample. Actually, the analysis should focus here
on how the NASV VaR improves over the SV-VaR and how the NASVJ VaR improves
over SVJ VaR.
If figure 5-8 compared with figure 5-5 and figure 5-9 compared with figure 5-7
we should note that VaR estimates in 5-8 and 5-9 are higher and may be more volatile
compared with VaR estimates in figure 5-5 and 5-7 respectively. This is because of the
faster updating in volatility assumption. If we compare figure 5-8 with figure 5-5 that
belongs to the SV-VaR we will find that the only one violation in JP Morgan that appears
under the SV-VaR is vanished under the NASVJ. This explicitly means that the nonaffine stochastic volatility has improved over the square root (affine) stochastic volatility.
The matter is less obvious for figures5-9 and 5-7. But in all cases, VaR estimates in
figure 5-9 (NASVJ VaR) should be at least as much as VaR estimates in figure 5-7
(NASV VaR).
As mentioned above the comparison between SVJ VaR and NASVJ VaR
is less obvious because they have the same number of violations in each bank. As figures
5-8 and 5-9 show, Bank of America and Bankers Trust are the only banks that still have
violations under the NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR. As we noted before those banks still
have the same number of violations as under the SVJ VaR which is two violations in each
bank. However, as indicated below (table 5-12), even with the same number of violations
in those two banks, the mean sizes of violations and the maximum violation sizes are not
the same, at least numerically.

153

Figure (5-8)
Non-Affine Stochastic Volatility with Jump VaR and Unexpected Trading Revenues, 1995:Q1-2002: Q3
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Figure (5-9)
Non-Affine Stochastic Volatility with Jump VaR and Unexpected Trading Revenues, 1995:Q1-2002: Q3
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Table 5-11 below addresses the effect of including the non-affine volatility
component in the SV-VaR and the SVJ VaR. The table below compared the means of
NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR estimates with the means of SV-VaR and SVJ VaR
estimates. As in previous tables, the first two columns in table 5-11 show the differences
between the means of the NASV and NASVJ estimates and the 99th percentile of
unexpected trading revenues assuming normality. Negative numbers show that those VaR
means falls outside the 99th percentile of unexpected trading revenues.
To get sense of the effect of non-affine stochastic volatility, the best way is to
compare the first column of table 5-11 with the first column of table 5-6, and the second
column of table 5-11 with the first column of table 5-9. The first column in table 5-11
indicates that there are three banks fall inside the 99th percentile under the NASV VaR,
two of them significantly fall inside this percentile. This is one improvement over the SV
VaR where only the mean of SV-VaR in CitiCorp falls inside the 99th percentile.
Additionally, some of the banks that significantly fall outside the 99th percentile are no
longer significant under the NASV. The picture is also clearer with the NASVJ VaR
model, where the mean of NASVJ VaR for 5 banks (Bankers Trust is the only exclusion)
is now significantly fall inside the 99th percentile compared with only 3 banks that are
significantly falling within the 99th percentile under the SVJ VaR.
Table 5-11 also gives another avenue to see how the non-affine structure increases
VaR estimates through comparing the means of VaR estimates with and without the nonaffine stochastic component. The third and fifth columns in table 5-11 explore more the
effect of the non-affine structure of stochastic volatility on VaR estimates. In those
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Table (5-11)
NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR Absolute Mean Differences Compared with SV-VaR, and SVJ VaR.
NASV VaR
NASV VaR
Mean
NASVJ VaR NASVJ VaR
Mean NASV
VaR
NASVJ VaR Mean Minus Mean Minus Mean Minus Mean Minus
SVJ VaR
Difference SV- VaR
SVJ VaR
NASV VaR
Difference
Mean(5)
Mean(7)
from 99
from 99
Mean(8)
Mean(9)
(6)
(6)
(6)
(1)
(3)
(test stats)
(test stats)
(test stats)
(test stats)(6)
percentile
percentile
(test-stat)(2)
(test-stat)(4)
Bank of
-20.88
91.12**
34.22**
-44.51
67.49***
112.00***
America
(-0.47)
(1.71)
(12.91)
(-13.84)
(9.494)
(11.06)
Bank of New
1.95
9.19***
3.42**
-3.31***
3.93***
7.24***
York
(0.81)
(3.10)
(22.84)
(-13.41)
(16.55)
(5.34)
Bankers
-189.12***
-153.71***
13.67*
-18.02**
17.50***
35.52***
Trust
(-7.89)
(-6.82)
(1.52)
(-1.99)
(3.87)
(6.56)
Bank One /
19.51***
43.58***
32.93***
-10.52***
13.55***
24.06***
First Chicago
(4.67)
(7.60)
(18.11)
(-6.14)
(7.25)
(10.55)
CitiCorp
89.35***
184.93***
28.46***
-40.2***
55.37***
95.58***
(6.44)
(11.58)
(5.84)
(-6.86)
(8.11)
(12.63)
JP Morgan
-18.88
325.55*
111.43**
-154.60***
189.83***
344.4343***
Chase & Co.
(0.09)
(1.35)
(2.25)
(-2.87)
(3.11)
(5.12)
th
(1) The difference between the mean NASV VaR and the 99 percentile of the data assuming normality.
(2) H0: the absolute mean of NASV VaR minus the absolute 99th percentile equals zero.
(3) The difference between the mean NASVJ VaR and the 99th percentile of the data assuming normality.
(4) H0: the absolute mean of NASVJ VaR minus the absolute 99th percentile equals zero.
(5) Absolute mean of NASV VaR minus absolute mean of SV-VaR.
(6) H0: absolute mean difference equals zero.
(7) Absolute mean of NASV VaR minus absolute mean of SVJ VaR.
(8) Absolute mean of NASVJ VaR minus absolute mean of SVJ VaR.
(9) Absolute mean of NASVJ VaR minus absolute mean of NASV VaR.
(10) *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.
Bank
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two columns the mean of NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR estimates are compared with the
means of SV-VaR and SVJ VaR estimates respectively. As mentioned before positive
values imply that the absolute means of NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR estimates are
higher than the absolute means of SV-VaR and SVJ VaR estimates respectively. Easily,
we can see that the means of NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR exceed significantly the
means of SV-VaR and SVJ VaR respectively in all banks included in the sample. Those
results are undoubtedly emphasizes the role of the non-affine structure of stochastic
volatility in improving VaR results.
Columns 4 and 6 in the table compare the effect of non-affine structure of
stochastic volatility with the jump component. The non-affine structure of volatility and
the assumed jump diffusion of trading revenues both improve the estimate of VaR
measures. Although those two components have the same effect on VaR, the source of
increment to VaR is different under each of those components. Non-affine stochastic
volatility increases VaR because it gives higher estimate of volatility that affects VaR
positively. The jump diffusion affects VaR estimate on the other hand, by contributing to
the tail thickness of the distribution, which is the core idea of VaR estimates.
Table 5-11 shows that the jump diffusion assumption contributes more in
increasing VaR estimates. Column 4 shows in all cases that the absolute mean of NASV
VaR is significantly less that the absolute mean of SVJ VaR. On the other hand, column 6
indicates that the absolute mean of the NASVJ VaR is significantly higher than the
absolute mean of the NASV VaR. This means that VaR models that include jump
structures have significantly higher mean than VaR models that include the non-affine
structure. However, we need to be careful here, not to conclude that jump diffusion
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contributes to (distribution’s tail thickness) and hence VaR more than what stochastic
volatility (the other distribution’s tail thickness source) contributes. The conclusion here
is that the jump as a tail thickness source contributes to VaR estimates more than the nonaffine structure which is volatility increasing source (rather than a tail thickness source).
Table 5-12 below explores the effect of the non-affine stochastic structure through
changes in the violation sizes. The table provides the number of violations, the mean size
of violations and the difference in the mean size of violations between the NASV VaR
and NASVJ VaR in one side and the SV-VaR and the SVJ VaR in the other side.
As mentioned above, under the NASV VaR, SVJ VaR, and NASVJ VaR, Bank of
America and Bankers Trust witness two violations in each bank. In addition to those two
banks, JP Morgan Chase (excluded from table 5-12) witnesses one violation under SVVaR which directly give the sense that NASV VaR perform better than SV-VaR in
binding banks’ losses.
The first issue that we see from table 5-12 is that the mean violation under
the NASVJ VaR is less than the mean violations under the NASV VaR. This means that
jumps improve VaR estimates better than the non-affine structure. However, as the last
column in the table shows, those differences in violations’ mean are statistically
insignificant.
On the other hand, we can see that the inclusion of the non-affine structure
to the stochastic volatility reduces the mean size of violations in the NASV VaR and
NASVJ VaR compared with the SV-VaR and SVJ-VaR, only numerically. If we check
for how significant those difference in the mean of violations under those different VaR
models, we find that non-of those differences is significant. The same is applicable to the
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Table (5-12)
NASV VaR and NASVJ Violation Statistics Compared with SV-VaR and SVJ VaR, for The Banks that Have Violations under
the NASV and NASVJ VaRs, (Means of Violations in Absolute Value)
No. of
No. of
NASVJ
NASV
NASV
NASVJ
NASVJ
NASV
Bank
Violation
Violation
VaR
Violation Violation Violation
Violation
VaR
s in
s in
Minus
Minus
Minus
Minus
Mean(1)
Mean(3)
NASV
Size of
NASVJ
Size of
SVSVJ
SVJNASV
VaR
Violations
VaR
Violations
VaR(5)
VaR(7)
VaR(9)
VaR(11)
(test(test(test-stat) (test-stat)
(test-stat)
(test-stat) (12)
(6)
(8)
(10)
stat)(2)
stat)(4)
Bank of
2
263.94
2
213.60***
-18.34
18.71
-31.63
-50.34
America
***
(2.35)
(-0.10)
(0.10)
(-0.17)
(-0.28)
(2.86)
Bankers
2
164.55
2
140.38***
-25.40
15.23
-8.93
-24.17
Trust
***
(7.44)
(-0.63)
(0.39)
(-0.24)
(-0.62)
(8.17)
(1) The absolute mean of NASV VaR violations.
(2) H0: The absolute Mean NASV VaR =0.
(3) The absolute mean of NASVJ VaR violations.
(4) H0: The absolute Mean NASVJ VaR =0.
(5) Absolute mean NASV VaR minus absolute mean of SV-VaR.
(6) H0: The difference between the mean absolute NASV VaR and the mean absolute SV-VaR is zero.
(7) Absolute mean NASV VaR minus absolute mean of SVJ VaR.
(8) H0: The difference between the mean absolute NASV VaR and the absolute mean SVJ VaR is zero.
(9) Absolute mean NASVJ VaR minus absolute value of SVJ VaR.
(10) H0: The difference between the mean absolute NASVJ VaR and the absolute mean SVJ VaR is zero.
(11) Absolute mean NASVJ VaR minus absolute mean of NASV.
(12) H0: The difference between the mean absolute NASVJ VaR and the absolute mean NASV VaR is zero.
(13) *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5% and * is significant at 10%.

160

comparisons of jump component and non-affine structure that shows that mean
violations are less under VaR models that include jumps. However, as mentioned before,
those differences are statistically insignificant.
Comparing the maximum violations under the NASV VaR and NASVJ VaR
models with the SV VaR and SVJ VaR models respectively should give clearer picture.
In case of Bank of America, the maximum violation under NASV VaR decreases by
$18.0 millions compared with SV VaR, and increases by $18. 8 millions compared with
SVJ VaR. The same direction of changing in the maximum violation appears in Bankers
Trust, where the maximum violation decreases under the NASV VaR by $26.1 compared
with the SV-VaR and increases by $18.1 millions compared with the SVJ VaR.
The maximum violation under the NASVJ VaR in Bank of America decreases by
$34.1 millions compared with the maximum violation under the SVJ VaR, but it
decreases by almost $53 millions compared with the NASV VaR. The same trend in
changing maximum VaR violation is noticed in Bankers Trust, where the maximum
violation under NASVJ VaR decreases by $8.6 millions compared with the SVJ VaR and
by more than triple of this amount, under the NASV VaR.
All of the above results in this section indicate that the inclusion of the non-affine
structure to the volatility improves VaR estimates compared with the affine square root
structure of volatility. But the inclusion of jump diffusion has more significant impact on
VaR estimation, since jumps affect directly tail thickness of the distribution and hence
VaR estimate, whereas the non-affine structure affects volatility magnitude which also
affect VaR positively.
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5.3. Conclusion
The empirical investigation and estimation of the proposed VaR models on this
dissertation through applying it to the data sample yields the following conclusions:
1- As Assumed, the stochastic volatility and jump models, as two sources of tail
thickness of the distribution, could produce higher estimates for VaR. VaR
estimates under the stochastic volatility and jump diffusion model appear to
be significantly higher than the GBM VaR estimate (the plain vanilla VaR
model) almost in all cases.
2- The inclusion of both stochastic volatility and jumps in VaR estimate could
improve the estimate of VaR compared with the VaR models that include the
stochastic volatility alone or the jump diffusion alone. This could be a way to
prove that stochastic volatility and jumps are tail thickness sources in financial
data as many theoretical and empirical studies show.
3- The results of comparisons of SV-VaR model and JD VaR model give some
how mixed results. In some cases the SV-VaR estimates appeared to be
higher, in other cases, JD VaR estimates to be higher. The general impression
might be that the SV gives higher VaR estimates compared with jump
diffusion models. However, this conclusion can not be distinctive because
volatility varying it self could produce higher levels of volatility and hence
higher VaR estimate.
4- Non–affine component of stochastic volatility seems also to improve VaR
estimates. This is because of the faster updating of volatility that might
produce higher volatility levels and hence higher VaR estimates. In spite the
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fact that the non-affine structure improves VaR estimates, it has contributes
less compared with jumps that affect the tail thickness rather than volatility as
in the case of the non-affine structure. Researches should explore more the
non-affine structure of stochastic volatility in finance literature. The nonaffine structure appears to be very suitable in modeling volatility during
collapses and crashes where volatility updates vary fast. Thus I think that
finance people should focus of such volatility models.
5- VaR models developed in this dissertation could produce VaR estimate closer
to the actual unexpected trading revenues of the banks in the sample. The
number of violations and the sizes of violation decreased significantly under
the proposed VaR models, which means that the proposed VaR models could
bind the actual bank losses better than the banks’ VaR in some cases.
Generally speaking that NASVJ VaR produced the highest VaR estimates
among all the proposed models, and of course the GBM VaR produces the
lowest. The second highest VaR estimate comes with the association of
stochastic volatility with jumps, the NASV VaR model produces roughly the
third highest VaR estimate.
6- All the developed VaR models fail to bind the losses for two banks, Bank of
America and Bankers Trust during the late 1997 and 1998, in spite that the
sizes of violations decrease noticeably under the proposed models.
7- Some banks appear to have very low and conservative VaR estimates that is
even less that the GBM VaR, others have relatively higher VaR estimates that
exceeds the estimates of all proposed models. The banks with conservative
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VaR estimates witnesses more frequent violation (losses went beyond VaR)
during the analysis period. On the other hand Banks with high VaR estimates
do not suffer any violations of its models during the analysis period.

164

REFERENCES
Ahn, C., and H. Thompson, (1988), “ Jump-Diffusion and Term Structure of
Interest Rates,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, 155-174.
Airoldi M., (2001), “ Correlation Structure and Fat Tails in Finance: a New
Mechanism,” Risk Management & Research, Intesa-Bci Bank, Milan,
Italy.
Bakshi, G., C. Cao and Z. Chen, (1997), “ Empirical Performance of alternative
Option Pricing Models,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 2003-2049.
Bates, D., (1996 a), “ Jumps and Stochastic Volatility: Exchange Rate Processes
Implicit in Deutsche Mark Options,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 9,
69-107.
Bates, D., (1996 b), “ Dollar Jump Fear, 1984-1992: Distributional Abnormalities
Implicit in Currency Futures Options,” Journal of International Money
and Finance, Vol. 15, 65-93.
Beder, T., (1995), “Seductive But Dangerous,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol.
51, 12-24.
Berkowitz, J., and J. O’Brien, (2002), “How Accurate Value-at Risk Models at
Commercial Banks,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, 1093-1111.
Black, F., (1976), “Studies of Stock Price Volatility Changes,” in Proceedings of
1976 Meetings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section,
American Statistical Association, 177-181.
Bohman, H., (1961), “Approximate Fourier Analysis of Distribution Functions,”
Arkiv for Mathematik, Vol., 99-157.
Bohman, H., (1970), “A Method to Calculate the Distribution Function When the
Characteristic Function is Known,” BIT, Vol. 10, 237-242.
Bohman, H., (1972), “From Characteristic Function to Distribution Function via
Fourier Inversion,” BIT, Vol. 12, 279-283.

165

Bohman, H., (1975), “Numerical Inversion of Characteristic Functions,”
Scandinavian Actuarial Analysis, 121-124.
Bohman, H., (1980), “Numerical Fourier Inversion,” in Computational
Probability, ed. P. M. Kahn, New York Academic Press.
Bollerslev, T, (1987), “ A Conditionally Heteroskedastic Time Series Model for
Speculative Prices and Rates of Return,” Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 69, 542-547.
Boudoukh, J, M. Richardson, and R. Whitelaw, (1998), “The Best of Both
Worlds: A Hybrid Approach to Calculating Value at Risk,” Working
Paper.
Bradley, B, and M. Taqqu, (2002), “ Financial Risk and Heavy Tails,” Heavy
Tails in Finance, Svetlozar T. Rachev, editor, North Holland.
Butler, J., and B. Schachter, (1996), “Improving Value at Risk Estimates By
Combining Kernel Estimation with Historical Simulation,” Office of the
Comptroller of Currency, Economic & Policy Analysis, Working Paper.
Butler, J., and B. Schachter, (1998), “Estimating Value at Risk with A Precision
Measure By Combining Kernel Estimation With Historical Simulation,”
Review of Derivatives Research Vol. 2, 371-390.
Cardenas, J, E. Fruchard, E. Koehler and C. Michel, (1997), “VaR: One Step
Beyond,” Risk, Vol. 10, 72-75.
Cardenas, J. E. Fruchard, J-F. Ficron, C. Ryes, K. Walter and W. Yang, (1999),
“Monte Carlo within a Day: Calculating Intra-Day One Step Beyond,”
Risk, Vol. 12, 55-60.
Chacko, G., and S., Das, (2002), “Pricing Interest Rate Derivatives: A General
Approach,” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol.15, 195-241.
Chacko, G., and L. Viceira, (2001), “Spectral GMM Estimation of Continuous
Time Process,” Journal of Econometrics, forthcoming 2003.
Chacko, G., and L. Viceira, (2002), “Dynamic Consumption and Portfolio Choice
with Stochastic Volatility in Incomplete Markets,” Working Paper,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.

166

Chenov,M., A. Gallant, E. Ghysels and G. Tauchen, (1999), “A New Class of
Stochastic Volatility Models with Jumps: Theory and Estimation,”
Working Paper, The Pennsylvania State University.
Chourdakis, K., (2000), “Stochastic Volatility and Jumps Driven by Continuous
Time Markov Chains,” Working Paper, Department of Economics,
Queen Mary, University of London, WP No. 430.
Crouhy, M., D. Galai and R. Mark, (2001), “Risk Management,” McGraw-Hill.
Das, S., and R. Sundaram, (1999), “Of Simle and Smirks: A Term Structure
Perspective,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.34,
211-239.
Davies, R., (1973), “Numerical Inversion of A Characteristic Function,”
Biometrica, Vol. 60, 415-417.
Dowd, K.,(1998), “ Beyond Value at Risk: The New Science of Risk
Management,” John Wiley & Sons.
Duffie, D., (1988), “Security Market Stochastic Models,” Academic Press Inc.,
Boston.
Duffie, D., (2001), “Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory,” Fourth Edition, Princeton
University Press.
Duffie, D., D. Filipovic and W. Schachermayer, (2001), “Affine Processes and
Applications in Finance,'' Working Paper, Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University.
Duffie, D. and J. Pan, (1997), “An Overview of Value at Risk,” The Journal of
Derivatives, Vol. 4, 7-49.
Duffie, D. and J. Pan, (1997), “ Analytical Value at Risk with Jumps and Credit
Risk,” Finance and Stochastic, Vol. 5, 155-180.
Duffie, D., J. Pan and K. Singleton, (2000), “Transform Analysis and Asset
Pricing for Affine Jump-Diffusions,” Econometrica, Vol. 68, 1343-1376.
Dynkin, E., (1965), “Markov Processes,” Two Volumes, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Eberlein, E., J. Kallsen and J. Kristen, (2001), “Risk Management Based on
Stochastic Volatility,” Working Paper.

167

El-Jahel,L. W. Perraudin, and P. Sellin, (1999), “ Value at Risk for Derivatives,”
Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 6, 7-26.
Embrechts, P., (2002), “Extremes in Economics and The Economics of the
Extremes” Working Paper.
Embrechts, P., C. Kluppelberg and T. Mikosch, (1997), “ Modeling Extremal
Events for Insurance and Finance,” Springer.
Engle, R., (1982), “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates
of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation,” Econometrica, Vol. 50,
987-1007.
Epps, T., (1993), “Characteristic Functions and Their Empirical Counterparts:
Geometrical Interpretation and Application to Statistical Inference,”
American Statistician, Vol.47, 33-38.
Fallon, W., (1996), “Calculating Value-at-Risk,” Wharton School Financial
Institutions Center Working Paper.
Fabozzi, F., (2000), “ Bonds Market, Analysis and Strategies,” Forth Edition,
Prentice Hall.
Fong, G., and O. Vasicek, (1997), “Multidimensional Framework for Risk
Analysis,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 53, 51-58.
Frye, J., (1997), “ Principles of Risk: Finding Value at Risk Through FactorBased Interest Rate Scenarios,” In Grayling, S., Editor VaR:
Understanding and Applying Value at Risk, London: Risk, 275-287.
Gencay, R., F. Selcuk, and A. Ulugulyagci, (2001), “ High Volatility, Thick Tails
and Extreme Value Theory in Value-at-Risk Estimation” Working Paper.
Gibson, M., (2001), “ Incorporating Event Risk into Value at Risk,” Working
Paper.
Gibson, M., and M. Pritsker, (2000), Improving Grid-Based Methods for
Estimating Value at Risk of Fixed Income Portfolios,” Federal Reserve
Board Finance and Economic Discussion Series 2000-25
Gihman, I., and A. Skorohod, (1972), “Stochastic Differential Equations,”
Springer-Verlag, New York.

168

Golub, B., and L. Tilman, (2000), “Risk Management: Approaches for Fixed
Income Markets,” John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Hendricks, D., (1996), “Evaluation Value-at-Risk Models Using Historical Data,”
Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Vol. 2,
39-70.
Heston, S., (1993), “A Closed Form Solution for Options with Stochastic
Volatility with Application to Bond and Currency Options,” The Review
of Financial Studies, Vol.6, 327-344.
Hsieh, D., (1989), “Testing for Nonlinearity in Daily Exchange Rate Changes,”
Journal of Business, Vol. 62, 339-368.
Hsieh, D., (1991), “Chaos and Nonlinear Dynamics: Application to Financial
Markets,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, 1839-1877.
Hsieh, D., (1993), “Implications of Nonlinear Dynamics for Financial Risk
Management,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28,
41-64.
Hull, J., (2002), “ Options, Futures, & Other Derivatives,” Fifth Edition, Prentice
Hall.
Hull, J. and A. White, (1998a), “Value at Risk When Daily Changes in Market
Variables are not Normally Distributed” Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 6,
9-19.
Hull, J. and A. White, (1998b), “ Incorporating Volatility Updating into the
historical Simulations Method for Value at Risk” Journal of Risk, Vol. 1,
5-19.
Imhof, J., (1961), “Computing the Distribution of Quadratic Form in Normal
Variables,” Biometrika,” Vol. 48, 419-426.
Ingersoll, J., (1987), “Theory of Financial Decision Making,” Studies in Financial
Economics, Rowman and Littlefield
Jackson, P., D. Maude and W. Perraudin, (1997), “Bank Capital and Value at
Risk,” Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 4, 73-90.
Jamshidian F. and Y. Zhu, (1996),“Scenario Simulation model for Risk
Management,” Capital Market Strategies Vol. 12, 26-30.

169

Jamshidian F. and Y. Zhu, (1997), “ Scenario Simulation: Theory and
Methodology,” Finance and Stochastic, Vol.1, 43-67.
Jiang G., and J. Knight, (2000), “ Efficient Estimation of the Continuous Time
Stochastic Volatility Model Via the Empirical Characteristic Function,”
Unpublished Paper, University of Western Ontario.
Jiang G., and J. Knight, (2000), “Estimation of the Continuous Time processes
Via the Empirical Characteristic Function,” Journal of Business and
Statistics, Vol. 20, 198-212.
Jorion, P., (2001), “ Value at Risk” 2nd edition McGraw-Hill.
Jorion, P., (2002), “How informative are Value-at-Risk Disclosures?” Accounting
Review, Vol. 77, 911-932.
JP Morgan, (1995), RiskMetricsMT, Third Edition, JP Morgan.
Kevorkian, J., and J. Cole, (1981), “Perturbation Methods in Applied
Mathematics,” Springer-Verlag, New York.
Khindanova, I., and S. Rachev, (2000), “ Value at Risk: Recent Advances,”
Working Paper.
Khindanova, I., S. Rachev, and E. Schwartz, (2001), “Stable Modeling of Value at
Risk,” Working Paper.
Knight, J., and J. Yu, (2002), “ Empirical Characteristic Function in Time Series
Estimation,” Econometric Theory, Vol. 18, 691-721.
Knight, J., S. Satchel and J. Yu, (2002). “ Estimation of the Stochastic Volatility
Model by the Empirical Characteristic Function Method,” Australian
Statistical Publishing Association, 319-335.
Kupiec, P. (1995), “Techniques for Verifying the Accuracy of Risk Measurement
Models,” The Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 3, 73-84
Kushner, H., (1967), “Stochastic Stability and Control,” Mathematics in Science
and Engineering, Vol. 33, Academic Press, New York.
Lauprete, G. (2001), “ Portfolio Risk Minimization under Departures from
Normality” Ph.D. Thesis, MIT, September.

170

Lawrence, C., and G. Robinson, (1995), “How Save is RiskMetrics?” Risk, Vol.
8, 26-29.
LeBaron, B., (1989), “ The Changing Structure of Stock Returns,” Working
Paper, University of Wisconsin.
Levin, A. and A. Tchernitser, (2001), “ Multifactor Stochastic Variance Models in
Risk Management: Maximum Entropy Approach and Levy Processes,”
Working Paper, Bank of Montreal, Toronto.
Lewis, A, (2000), “Option Valuation under Stochastic Volatility with
Mathematica Code,” Finance Press.
Lewis, A, (2001), “A Simple Option Formula for General-Jump Diffusion and
Other Exponential Levy Processes,” Working Paper, Envision Financial
System and OptionCity.net
Lewis, A, (2002), “ Mixing Approach to Stochastic Volatility and Jumps
Models,” Working Paper.
Li, D., (1999), “Value at Risk Based on Volatility, Skewness and Kurtosis”
Working Paper, RiskMetrics Group.
Linsmeier, T., and N. Pearson, (1997), “Quantitative Disclosure of Market Risk in
the SEC Release, Commentary,” Accounting Horizon. Vol. 11, 107-135.
Linsmeier, T., and N. Pearson, (1999), “Risk Measurement: An Introduction to
Value at Risk,” Working Paper, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign.
Liu, J., (2001), “Portfolio Selection in Stochastic Environments,” Working Paper,
UCLA.
Marshall, C. and M. Siegel, (1997), “Value at Risk: Implementing A Risk
Management Standard,” Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 4, 91-110.
Merton, R., (1971), “Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous
Time Model,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, 373-413.
Merton, R., (1976), “Option Pricing when Underlying Stock Returns are
Discontinuous,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3, pp. 125-144.

171

Merton, R., (1980), “On Estimating the Expected Return on the Market: An
Exploratory Investigation,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 8, 32361.
Owen, A. and D. Tavella, (1997), “Scrambled Nets for Value at Risk
Calculations,” in Grayling S. Editor, VaR: Understanding and Applying
Value at Risk, London: Risk 289-297.
Paskov, S and J. Traub, (1995), “Faster Valuation of Financial Derivatives,”
Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 22, 113-120.
Pollock, D., (2000), “A Handbook of Time-Series Analysis, Signal Processing
and Dynamics (Signal Processing and Its Applications Series),”
Academic Press.
Pritsker, M., (1996), “Evaluating Value at Risk Methodologies: Accuracy Versus
Computational Time,” Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working
Papers series.
Rachev, S., E. Schwartz, and I. Khindanova (2002), “Stable Modeling of Market
and Credit Value at Risk,” Working Paper.
Rachev, S., and S. Mittnik, (2000), “Stable Paretian Models in Finance,” Wiley
and Sons, Inc., Series in Financial Economics and Quantitative Analysis.
Rose, C., and M. Smith, (2002), “Mathematical Statistics with Mathematica,”
Springer Texts in Statistics, Springer, New York
Rouvinz C., (1997)” Going Greek with VaR” Risk, Vol. 10, 57-65.
Saunders, A., (1999), “ Credit Risk Measurement: New Approaches to Value at
Risk and Other Paradigms,” John Wiley and Sons Inc.
Scheinkman, J, and B. LeBaron, (1989), “ Nonlinear Dynamics in Stock Returns,”
Journal of Business, Vol. 62, 311-337.
Schobel, R., and J. Zhu, (1999), “Stochastic Volatility with An OrnsteinUhlenbeck Process: An Extension,” European Finance Review, Vol. 3,
23-46.
Schorr, B., (1975), “ Numerical Inversion of A Class of Characteristic Functions,”
BIT, Vol. 15, 94 -102.

172

Scott, O., (1997), “ Pricing Stock Options in A Jump-Diffusion Model with
Stochastic Volatility and Interest Rates: Application of Fourier Inversion
Methods,” Mathematical Finance, Vol. 7, 413-426.
Shephard, N., (1991), “From Characteristic Function to Distribution Function: A
Simple Framework for the Theory,” Econometric Theory, Vol. 7, 519529.
Singleton, K., (2001), “ Estimation of Affine Asset Pricing Models Using The
Empirical Characteristic Function,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 102,
111-141.
Stien E., and Stein J., (1991), “ Stock Price Distribution with Stochastic
Volatility: An Analytic Approach,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 4,
727-752.
Stuart, A., and J. Ord, (1994), “Kendall’s Advanced Theory of Statistics, Volume
1, Distribution Theory, Fifth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Venkataraman, S., (1997), “Value at Risk for A Mixture of Normal Distributions:
The Use of Quasi-Bayesian Estimation Techniques,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 2-13.
Waller, L, (1995), “Does the Characteristic Function Numerically Distinguish
Distributions?” The American Statistician, Vol. 49, 150-152.
Waller, L., B. Turnbull and M. Hardin, (1995), “Obtaining Distribution Functions
by Numerical Inversion of Characteristic Functions with Applications,”
The American Statistician, Vol. 49, 346-350.
Wiener, Z., (1997), “ Introduction to VaR (Value-at-Risk)” Risk Management
and Regulation in Banking, Working Paper, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
Wilson, T., (1996), “Calculating Risk Capital,” In The Handbook of Risk
Management and Analysis, ed. C. Alexander: 193-232. Chichester: John
Wiley and Sons.
Yu, J., (1999), “Estimation of A Self-Exciting Poisson Jump Diffusion Model by
The Empirical Characteristic Function Method,” Working Paper,
Department of Economics University of Auckland.
Zangari, P., (1996a), “A VaR Methodology for Portfolios That Include Options,”
RiskMetricsTM Monitor, First Quarter, pp.4 -12.

173

Zangari, P., (1996b), “How Accurate the Delta-Gamma Methodology?”
RiskMetricsTM Monitor, Third Quarter, pp. 12-29.
Zangari, P., (1996c), “An Improved Methodology for Measuring VaR,”
RiskMetricsTM Monitor, Second Quarter, pp.7 - 25.
Zangari, P., (1996d), “A Value-at-Risk Analysis of Currency Exposures,”
RiskMetricsTM Monitor, Second Quarter, pp.26 - 33.
Zangari, P., (1996e), “When Is Non-Normality Problem? The Case of 15 Time
Series from Emerging Markets,” RiskMetricsTM Monitor, Fourth Quarter,
pp.7 - 25.

174

APPENDIXES
Parameter Estimate of the Processes
Table (A-1)
Parameter Estimate for GBM Model*
dPt
= µdt + vt dWP ,t
P
Obs.
µ
No.
(S. E)
Bank of America
94:Q1-02:Q3
-0.093
35
(0.096)
Bank of New York
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.030
35
(0.044)
Bankers Trust
94,Q1-02,Q1
0.119
33
(0.103)
Bank One/First
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.422
Chicago
35
(0.641)
CitiCorp
94:Q1-02:Q3
1.083
35
(0.848)
JP Morgan Chase
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.743
35
(1.006)
* Estimate parameters numbers are multiplied by 1000.

Bank

v
(S. E)
4.397
(2.462)
0.063
(0.048)
2.927
(2.722)
2.653
(0.966)
2.256
(2.033)
6.726
(3.328)
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Table (A-2)
Parameter Estimate for Stochastic Volatility Model*
dPt
= µdt + vt dWP ,t
P
dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σ vt dWv ,t
Corr (dWP ,t , dWv ,t ) = ρ
Obs.
µ
σ
θ
κ
No.
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
Bank of America
94:Q1-02:Q3
-0.071
4.757
0.067
0.277
35
(0.041)
(3.661)
(0.116)
(0.198)
Bank of New York
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.052
1.199
0.031
0.135
35
(0.022)
(0.865)
(0.062)
(0.287)
Bankers Trust
94,Q1-02,Q1
0.131
3.227
0.011
0.136
33
(0.018)
(2.143)
(0.006)
(0.251)
Bank One/First
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.575
2.258
0.020
0.217
Chicago
35
(0.284)
(1.061)
(0.012)
(0.189)
CitiCorp
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.972
4.127
0.051
0.566
35
(0.664)
(4.054)
(0.053)
(0.611)
JP Morgan Chase
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.883
9.935
0.184
0.693
35
(0.755)
(5.217)
(0.058)
(0.469)
* Estimate parameters numbers are multiplied by 1000 except for the correlation coefficient ρ.
Bank

ρ
(S. E)
-0.678
(0.031)
-0.433
(0.389)
-0.586
(0.198)
0.201
(0.236)
-0.489
(0.277)
0.266
(0.432)
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Table (A-3)
Parameter Estimate for Jump-Diffusion Model*
dPt
= µdt + σdWP ,t + [exp( J u ) − 1]dN u (λu ) − [exp( J d ) − 1]dN d (λd )
Pt
Bank
Obs.
µ
σ
No.
(S. E)
(S. E)
Bank of America
94:Q1-02:Q3
-0.089
4.397
35
(0.058)
(2.462)
Bank of New York
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.028
0.063
35
(0.026)
(0.048)
Bankers Trust
94,Q1-02,Q1
0.114
2.927
33
(0.094)
(2.722)
Bank One/First
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.399
2.653
Chicago
35
(0.422)
(0.966)
CitiCorp
94:Q1-02:Q3
1.001
2.256
35
(0.766)
(2.033)
JP Morgan Chase
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.684
6.726
35
(0.953)
(4.428)
* Estimate parameters numbers are multiplied by 1000.

ηu

(S. E)
0.008
(0.013)
0.012
(0.009)
0.024
(0.016)
0.031
(0.029)
0.017
(0.019)
0.048
(0.011)

λu

(S. E)
1.231
(1.385)
0.882
(0.241)
0.632
(0.915)
0.446
(1.125)
0.523
(0.213)
0.961
(0.807)

ηd

(S. E)
0.041
(0.016)
0.074
(0.058)
0.088
(0.060)
0.053
(0.044)
0.080
(0.076)
0.082
(0.107)

λd

(S. E)
2.016
(0.953)
1.284
(0.691)
0.944
(0.830)
1.373
(1.521)
2.026
(3.115)
1.363
(2.171)
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Table (A-4)
Parameter Estimate for Stochastic Volatility, Jump-Diffusion Model*
dPt
= µdt + vt dWP ,t + [exp( J u ) − 1]dN u (λu ) − [exp( J d ) − 1]dN d (λd )
Pt
dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σ vt dWv ,t

κ
θ
σ
ρ
µ
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
Bank of
-0.112
0.213
0.061
4.625
-0.241
America
(0.096)
(0.209)
(0.108)
(4.326)
(0.017)
Bank of New
0.064
0.213
0.024
1.031
-0.131
York
(0.059)
(0.215)
(0.058)
(0.847)
(0.243)
Bankers
0.162
0.331
0.020
2.773
-0.201
Trust
(0.133)
(0.624)
(0.018)
(2.554)
(0.137)
Bank One
0.690
0.219
0.012
3.055
0.009
(0.333)
(0.128)
(0.027)
(2.136)
(0.012)
CitiCorp
0.948
0.486
0.048
4.008
-0.163
(0.739)
(0.441)
(0.055)
(4.106)
(0.236)
JP Morgan
0.944
0.681
0.167
7.328
0.113
Chase
(0.962)
(0.545)
(0.096)
(4.619)
(0.362)
* Estimate parameters numbers are multiplied by 1000 except for ρ.

Bank

ηu
(S. E)
0.010
(0.004)
0.011
(0.013)
0.026
(0.014)
0.038
(0.211)
0.019
(0.027)
0.054
(0.023)

λu
(S. E)
1.046
(1.247)
0.625
(0.323)
0.547
(0.857)
1.224
(1.264)
0.511
(0.384)
0.755
(0.821)

ηd
(S. E)
0.040
(0.017)
0.055
(0.141)
0.076
(0.058)
0.044
(0.056)
0.065
(0.153)
0.096
(0.367)

λd
(S. E)
2.008
(1.628)
1.310
(0.991)
0.874
(0.602)
1.879
(1.488)
2.166
(3.045)
1.328
(2.112)
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Table (A-5)
Parameter Estimate for Non-affine Stochastic Volatility Model*
dPt
= µdt + vt dWP ,t
P
γ

dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σvt2 dWv ,t
Corr (dWP ,t , dWv ,t ) = ρ
Obs.
µ
κ
θ
No.
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
Bank of America
94:Q1-02:Q3
-0.073
0.258
0.061
35
(0.054)
(0.164)
(0.135)
Bank of New York
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.048
0.104
0.022
35
(0.020)
(0.221)
(0.056)
Bankers Trust
94,Q1-02,Q1
0.127
0.122
0.005
33
(0.011)
(0.230)
(0.002)
Bank One/First Chicago
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.516
0.187
0.016
35
(0.291)
(0.111)
(0.011)
CitiCorp
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.899
0.511
0.049
35
(0.618)
(0.586)
(0.050)
JP Morgan Chase
94:Q1-02:Q3
0.857
0.644
0.167
35
(0.671)
(0.407)
(0.066)
* Estimate parameters numbers are multiplied by 1000 except for γ and ρ.

Bank

σ
(S. E)
3.696
(2.931)
1.125
(0.743)
2.883
(1.938)
2.161
(0.967)
3.814
(3.610)
9.278
(6.681)

γ
(S.E)
1.128
(0.489)
1.101
(0.662)
2.370
(2.602)
1.991
(0.438)
1.583
(1.714)
1.335
(0.932)

ρ
(S. E)
-0.531
(0.631)
-0.504
(0.326)
-0.311
(0.166)
0.124
(0.212)
-0.367
(0.463)
0.217
(0.292)
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Table (A-6)
Parameter Estimate for Non-affine Stochastic Volatility, Jump-Diffusion Model*
dPt
= µdt + vt dWP ,t + [exp( J u ) − 1]dN u (λu ) − [exp( J d ) − 1]dN d (λd )
Pt
γ
2
t

dvt = κ (θ − vt )dt + σv dWv ,t
µ
κ
θ
σ
ρ
γ
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S. E)
(S.E)
Bank of
-0.136
0.256
0.060
4.414
-0.451
1.116
America
(0.110)
(0.241)
(0.041)
(4.228)
(0.026)
(1.454)
Bank of New
0.098
0.300
0.027
1.102
-0.201
1.646
York
(0.072)
(0.143)
(0.050)
(0.832)
(0.252)
(2.088)
Bankers Trust
0.221
0.414
0.023
2.728
-0.338
1.626
(0.151)
(0.802)
(0.020)
(2.623)
(0.325)
(1.021)
Bank One/First 0.711
0.288
0.017
3.221
0.014
1.868
Chicago
(0.328)
(0.155)
(0.024)
(2.432)
(0.018)
(0.324)
CitiCorp
0.955
0.499
0.042
4.057
-0.231
1.479
(0.689)
(0.442)
(0.054)
(4.326)
(0.182)
(2.700)
JP Morgan
0.858
0.573
0.18
6.581
0.116
1.311
Chase
(0.822)
(0.474)
(0.091)
(4.588)
(0.069)
(1.698)
* Estimate parameters numbers are multiplied by 1000 except for γ and ρ.

Bank

ηu

(S. E)
0.017
(0.108)
0.016
(0.064)
0.023
(0.113)
0.029
(0.109)
0.034
(0.025)
0.041
(0.022)

λu

(S. E)
1.112
(1.004)
0.852
(0.428)
0.544
(0.818)
1.381
(1.098)
0.771
(0.828)
0.722
(0.686)

ηd

(S. E)
0.039
(0.018)
0.031
(0.019)
0.069
(0.065)
0.071
(0.039)
0.045
(0.043)
0.073
(0.047)

λd

(S. E)
2.354
(1.929)
1.564
(1.352)
0.885
(0.618)
1.924
(1.631)
1.968
(2.102)
1.753
(2.277)
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